“4. ‘Recognition of the right of Japan to send, for the same purpose, troops to Korea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission is accomplished.
“5. ‘Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes, nor to undertake on the coasts of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Korea.
“6. ‘Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of Korea lying to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops.
“7. ‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.
“8. ‘This Agreement to supersede all previous agreements between Russia and Japan regarding Korea.[[599]]’”
In comparing this counter-note with the original note of Japan, it will at once be seen that Russia seriously reduced Japan’s demands concerning Korea by excluding her right of rendering advice and assistance to Korea in the latter’s military affairs, and also by quietly suppressing the important clause providing for mutual recognition of the principle of the equal economic opportunity for all nations in Korea. Moreover, Russia imposed upon Japan the following new conditions regarding Korea: not to use any part of the territory for strategical purposes; not to fortify the southern coast; and to consider the territory north of the thirty-ninth parallel, covering nearly one third of the area of the Empire, as neutral[[600]] between the two Powers. As regards Manchuria, Russia silently discarded the two fundamental principles proposed by Japan and often avowed by Russia herself, namely, China’s sovereignty over it and the equal economic opportunity for all nations therein. On the contrary, Russia requested Japan to declare Manchuria and its littoral as outside of her sphere of interest. If the Power which exchanged necessaries of life with Manchuria in fast growing quantities, controlled more than ninety per cent. of the exports at Niu-chwang, and numbered tens of thousands of its subjects residing in the Three Provinces, should be required by Russia to declare itself uninterested in Manchuria, the exclusive designs of Russia upon the territory would seem to need no stronger proof. The general tenor of the note of October 3 was, thus, to exclude Manchuria from discussion, and, furthermore, to restrict Japan’s influence in Korea. Russia explained that the question of Manchuria rested between herself and China, and that she had no reason to make any arrangement about it with a third Power. To this, Japan replied that she had asked from Russia no concession of any kind in Manchuria, but merely requested her to recognize anew the principles which she had voluntarily and repeatedly professed. Such a recognition, Japan contended, was of vital interest to her, inasmuch as the Russian occupation of Manchuria would continually threaten the independence of Korea.[[601]] It was evident from Russia’s counter-note that there lay an impassable gulf between the propositions of the two Powers, not only in the actual terms under discussion, but also in the principles involved in them, for, to all appearance, nothing could prove more clearly that Russia was bent upon absorbing and closing up all Manchuria, as well as marking out Northern Korea as an eventual sphere of her influence, and that she was unwilling to recognize the profound and increasing common interest of Japan and Manchuria, and the vital importance to the former of the independence, strength, and development of Korea.
The date fixed in the Convention in April, 1902, for the final evacuation of Manchuria arrived on October 8, 1903—five days after the Russian counter-note was received by Japan, but the day came and passed with no sign of the evacuation. On the contrary, the Russian Minister at Peking was engaged, regardless of the negotiations at Tokio between his Government and the Japanese, in urging Prince Ching to change the terms of the Convention. Those who had been impressed by the manner and contents of the Russian reply to the Japanese note did not fail to observe in M. Lessar’s conduct at Peking another proof of the slight weight which the Russians attached to the overtures of Japan at least concerning Manchuria. For, if Russia succeeded in securing China’s consent to her new demands regarding Manchuria, which in every way transgressed the principles contained in the Japanese note, the Manchurian negotiations between Russia and Japan would become unnecessary. The Russian course of action at Tokio and Peking was thus consistent in ignoring Japan’s vital interests in Manchuria, and, therefore, was regarded as consistently insulting to Japan. The secret of the situation seemed to be, as has been already suggested, that the centre of gravity of Russian diplomacy in the East had largely shifted from St. Petersburg to Port Arthur—from Count Lamsdorff to the inflexible Admiral Alexieff. Ever since the latter had convened, at Port Arthur, early in July, a large council of the diplomatic, military and naval, and financial agents of Russia in the Eastern Asiatic countries, as well as General Kuropatkin, who was then traveling in the Orient, it had appeared that the Viceroy of the Far East,[[602]] and not the Foreign Office at the Russian Capital, was the guiding spirit of the Czar’s policy in Korea, China, and Japan. Hereafter, Count Lamsdorff could perhaps moderate the terms, and transmit to Japan the revised contents, of the Viceroy’s unconciliatory views, but had otherwise lost the control of the situation. The reason why Alexieff had risen to such a great influence may not be known until the relations he had with M. Bezobrazoff, the late von Plehve, and other influential politicians at St. Petersburg of that day, become more clearly understood than they are to-day. As to the probable views of the Viceroy regarding the situation in the East, it is not hard to infer them from the diplomatic history in China, Korea, and Japan, during the half year ending with February, 1904.
