[131]. To the last moment Russia, it is said, persisted in advising China to postpone the ratification.

[132]. The London Times, May 3, 1895, p. 5; M. de Blowitz’s correspondence, dated Paris, May 2.

[133]. The declaration made in November, 1903, by a person intimately associated with Marquis Itō, who was the Premier during the war.—The Kokumin Shimbun, November 10, 1903.

[134]. Germany is said to have undertaken, when her note was presented, to guarantee a monetary consideration from China. By the treaty between Japan and China, concluded on September 22, the sum was fixed at 30,000,000 taels.

[135]. Tokushu Jōyaku, pp. 81–87. As has been said, the diplomatic correspondence of the day has not been published by any of the Powers concerned. The information briefly given in the text has been culled from, besides Tokushu Jōyaku, the leading articles of the Tokio Nichi-Nichi Shimbun (Tokio Daily News), a semi-official organ of the Japanese Government at the time, as quoted in the Nisshin Sen Shi (history of the Japan-China war, Tokio, 1894–5, 8 vols.), vol. viii. pp. 141–171. These articles give a minute and careful account of the diplomacy of the day, and may largely be relied upon as authentic.

[136]. It will be remembered that Japan had in 1894 revised her treaties with the Powers, and thereby freed herself from the yoke of consular jurisdiction and placed the foreign residents within her domain under the jurisdiction of her own law, and also largely restored her tariff autonomy.

[137]. The position which the military and naval expenditures have occupied in the finance of the Japanese Government since the war of 1894–5 may be gathered from the following table (unit, 1000 yen; yen = 49.8 cents):—

Total revenue of the GovernmentTotal expenditures of the GovernmentArmy and navy expendituresRatio of the last two
1894–5[[139]]98,17078,12820,66226.4%
1895–6[[139]]118,43285,31723,53627.6%
1896–7[[139]]187,019168,85673,24843.4%
1897–8[[139]]226,390223,678110,54249.3%
1898–9[[139]]220,054219,757112,42751.1%
1899–1900[[139]]254,254254,165114,21244.9%
1900–1[[140]]295,854292,750133,11345.4%
1901–2[[141]]274,359266,856102,36038.3%
1902–3[[141]]297,341289,22685,76829.7%
1903–4[[142]]251,681244,75271,36831.7%
1904–5[[143]]229,855223,18169,43331.1%

[138]. To take only a few tangible instances, Japan’s national budget grew more than three-fold during the ten years before 1903, her foreign trade in 1903 was 263% as large as it was in 1894, her private companies increased from less than 3000 in 1894 to 8600 in 1902, with a corresponding growth of their authorized capital from less than 200 million to 1,226.7 million yen, and her population itself has increased perhaps by 12%. A decisive development has also taken place in both the internal politics and the international relations of Japan.

[139]. An attempt has been universally made during the present war to explain the apparent contempt of death of the Japanese soldier as due to his low estimate of human life, or else to his fatalistic view of the world. It may be seriously doubted whether these explanations are tenable. At least it may be said that in no other case would the sons of Japan so fearlessly and cheerfully face death. It is impossible to discover in them a less fear of death than in other nations. Life is dear, but it is sacrificed to a cause which is considered higher than life. It was the primary lesson in the education of the samurai to choose death when it saved honor and when life was selfish. This view of life has now been transferred from the narrow sphere of the individual person or fief to the large field of the entire nation, whose cause, it is believed, represents the best postulates of human progress. It would, perhaps, be legitimate to criticise the incidental abuse of this feeling, or to question whether the same loyalty might not be transferred to a still higher region than the state, but the subject must first be understood by the critic.