At the coronation of the Czar, Korea was represented by an influential, pro-Russian member of the Min family. It was then rumored that he concluded with the Russian Government a secret agreement by which Korea undertook to employ Russian military instructors and financial councilors. However that may be, the Russian Representatives at Seul are said to have since appealed more than once to the “secret agreement” in their attempts to force the engagement of Russian service upon the Korean Government.[[510]] If these reports were true, no better proof of the light estimate with which Russia from the first regarded the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol could be found than her alleged agreement with Min Yong-hwan, for the latter was a direct reversal of the first two Articles of the former. Russia may be credited with having succeeded, by her separate and mutually contradictory arrangements with Min, Yamagata, and Li Hung-chang,[[511]] in simultaneously bringing the three Eastern Powers to terms.
Whatever the truth of the reported Russo-Korean Agreement, Russia did no sooner sign her Japanese Protocol of June 9, than she began to violate its terms. In the same month, it was resolved that Korean troops should henceforth be instructed under the Russian system of military education, and accordingly, in October, three army officers, a medical officer, and ten soldiers from Russia arrived at Seul. In April, 1897, M. Waeber was urging upon the Seul Government the employment of 160 officers and soldiers, and, despite the reluctance of Korea and inquiries from Japan, three Russian officers and ten soldiers entered the capital in July, whose service for three years was finally, on September 6, imposed upon the Korean Government by M. A. de Speyer, the new Russian Minister. Thus the royal guard and five battalions of the Korean infantry, numbering about 3000, came under Russian instruction.[[512]] A month later, M. Speyer requested that the control of all the receipts from the taxes and customs be placed in the hands of one M. Kir Alexieff. At that time, however, a British subject, Mr. MacLeavy Brown, had not served his term as Financial Adviser and General Director of Customs of Korea. Failing the assent of the Finance Department, M. Speyer pressed upon the Foreign Department, which yielded at last. The British Consul, Mr. Jordan, protested in vain, for, on October 26, the Korean King issued an edict releasing Mr. Brown from his duties. A Russo-Korean Bank was soon organized to transact the financial and economical affairs of Korea. On December 27, seven British men-of-war visited Chemulpo, and Mr. Jordan went thither, returning to Seul accompanied by a naval officer and ten marines. Mr. Brown was consequently restored to his office, and M. Alexieff had to content himself with a subordinate position under him.[[513]]
It was a misfortune to Russia that her able representative at Seul, M. Waeber, who had been in Korea since 1884, had been transferred to Mexico, and was replaced by M. Speyer. The former diplomat’s pleasing manners were succeeded by the latter’s overbearing conduct, which appeared gradually to alienate from Russian influence many a former friend of M. Waeber. The anti-Russian sentiment grew finally so strong that a large number of intelligent Koreans organized the Korean Independence Society, whose object was declared to be to restore the military, financial, and political control of the Kingdom to the hands of the Koreans. The impatient M. Speyer was reported to have written a note to the Korean Government, on March 7, 1898, asking for a reply within twenty-four hours to the query whether Korea was really in want of the service of the Russian experts, whose position had become rather precarious. The astounded Government replied politely but firmly in the negative. Other events occurred which further evinced the arbitrary attitude of M. Speyer. With an equally astonishing decision, he ordered, on March 17, all the financial and military councilors to be recalled to Russia. The Russo-Korean Bank was also disorganized. M. Speyer himself leaving Korea in April, his post was occupied by the amiable M. Matunine.[[514]] About this time, a new Russo-Japanese Protocol was signed at Tokio between Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister to Japan, and Baron Nishi, the Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government.
It is evident that the relaxation of Russia’s diplomacy in Korea was in no small measure due to the swift movement of events, as well as her own all-engrossing activity, in China. The Nishi-Rosen Protocol of April 25, 1898, concluded as it was at this unfavorable moment for Russia, was far more in Japan’s favor than the agreements of 1896. It not only gave an explicit recognition of the independence of Korea, but also incorporated in the second Article the best principles of the previous agreement, and, in addition, fully recognized the special economic interests of Japan in the Peninsula. The entire Protocol deserves quotation:—
“Article I. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitely recognize the independence and the perfect sovereignty of Korea, and mutually engage to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country.
“Article II. Desirous of removing all possible causes of misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage, in case Korea should have recourse to the counsel and assistance of either Japan or Russia, not to take any measure regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers, without having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the subject.
“Article III. In view of the great development of the commercial and industrial enterprises of Japan in Korea, as also of the considerable number of the Japanese subjects residing in that country, the Russian Imperial Government shall not obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.”[[515]]
Each one of these three Articles should be carefully noted, for five years later, in 1903, they, together with the last Article of the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol of June 9, 1896, became a conventional ground for Japan’s direct negotiations with Russia which preceded the present war. Particular attention is called to the third Article, wherein Russia recognized for the first time the peculiar interest of the Japanese nation in the economic development of Korea.
Less artificial as the Protocol was in comparison with the former agreements, it was, however, hardly adequate as an instrument to reconcile the conflicting interests of Russia and Japan. Fresh complications could well be expected from the second Article, for it, on the other hand, barred the reformatory attempts of a Power whose interests demanded the independence and strength of Korea, and, on the other, cleared the ground for the renewed activity of another Power which had little intention to abstain from undermining the vital interests of Japan. Under these precarious circumstances was opened the second period of the Russo-Japanese relations in Korea.