Let us make a brief review of the diplomatic manœuvres of the Russian Representative at Peking regarding Manchuria, which proceeded much as if his Government were not engaged in negotiations with Japan in respect to the same territory. The secret Manchurian agreement which was reported to have been concluded on July 20[[603]] was probably unfounded, and its detail may otherwise be safely left unnoticed. The nature of the Russian policy regarding Manchuria could, however, be inferred from the remarkable exchange of views which took place at London in July between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff. In this interview on July 11, the latter said, in effect: “Whatever may be the result of the negotiations which are pending between Russia and China, ... the Imperial Government [of Russia] has no intention of opposing the gradual opening of China, as commercial relations develop,[[1]] of some towns in Manchuria to foreign commerce, excluding, however, the right to establish ‘Settlements.’ This declaration does not apply to Harbin. The town in question being within the limits of the concessions for the Eastern Chinese Railway, is not unrestrictedly subject to the Chinese Government;[[604]] the establishment there of foreign consulates must therefore depend upon the consent of the Russian Government.”[[605]] The three conditions here printed in italics would seem not only contradictory to the declaration made by Count Lamsdorff to Mr. MacCormick on April 28,[[606]] but also almost tantamount to opposing the opening of any new treaty port in Manchuria. For it was well understood that the desire on the part of some Powers for the speedy opening of some new ports in Manchuria was largely calculated to prevent the aggressive and exclusive proceedings of Russia in that territory. If, as Count Benckendorff suggested, the development of trade relations was the sole reason for “gradually” opening some towns, if foreign settlements should be excluded from the new ports, and if Harbin, and logically all the towns situated at the “depots” of the railway, could not be opened without Russian consent, Manchuria, excepting the regions touching the few towns which had already been opened, would remain open to the growing influence of Russia, but practically sealed to the rest of the world.[[607]] This inference was presently demonstrated by the new demands made at the Peking Foreign Office by M. Lessar on September 6. These demands, presented, as they were, in the midst of the Russo-Japanese negotiations at Tokio and on the eve of the close of the period of Manchurian evacuation, deserve a special notice. Briefly stated, M. Lessar requested: (1) that China should not alienate, in any manner, any port, of whatever size, of Manchuria to any other Power; (2) that Russia should be allowed to construct wharves on the Sungari River, to connect them by telegraph, and to station Russian troops to protect the telegraph lines and the ships plying the river; (3) that Russia should be allowed to establish post stations along the road from Tsitishar to Blagovestchensk; (4) that no greater duties should be imposed on goods brought into Manchuria by rail than those now imposed on goods transported by road or river; (5) that after the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the branches of the Russo-Chinese Bank should be protected by Chinese troops, but at the cost of the Bank; and (6) that a Russian doctor should be appointed member of the Sanitary Board at Niu-chwang. On these conditions, the Russian forces would evacuate Niu-chwang and the rest of the Sheng-king Province on October 8, the Kirin Province after four months, and the Hei-lung Province at the end of one year.[[608]] Of these, the first demand was interpreted to imply the prevention of the establishment of new foreign settlements and concessions in any part of Manchuria. As to the meaning of stationing troops along the Sungari and building a post road from Tsitsihar to Blagovestchensk, it is instructive to observe that Prince Ching opined that, if China conceded these demands and Russia then nominally withdrew, the latter would still be in virtual possession of the territory.[[609]] The British and Japanese Ministers at Peking naturally warned China not to accept the Russian propositions.[[610]] The Foreign Office, after some hesitation,[[611]] finally refused all of the demands in a written note, on September 24.[[612]] This refusal, however, by no means terminated the Manchurian negotiations at Peking. As the Chinese Government showed inclinations, vacillating as they were, to sympathize with Japan in her efforts to maintain the sovereign rights of China in Manchuria, M. Lessar is said to have resorted to occasional threats that, if a war should occur between Russia and Japan and the latter be defeated, China would repent her sorry plight only too late, for then Manchuria would not be hers. Particularly vigorous was his obstruction of the effort of the United States Commissioners at Shanghai to secure the opening of new ports in Manchuria to foreign trade.[[613]] In spite of all this, however, on October 8—the very day once fixed for the final evacuation of Manchuria—the American-Chinese treaty was signed, opening Mukden and An-tung as treaty ports. The next day saw the conclusion of the Japanese-Chinese treaty, bearing the date of October 8, which also provided for the opening of Mukden and Tatung-kao. It was perhaps nothing more than a singular coincidence of circumstances that Mukden should be, as it was, occupied by Russian soldiers shortly after its opening had been secured by the United States and Japan. Early in the morning of October 28, 780 Russian soldiers with eight cannon suddenly, without warning, rushed through the city gate and took possession of the Yamên of the Tartar General, Tsêng-chi, holding him in custody and reducing the military forces under his control.[[1]] A generally accepted ground for this precipitous act was naught more than that a subordinate Taotai under the jurisdiction of the Tartar General had undertaken to punish some recalcitrant bandits who had been under Russian employ. The Journal de Saint Pétersbourg explained, however, that the seizure of Mukden was owing “to the apathy of the Chinese authorities, to the non-execution of the promises made on their part, and to the agitation which prevailed in the district.”[[614]] Mukden being the sepulchral city of the reigning dynasty of China, its sudden occupation by the Russians appeared to have aroused a bitter resentment among the educated classes throughout the Empire.
