When Ricardo suddenly gets off the straight path of his presentation and takes the very opposite view, he does so to turn his attention to the international circulation of precious metals and thus brings confusion into the problem by introducing considerations that are foreign to the subject. Let us follow his own course of reasoning, and, in order to remove everything that is artificial and incidental, let us assume that the gold and silver mines are located in the interior of the countries in which the precious metals circulate as money. The only inference which follows from Ricardo’s reasoning as so far developed, is that, the value of gold being given, the quantity of money in circulation will be determined by the prices of commodities. Thus, at a given moment, the quantity of gold in circulation in a country is simply determined by the exchange value of the commodities in circulation. Let us suppose now that the sum total of these exchange values has declined either because there are less commodities produced at the old exchange values, or because, in consequence of an increased productivity of labor, the same quantity of commodities has a smaller value. Or, we may assume on the contrary that the sum total of exchange values has increased, either because the quantity of commodities has increased while the cost of their production has remained the same, or because the value of the same or of a smaller quantity of commodities has risen in consequence of a diminished productivity of labor. What becomes in either case of the given quantity of metal in circulation? If gold is money merely because it is current as a medium of circulation; if it is compelled to remain in circulation like government legal tender paper money (and that is what Ricardo has in mind), then the quantity of money in circulation will rise above the normal level, as determined by the exchange value of the metal, in the former case, and fall below that level in the latter. Although possessing a value of its own, gold will become in the former case a token of a metal of lower exchange value than its own, and in the latter, a token of a metal of higher value. In the former case it will remain as a token of value less than its own, in the latter greater than its own (again an abstract deduction from legal tender paper money). In the former case it is the same as though commodities were estimated in a metal of lower value than gold, in the latter, as though they were estimated in a metal of higher value. In the former case, prices of commodities would rise therefore, in the latter they would fall. In either case the movement of prices, their rise or fall, would appear as the effect of a relative expansion or contraction of the volume of gold in circulation above or below the level corresponding to its own value, i. e. above or below the normal quantity which is determined by the proportion between its own value and that of the commodities in circulation.
The same process would take place if the sum total of the prices of the commodities in circulation remained unchanged, while the volume of gold in circulation came to be below or above the right level: the former in case the gold coin worn out in the course of circulation were not replaced by the production of a corresponding quantity of gold in the mines; the latter, if the output of the mines exceeded the requirements of circulation. In either case it is assumed that the cost of production of gold or its value remain the same.
To sum up: the money in circulation is at its normal level, when its volume is determined by its own bullion value, the exchange value of commodities being given. It rises above that level, bringing about a fall in the value of gold below its own bullion value and a rise of prices of commodities, whenever the sum total of the exchange values of commodities declines, or the output of gold from the mines increases. It sinks below its right level, leading to a rise of gold above its own bullion value and to a fall of prices of commodities, whenever the sum total of the exchange values of the commodities or the gold output of the mines is not sufficient to replace the quantity of outworn gold. In either case the gold in circulation becomes a token of value greater or smaller than that it really possesses. It may become an appreciated or depreciated token of itself. As soon as all commodities would come to be estimated in gold of this new value and the general price level would accordingly rise or fall, the quantity of current gold would again answer the requirements of circulation (a consequence which Ricardo emphasizes with great pleasure), but would be at variance with the cost of production of the precious metals and, therefore, with their relation as commodities to all other commodities. According to the general Ricardian theory of exchange value, the rise of gold above its exchange value, i. e., above the value as determined by the labor-time contained in it, would cause an increase in the production of gold until the increased output of it would reduce its value to the proper magnitude. And in the same manner, a fall of gold below its value would cause a decline in its production until its value rose again to its proper magnitude. By these opposite movements the discrepancy between the bullion value of gold and its value as a medium of circulation would disappear, the normal level of the volume of gold in circulation would be restored, and the price level would again correspond to the measure of value. These fluctuations in the value of gold in circulation would to the same extent affect gold in the form of bullion, because by assumption, all gold that is not utilized as an article of luxury, is supposed to be in circulation. Since gold itself may become, both as coin and bullion, a token of value of greater or smaller magnitude than its bullion value, it is self understood that convertible bank-notes in circulation have to share the same fate. Although bank-notes are convertible, i. e. their real value and nominal value agree, “the aggregate currency consisting of metal and of convertible notes” may appreciate or depreciate according as to whether it rises or falls, for reasons already stated, above or below the level determined by the exchange value of the commodities in circulation and the bullion value of gold. Inconvertible paper money, has, from this point of view, only that advantage as against convertible paper money, that it may depreciate in a two-fold manner. It may fall below the value of the metal which it is supposed to represent, because it has been issued in too great quantity, or it may depreciate because the metal it represents has itself fallen in value. This depreciation, not of paper as compared with gold, but of gold and paper together, or of the aggregate currency of a country, is one of the principal discoveries of Ricardo, which Lord Overstone and Co. pressed into their service and made a fundamental principle of Sir Robert Peele’s Bank legislation of 1844 and 1845.
