[219]. Ibid., Nos. 65, 69, 75, 78, 79.
[220]. In his speech before the House of Lords on February 8. See ibid., Nos. 82, 83, 87; the Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, vol. 53, pp. 40–41.
[221]. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 54.
[222]. Ibid., No. 59.
[223]. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 85.
[224]. Ibid., No. 88.
[225]. Ibid., Nos. 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 103.
[226]. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 95 (Salisbury to MacDonald).
[227]. The Russian Government soon had occasion to gauge the strength of the British protest, for, on March 8, Sir N. O’Conor made a striking statement to Count Muravieff, as will be seen in the following report (ibid., No. 108, O’Conor to Salisbury): “I alluded, as no doubt his Excellency was aware, to the junction of the Burmese and Chinese railway systems. This demand became at once still more necessary and reasonable if greater privileges of the same kind were accorded to Russia in the Liao-tung Peninsula, as they had apparently already been accorded in Manchuria. Count Muravieff did not, however, respond to these remarks beyond saying that he supposed the Burma-Chinese line would, in this case, descend to the valley of the Yang-tsze.” The Count’s remark may be considered a sufficient reply, when it is seen in connection with another remark he made a few moments earlier. When Sir N. O’Conor alluded to the objectionable features of leasing Port Arthur, the Foreign Minister reminded him that British interests were principally represented in the neighborhood of the Yang-tsze. Russia would evade the British protest by turning England’s attention to her own sphere, in which Russia had little interest, and would not object to a British repetition there of Russia’s conduct in Manchuria. Muravieff must have thought that O’Conor, by his reference to the Burmese Railway, now voluntarily threw himself into his net. Russia later succeeded in inducing England to conclude the Anglo-Russian railway declaration of April 28, 1899, delimiting in a negative manner the railway spheres of the two Powers in China, Russia pledging not to seek concessions and not to obstruct those of the British in the Yang-tsze valley, and England pledging similarly in regard to Russian concessions beyond the Great Wall. (See China, No. 2 (1899), No. 138.) The Russian Government naturally considered the conclusion of this agreement as a diplomatic victory over the British, and seemed to have interpreted its terms as implying that all the territory beyond the Great Wall was the Russian sphere, not only of railway concessions, but also of general interests and influence. Already in May of the same year, M. Pavloff renewed his demand at Peking for the concession of a Russian railway to be built directly to the Chinese capital, thus even overreaching the limit set in the British agreement of less than a fortnight previous. See China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 112, 116, 120, 129, 132–133, 214–215.
[228]. China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 101, 105, 108, 110, 114, 120, 149.