Turning to the Korean frontier, the conduct of the Russians at Yong-am-po[[615]] on the left side of the Yalu, near its mouth, had now assumed an unmistakably political character. Early in July a telegraphic connection had been made without permission with An-tung, a strategic centre in Eastern Manchuria. At the instance of the Japanese Minister, the Korean Government succeeded in enforcing the removal of the line.[[616]] Late in the same month, the Commissioner of Forestry of Korea and Baron Gunzburg visited Yong-am-po, and drafted an agreement leasing the port to the Timber Company, nominally represented by the Baron. The contract bore neither a definite period of time for the lease nor fixed area of the leased territory, in the Korean text of the agreement, but, according to the Russian document, the lease is said to have extended over twenty years and covered a space equivalent to 204 acres. The company also was granted, in the Korean text, judiciary rights over the residents within the leased area.[[617]] At the same time, extensive works had been started by the Russians at Yong-am-po, including the erection of large brick buildings and the laying out of roads, streets, and light railways, to be later increased by what was conceded to be a fort; while, beyond the river, the military forces at An-tung and other centres had been in the process of augmentation.[[618]] The situation had now become so grave that Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Minister at Seul, was obliged to enter sharp protests at the Korean Foreign Office against the conclusion of the lease agreement,[[619]] and to urge again the opening of Wiju, and now also of Yong-am-po, to foreign trade. Both the British and American Representatives also pressed the Seul Government to open these ports.[[620]] The Russian Minister, M. Pavloff, however, was as strenuously opposed to the opening of these ports as Mr. Hayashi was to the conclusion of the lease agreement. The conditions were almost identical with those in 1898 under which Great Britain urged the opening of Talien-wan, so as to counteract the Russian aggression upon it and Port Arthur, and also with those in Manchuria, in this same year, where the American and Japanese Governments demanded the opening of new ports in order to prevent the exclusion of foreign trade and industry from Manchuria under Russian rule. The struggle between the open and the exclusive policy, however, continued much longer in Korea than in China, owing largely to the extremely unstable political conditions at Seul, which enabled the Russian diplomats oftener and longer to influence the Korean court.[[621]] As regards the lease of Yong-am-po, the Korean Government was now so alive to the serious nature of the agreement that it proposed to modify its terms late in August.[[622]] M. Pavloff, however, persistently urged the Korean Government to ratify the original agreement. On August 27, for instance, he and Baron Gunzburg remained at the Foreign Office from one to six o’clock in the afternoon, requesting the immediate conclusion of the contract, until the Foreign Minister escaped out of the door and tendered his resignation.[[623]] At the same time, the conduct of the Russians on the frontier grew even more menacing than before. The cutting of timber was started at different points, where many Koreans were forced into unpaid service, and the bandits in Russian employ created disorder among peaceful citizens.[[624]] Moreover, according to the reports of Korean officials, the Russians had occupied at Yong-am-po—now named Nicolas—a ground far more extensive than the lease-area stipulated in the yet unratified agreement.[[625]] All this while, the Russians at the Capital exercised a powerful influence over both Yi Keun-thaik and Yi Yong-ik, two of the most noted politicians at Seul, and over the strong party upholding the interests of Lady Öm.[[626]] It was through these pro-Russian people that the unique idea of declaring the neutrality of Korea before the outbreak of any war—an idea which had more than once been unsuccessfully proposed[[627]]—was again brought forward, and finally, early in 1904, carried into effect in an awkward manner.[[628]]
Russian activity in Korea and Manchuria, which has been briefly described, may be said to constitute the reverse side of the diplomacy of the Czar’s Government at Tokio. The actual control of the Eastern situation having probably passed from the central power to Port Arthur, it was now founded, perhaps not upon greater practical wisdom than before, but apparently upon a uniform basis. For the conclusion is forced upon the student that Viceroy Alexieff’s policy must have been, on the one hand, to deal with Japan’s overtures lightly and leisurely, but, on the other, to hasten the establishment of Russian control in Manchuria and upon the Korean frontier, so that Japan might in time be compelled to bow to the situation and accept terms dictated by Russia. The proof of this policy had already seemed abundantly sufficient by the time when the Russian counter-note reached Baron Komura on October 3. It is impossible to tell whether, in framing such a policy, the Viceroy had taken into consideration the fact that the entire nation of Japan felt as one man that they had come to the greatest crisis known in their long history.