What should have been proven was that the price of commodities or the value of gold depends on the quantity of gold in circulation. The proof consists in the assumption of what is to be proven, viz. that any quantity of the precious metal employed as money must become a medium of circulation or coin, and thereby a token of value for the commodities in circulation, no matter in what proportion to its own intrinsic value and no matter what the total value of those commodities may be. To put it differently, the proof consists in overlooking all the other functions which money performs besides its function of a medium of circulation. When hard pressed, as in his controversy with Bosanquet, Ricardo, completely under the influence of the phenomenon of depreciated tokens of value caused by their quality, takes recourse to dogmatic assurances.[138]
If Ricardo had built up this theory by abstract reasoning, as we have done it here, without introducing concrete facts and incidental matters which only distract his attention from the main question, its hollowness would be striking. But he takes up the entire subject in its international aspect. It will be easy to prove, however, that the apparent magnitude of scale does not make his fundamental ideas less diminutive.
His first proposition was as follows: the volume of metallic currency is normal when it is determined by the total value of the commodities in circulation estimated in its bullion value. Expressed so as to apply to international conditions, it reads thus: in a normal state of circulation every country possesses a quantity of money “according to the state of its commerce and wealth.” Money circulates at a value corresponding to its real value or to its cost of production, i. e. it has the same value in all countries.[139] That being the case, “there could be no temptation offered to either for their importation or exportation.”[140] There would thus be established a balance of currencies between the different countries. The normal level of a national currency is now expressed in terms of an international balance of currencies, which practically amounts to the statement that nationality does not change anything in a universal economic law. We have reached again the same fatal point as before. How is the normal level disturbed? Or, speaking in terms of the new terminology, how is the international balance of currencies disturbed? Or, how does money cease to have the same value in all countries? Or, finally, how does it cease to pass at its own value in every country? We have seen that the normal level was disturbed by an increase or decrease of the volume of money in circulation while the total value of commodities remained the same; or, because the quantity of money in circulation remained the same while the exchange values of commodities rose or fell. In the same manner, the international level, determined by the value of the metal itself, is disturbed by an increase in the quantity of gold in a country brought about by the discovery of new gold mines,[141] or by an increase or decrease of the total exchange-value of the circulating commodities in any particular country. Just as in the former case the output of the precious metals decreased or increased according as to whether it was necessary to contract or expand the currency and thereby to lower or raise prices, so are the same effects produced now by export and import from one country to another. In the country in which prices would rise or the value of gold would fall below the bullion value in consequence of a redundant currency, gold would be depreciated, and the prices of commodities would rise as compared with other countries. Gold would, therefore, be exported, while commodities would be imported, and vice versa. Just as in the former case the output of gold, so now the import or export of gold and, with it, the rise or fall of prices of commodities would continue until, as we would have said before, the right value relation would be restored between the metal and commodities, or as we shall say now, the international balance of currencies would be restored. Just as in the former case the production of gold increased or decreased because gold stood above or below its value, so now the international migration of gold would take place for the same reason. Just as in the former case, every change in the production of the circulating metal affected its quantity and, thereby, prices, so would the same effect be produced now by international import and export. As soon as the relative values of gold and commodities or the normal quantity of currency would be restored, no further production would take place in the former case, and no further export or import in the latter, except in so far as would be necessary to replace outworn coin and to meet the demand of manufacturers of articles of luxury. It follows “that the temptation to export money in exchange for goods, or what is termed an unfavorable balance of trade, never arises but from a redundant currency.”[142] “The exportation of the coin is caused by its cheapness, and is not the effect, but the cause of an unfavourable balance.”[143] Since the increase or decrease in the production of gold in the former case and the importation or exportation of gold in the latter, take place only whenever its volume rises above or sinks below its normal level, i. e. whenever gold appreciates or depreciates in comparison with its bullion value, or whenever prices of commodities are too high or too low; it follows that every such movement works as a corrective,[144] since, through the resultant expansion or contraction of the currency, prices are restored to their true level: in the former case this level represents the balance between the respective values of gold and of commodities; in the latter, the international balance of currencies. To put it in other words: money circulates in different countries only in so far as it circulates as coin in every country. Money is but coin and all the gold existing in a country must therefore enter circulation, i. e. it can rise above or fall below its value as a token of value. Thus we safely land again, by the round-about way of this international complication, at the simple dogma which constituted our starting point.
