“So long as it was hoped that Russia would carry out, on the one hand, the engagement that she made with China, and, on the other, the assurances she had given to other Powers, regarding the subject of the evacuation of Manchuria, the Imperial Government maintained an attitude of watchful reserve. But the recent conduct of Russia has been, at Peking, to propose new demands, and, in Manchuria, to tighten her hold upon it, until the Imperial Government is led to believe that Russia must have abandoned the intention of retiring from Manchuria. At the same time, her increased activity upon the Korean frontier is such as to raise doubts as to the limits of her ambition.
“The unconditioned and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interest of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would thereby be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China impaired. There is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese Government. That is to say, if Russia was established on the flank of Korea, it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that Empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant Power in Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan’s line of defense, and Japan consequently considers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other Powers. These interests and influence, Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, another Power.
“The Imperial Government, after the most serious consideration, have resolved to consult the Russian Government, in a spirit of conciliation and frankness, with a view to the conclusion of an understanding designed to compose questions which are at this time the cause of their anxiety. In the estimation of the Imperial Government, the moment is opportune for making the attempt to bring about the desired adjustment, and it is believed that, failing this opportunity, there would be no room for another understanding.
“The Imperial Government, reposing confidence in your judgment and discretion, have decided to place the delicate negotiations in your hands.
“It being the wish of the Imperial Government to place their present invitation to the Russian Government entirely on an official footing, you are accordingly instructed to open the question by presenting to Count Lamsdorff, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, a note verbale to the following effect:—
“‘The Japanese Government desire to remove from the relations of the two Empires every cause of future misunderstanding, and believe that the Russian Government share the same desire. The Japanese Government would therefore be glad to enter with the Imperial Russian Government upon an examination of the condition of affairs in the regions of the extreme East, where their interests meet, with a view to defining their respective special interests in those regions.
“‘If this suggestion fortunately meets with the approval, in principle, of the Russian Government, the Japanese Government will be prepared to present to the Russian Government their views as to the nature and scope of the proposed understanding.’
“In presenting the foregoing note to the Russian Foreign Minister, you will be careful to make him understand that our purposes are entirely friendly, but that we attach great importance to the subject.
“You will present the note to Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and keep me fully informed regarding the steps taken by you under this instruction; and immediately upon the receipt of an affirmative reply from the Russian Government, the substance of our proposals will be telegraphed to you.”
To this request of Japan, Count Lamsdorff expressed a perfect agreement,[[584]] for, as he had very often said to Mr. Kurino, “an understanding between the two countries was not only desirable, but was the best policy.” “Should Russia and Japan enter into a full understanding,” said he, “no one would in future attempt to sow the seeds of discord between the two countries.”[[585]] The assent of the Foreign Minister was later sustained by the Czar.[[586]]