This is an attempt to present in a verifiable form some of the issues and the historical causes of the war now waged between Russia and Japan. Powerfully as it appeals to me, I would not have discussed a subject so strange to the proper sphere of my investigation, had it not been for the fact that no one else has, so far as I am aware, undertaken the task in the same spirit in which I have endeavored to write these pages. Although I deeply regret that I do not read the Russian language and cannot do full justice to the Russian side of the question, the impartial reader will observe, I trust, that this work is neither a plea for the one side nor a condemnation of the other, but a mere exposition of the subject-matter as I comprehend it. When the author offers what he considers a natural explanation of a question, the reader should not read into it a moral judgment. Indeed, I earnestly wish that the kind reader would thrash out of these pages every grain of real prejudice. Nor can I welcome a greater favor from any person than a more complete and just statement of Russia’s case than I have been able to make. After having said so much, it is unnecessary to tell the reader how, when the substance of the introductory chapter to this volume was published last May in the Yale Review, some of its critics ascribed to the writer motives utterly foreign to himself. One of those alleged motives was that I had sought to prove that the American trading interest in Manchuria and Korea would be better served by a final victory of Japan than by that of Russia. I neither proved nor disproved such a theme, but I did state that Japan’s interest demanded the maintenance in those regions of the principle of the impartial opportunity for all nations. Whether the result of this policy would prove better or worse for the interest of any one nation than the effect of an exclusive policy, did not concern me. It did not and does not belong to me to appeal to the commercial instinct of the reader, or even to his sympathy with, or antipathy to, either of the present belligerents. My only plea is that for truth.
The substance of the introductory chapter, as has been said, and also a brief summary of the body of the volume have been published in the Yale Review for May and August of the present year. I am greatly indebted to the editors of the Review for allowing me to use the material in the preparation of this work. I also wish to express my sincere thanks to my friends who have encouraged me in the publication of this volume.
Asakawa.
Hanover, New Hampshire,
August 30, 1904.
CONTENTS
| PAGE | ||
|---|---|---|
| Introductory | [1] | |
| Economic issues: (1) Japan’s side; transition from an agricultural to an industrial stage, pp. [1]–[10]; community of interest between Japan and Korea and Manchuria, [10]–[32]. (2) Russia’s side, [32]–[47]; comparison, [47]–[48]; political issues, 48–[51]; summary, [51]–[53]; conclusion, [53]–[61]. | ||
| Supplementary Note | [61] | |
| Chapter I. Retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula | [65] | |
| Primorsk and Sakhalien, [65]–[67]; intervention of 1895, [68]–[77]; its historical significance, [77]–[78]; its effects on Japan, 78–[82]. | ||
| Chapter II. The “Cassini Convention” and the Railway Agreement | [83] | |
| The Russo-French loan and the Russo-Chinese Bank, [83]–[85]; the agreement of alliance, [85]–[87]; the “Cassini Convention,” 87–[95]; the railway agreement of September 8, and statutes of December 23, 1896, [95]–[100]. | ||
| Chapter III. Kiao-chau | [101] | |
| The seizure of Kiao-chau, and the Agreement of March 6, 1898, [101]–[105]; the conduct of Great Britain, [106]–[109]. | ||
| Chapter IV. Port Arthur and Talien-wan | [110] | |
| Russian warships at Port Arthur, [111]–[112]; British demand for the opening of Talien-wan, [113]–[118]; Port Arthur and Talien-wan, the British and Russian Governments, [118]–[125]; Wei-hai-Wei, [125]–[129]; the Agreement of March 27, 1898, and supplementary agreements, [129]–[132]; the administration of the leased territory, and Dalny, [132]–[134]. | ||
| Chapter V. Secretary Hay’s Circular Note | [135] | |
| The circular of September, 1899, [135]; the Powers’ replies, 136–[138]. | ||
| Chapter VI. The Occupation of Manchuria | [139] | |
| Russia’s attitude toward the Boxer trouble in North China, 139–[143]; the Manchurian campaign, [143]–[146]. | ||
| Chapter VII. North China and Manchuria | [147] | |
| Characteristics of Russia’s diplomacy regarding Manchuria, 147–[148]; the distinction made between North China and Manchuria; the circular note of August 25, 1900, [148]–[155]. | ||
| Chapter VIII. The Anglo-German Agreement | [156] | |
| The Northern Railway affair, [156]–[157]; the Anglo-German Agreement of October 16, 1900, [157]–[158]; the Powers’ views, [158]–[160]; Germany’s view, [160]–[161]. | ||
| Chapter IX. A Modus Vivendi: the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement | [162] | |
| Peace negotiations at Peking, and Russia’s Manchurian policy, [162]–[165]; the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement of November, 1900, [165]–[168]; the protests of the Powers, [168]–[169]; Count Lamsdorff’s explanation, [169]–[172]. | ||