With what violence to actual facts Ricardo has to explain them in the sense of his abstract theory, a few illustrations will suffice to show. He maintains, e. g. that in years of poor crops, which happened frequently in England during 1800-1820, gold is exported not because corn is needed and gold as money is at all times an effectual means of purchase in the world market, but because gold is in such cases depreciated in its value as compared with other commodities and, therefore, the currency of the country in which there has been a failure of crops is depreciated with respect to other national currencies. “In consequence of a bad harvest, a country having been deprived of a part of its commodities ... the currency which was before at its just level ... become(s) redundant,” and prices of all commodities rise in consequence.[145] Contrary to this paradoxical interpretation it has been proven statistically that from 1793 to the present time, whenever England had a bad harvest the available supply of currency not only did not become superabundant, but became inadequate and that, therefore, more money circulated and had to circulate on such occasions.[146]
In the same manner, Ricardo maintained, with reference to Napoleon’s Continental System and the English Blockade Decree, that the English exported gold instead of commodities to the Continent, because their money was depreciated with respect to the money on the Continent, that their commodities were, therefore, more high priced, which made it a more profitable commercial speculation to export gold than goods. According to him England was a market in which commodities were dear and money was cheap, while on the Continent commodities were cheap and money was dear. The trouble, according to an English writer, was “the ruinously low prices of our manufactures and of our colonial productions under the operation ... of the ‘Continental System ‘during the last six years of the war.... The prices of sugar and coffee, for instance, on the Continent, computed in gold, were four or five times higher than their prices in England, computed in bank-notes. I am speaking ... of the times in which the French chemists discovered sugar in beet-root, and a substitute for coffee in chicory; and when the English grazier tried experiments upon fattening oxen with treacle and molasses—of the times when we took possession of the island of Heligoland, in order to form there a depot of goods to facilitate, if possible, the smuggling of them into the north of Europe; and when the lighter descriptions of British manufactures found their way into Germany through Turkey.... Almost all the merchandise of the world accumulated in our warehouses, where they became impounded, except when some small quantity was released by a French License, for which the merchants at Hamburgh and Amsterdam had, perhaps, given Napoleon such a sum as forty or fifty thousand pounds. They must have been strange merchants ... to have paid so large a sum for liberty to carry a cargo of goods from a dear market to a cheap one. What was the ostensible alternative the merchant had?... Either to buy coffee at 6d. a pound in bank-notes, and send it to a place where it would instantly sell at 3s. or 4s. a pound in gold, or to buy gold with bank-notes at £5 an ounce, and send it to a place where it would be received at £3 17s. 10-1/2d. an ounce.... It is too absurd, of course, to say ... that the gold was remitted instead of the coffee, as a preferable mercantile operation.... There was not a country in the world in which so large a quantity of desirable goods could be obtained, in return for an ounce of gold, as in England.... Bonaparte ... was constantly examining the English Price Current.... So long as he saw that gold was dear and coffee was cheap in England, he was satisfied that his ‘Continental System ‘worked well.”[147]
At the very time when Ricardo first formulated his theory of money, and the Bullion Committee embodied it in its parliamentary report, namely in 1810, a ruinous fall of prices of all English commodities as compared with those of 1808 and 1809 took place, while gold rose in value accordingly. Only agricultural products formed an exception, because their importation from abroad met with obstacles and their domestic supply was decimated by unfavorable crop conditions.[148] Ricardo so utterly failed to comprehend the rôle of precious metals as an international means of payment, that in his testimony before the Committee of the House of Lords in 1819 he could say “that drains for exportation would cease altogether so soon as cash payments should be resumed, and the currency be restored to its metallic level.” He died just in time, on the very eve of the crisis of 1825, which belied his prophesies.
The time when Ricardo wrote was generally little adapted for the observation of the function of precious metals as world money. Before the introduction of the Continental System, the balance of trade had almost always been in favor of England, and while that system lasted, the commercial intercourse with the European continent was too insignificant to affect the English rate of exchange. The money transmissions were mostly of a political nature and Ricardo seems to have utterly failed to grasp the part which subsidy payments played at that time in English gold exports.[149]