[294]. Cf. China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 267, 300, 314, 315.
Also see the most interesting Russian document, quoted in China, No. 2 (1904), p. 20. One of its passages reads as follows: “It must not be forgotten that an attack on the ancient traditions of the Chinese and on the prestige of their Government might be attended by the most disastrous consequences; all the more so that the international troops cannot occupy indefinitely the capital of a country of 400,000,000 inhabitants, whose right to live at home as they please can hardly be questioned.”
[295]. China, No. 1 (1901), No. 306. Also see No. 313.
On August 19 and 21, Li Hung-chang wired to Wu Ting-fang to urge upon the United States Government that, inasmuch as the declared purpose of the allies to relieve the Legations had now been accomplished, they should suspend hostilities, withdraw their troops, and appoint envoys to negotiate with China. See ibid., No. 239, and the 56th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. pp. 197, 288–290. We may naturally infer either that Li sent similar telegrams to Russia, or that Russia had consulted Li before the circular was sent to the Powers, the general tenor of thought is so alike in the telegrams and in the circular.
[296]. Russia herself was conscious of the fact that others attributed to her the motive of ingratiating herself with China at a critical moment by taking, separately from the other Powers, an action favorable to China. See China, No. 2 (1904), pp. 19–20.
[297]. See China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 275 (Austria); 280, 322, 328, (France); 309 (Italy); 281, 293, 305, 317, 318, 321, 327, 335, 378, 383 (England); 307; No. 5 (1901), Nos. 110, 124, 127 (Japan); No. 1 (1901), Nos. 270, 315; 56th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. ii. pp. 304–305, 378–379, 205 (the United States). As a matter of fact, the Boxers still roamed about Peking, and the Chinese Court, which had fled to Ta-yuen, was still under the control of Prince Tuan and his associates. A hasty withdrawal of troops from Peking would have been disastrous in its effect upon the foreigners and native Christians.
[298]. See China, No. 1 (1901), Nos. 356 (Russian proposition); 371, 395, 401 (England); 398 (Italy); No. 5 (1901), No. 128, (Japan); House Documents, op. cit., vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382.
[299]. China, No. 1 (1901), No. 375.
[300]. China, No. 7 (1901), Nos. 21, 76, 81, 84, 86, 95, 103, 149, 153, 154, 174, 187, 189.
[301]. Ibid., Nos. 1 and 7.