| Chapter X. A “Starting-Point”—the Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention | [173] | |
| The Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention, [173]–[176]; China’s appeal, and the Powers’ protests, [176]–[178]; Russia detached herself from the allies, [178]–[181]; the amendments of March, 1901, [181]–[182]; the British and Japanese remonstrances, and withdrawal of Russian demands, [182]–[188]. | ||
| Chapter XI. Further Demands | [189] | |
| M. Lessar’s demands in August, [189]–[190]; in October, 190–[193]; protests, replies, and delays, [193]–[196]. | ||
| Chapter XII. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the Russo-French Declaration | [197] | |
| A growing sympathy between Great Britain and Japan prior to the conclusion of the agreement, [197], [198]; diplomatic steps toward the conclusion, [199]–[202]; the Agreement of January 30, 1902, [202]–[209]; the Russo-French declaration of March 16, [209]–[213]. | ||
| Chapter XIII. The Convention of Evacuation | [214] | |
| The Russo-Chinese convention of April 8, 1902, [214]–[226]; an analysis of the document, [226]–[232]. | ||
| Chapter XIV. The Evacuation | [233] | |
| The first evacuation, October 8, 1902, [233]; the nominal character of the evacuation, [234]–[237]; Niu-chwang, [237]–[238]. | ||
| Chapter XV. Demands in Seven Articles | [239] | |
| The second evacuation, [239]–[241]; new Russian demands, April 5, 1903, [241]–[244]; the opposition of three Powers to the demands, [244]–[246]; Count Lamsdorff’s disclaimer, [246]–[248]; Count Cassini’s statement, [248]–[251]; diplomacy at Peking, [251]–[256]. | ||
| Chapter XVI. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, I | [257] | |
| Japan’s failure and Russia’s success at Seul, the murder of the Queen, [257]–[261]; the flight of the King, [262]–[263]; the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol, June 6, and the Komura-Waeber Memorandum, May 14, 1896, [263]–[268]; a decline of Russian influence, [268]–[271]; the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, April 25, 1898, [271]–[272]. | ||
| Chapter XVII. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, II | [273] | |
| Pavloff and Hayashi, [273]; the Masampo affair, [274]–[278]; abortive loans, [278]–[280]; Russians and pro-Russian Koreans at Seul, [280]; the bank-note trouble, [281]–[282]; the Keyserling whaling concession, [282]–[283]; the Tumên River telegraph lines, [283]–[285]; the Seul-Wiju Railway, 285–[289]; the Yong-am-po affair, [289]–[295]. | ||
| Chapter XVIII. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, I | [296] | |
| Japan’s invitation to negotiate, July 28, 1903, [296]–[299]; Russia’s assent, [299]; political changes in Russia, and the Viceroy of the Far East, [299]–[302]; Japan’s first proposals, August 12, [302]–[307]; negotiations transferred to Tokio, 307–[308]; Russia’s first counter-proposals, October 3, [308]–[311]; Russian diplomacy at Peking, [311]–[318]; the development of the Yong-am-po affair, [318]–[323]. | ||
| Chapter XIX. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, II | [324] | |
| Japan’s second proposals, October 30, [324]–[328]; Russia’s second counter-proposals, December 11, [328]–[329]; Japan’s third proposals, December 23, [329]–[331]; pacific declarations of Russia, [331]–[332]; Russia’s third counter-proposals, January 6, 1904, [332]–[335]; new ports opened in Manchuria, 335; Japan’s fourth proposals, January 13, [335]–[339]; military activity of the Russians, [339]–[341]; the termination of the negotiations and the rupture of diplomatic relations, February 5–[6], [341]–[344]; the first acts of war, [345]; the Russian Manifesto and the Japanese Declaration of War, January 10, [345]–[348]. | ||
| Supplementary Note to Chapter XIX | [348] | |
| The Russian communiqué, February 18, [348]–[349]; the Russian statement of February 20, [349]–[351]; Japan’s reply to the above, March 3, [352]–[354]; the Russian note to the Powers regarding Korean neutrality, February 22, [355]–[356]; Japan’s reply, March 9, [357]–[360]; Russia’s counter-reply, March 12, [360]–[362]. | ||
| Chapter XX. Chinese Neutrality and Korean Integrity | [363] | |
| Japan’s advice to China to be neutral, [363], [364]; Secretary Hay’s note, [364]–[365]; China’s own declaration, [365]; Japan’s pledge to China, [366]; the Korean-Japanese alliance, 366–[368]; its nature analyzed, [368]–[372]. | ||
| Index | [373] | |
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
| PAGE | |
|---|---|
| Map showing “the regions where the interests of the two Powers meet” | [Frontispiece] |
| Count Cassini, Russian Minister at Washington, and formerly at Peking | [90] |
| Count Lamsdorff, Russian Foreign Minister | [146] |
| Li Hung-Chang | [193] |
| Count Katsura, Premier of Japan | [202] |
| M. Lessar, Russian Minister at Peking | [255] |
| M. Pavloff, Late Russian Minister at Seul | [276] |
| Copyright, 1902, by George Grantham Bain | |
| Baron Komura, Japanese Foreign Minister | [296] |
| Admiral Alexieff, Viceroy of the Far East | [303] |
| Mr. Kurino, Late Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg | [331] |
| Baron de Rosen, Late Russian Minister at Tokio | [347] |
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFLICT