[239]. Cf. ibid., Nos. 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 149, and 151.
[240]. Ibid., No. 144. The agreement was signed at Peking on July 1. See Treaty Series, No. 14, 1898.
[241]. “Balance of power in Gulf of Pechili is materially altered by surrender of Port Arthur by the Yamên to Russia. It is therefore necessary to obtain,” etc.—Salisbury to MacDonald, March 25; China, No. 1 (1898), No. 129. Cf. also China, No. 1 (1899), No. 2.
It should be said, in justice to Great Britain, that at first, when the Chinese Government intimated toward the end of February that they would lease Wei-hai-Wei to her if she would accept it, Lord Salisbury considered such an offer premature, for his Government “aimed at discouraging any alienation of Chinese territory.”—Ibid., Nos. 90 and 91.
[242]. Two other instances may here be cited to further illustrate the policy of the British Government during this critical period of time. (1) Soon after the appearance of Russian war-vessels at Port Arthur, Admiral Buller, of the China station of the British navy, arrived at Chemulpo with seven ships, on December 29, and ordered the “Immortalité” and “Iphigenia” to proceed to Port Arthur. The former was, on January 10, ordered to leave for Chefu. The presence of the British boats created “a bad impression” on Russia, which requested England to avoid dangers of conflict in the Russian “sphere of influence.” The British Government explained that the ships had been sent by the Admiral without instruction from the Admiralty, and would soon leave, “in ordinary course of cruising.” It was added, at the same time, that British ships had a perfect right to proceed to Port Arthur. It was reported at one time that the two boats had been ordered away from Port Arthur under protest from Russia.—Ibid., Nos. 31, 48, 52, 63, 66, 68. (2) On March 8, Sir Claude MacDonald was informed by the Tsung-li Yamên that the only reason given by M. Pavloff for the demand of the lease of the two ports was to “assist in protecting Manchuria against the aggression of other Powers.” Probably England and Japan were meant, and the Yamên was fully alive to the absurdity of this pretext, but was unable to resist the Russian demands. It therefore begged earnestly that the British Government would assist it by giving a formal assurance to the Russian Government that England had no designs on Manchuria. It does not seem to have been thought necessary by the British Government to give such an assurance. See ibid., Nos. 100 and 109.
[243]. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 114 (O’Conor to Salisbury, March 13).
[244]. Ibid., No. 29.
[245]. “The Japanese Government,” said Baron Nishi, Foreign Minister of Japan, confidentially, to Sir Ernest Satow, about March 20, “had been anxious that China should be able to maintain her position at Wei-hai-Wei, but if she found it impossible to do so, Japan would have no objection to its being held by a Power disposed to assist in maintaining the independence of China.”—China, No. 1 (1899), No. 35. Cf. also Nos. 49, 79, 81, 107, etc.
[246]. Ibid., Nos. 85, 112, 118, 231, 238.
Russia had undertaken to request Japan to promise that China would secure Wei-hai-Wei after the Japanese evacuation, but Japan declined to make such a pledge.—Ibid., No. 30. In April, 1902, the control of Wei-hai-Wei was transferred from the Admiralty to the Colonial Office. The mouth of the harbor is so large that it would require an enormous expenditure and large forces to fortify and defend it adequately. At the time when England leased the port, she was hardly inclined to let financial considerations thwart her effort to restore her prestige so abruptly foreshadowed by that of Russia. In 1902, however, the lately concluded Anglo-Japanese agreement of alliance rendered the fortification of Wei-hai-Wei no longer necessary. See Tokushu Jōyaku, pp. 172–173.