On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be assumed that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really, among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of foreign administration »into her own hands.» The great fear of such a contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communiqué by the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2], without an agreement with Sweden.
How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing could interpret the Communiqué as it did?
As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it is impossible to make any definite assertions.
The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the Communiqué did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs — that demand could scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden — and passed over the Swedish delegates’ plain intention to bind Norway to the execution of that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates’ intentions with regard to the wording of the Communiqué on that point, and the Norwegian governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange, especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War Minister Stang’s open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his idea of the matter, the decisions in respect to the identical laws were scarcely in accordance with Mr Blehr’s interpretation of the Communiqué.
Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact remains clear, that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the Norwegian interpretation of the Communiqué. This must be kept strictly in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to be obtained.
[19:1] It is undoubtedly Russia’s proceedings in Finland which have especially influenced the recent unionist-political views of Björnson.
[21:1] The most effective power in the Committee was D:r Sigurd Ibsen, who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the Committee’s debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish Ambassador Bildt at the Court of St James, the Consul General Améen in Barcelona, and the Consul General Christophersen in Antwerp.
[21:2] The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.
[22:1] Nansen evidently looks upon the matter in this light (page 64): »No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it therefore, follows that even the Swedish Commissioners did not think it incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate Consuls». And, of course, he mentions, »the unanimous conclusion of the committee of experts from both countries» (p. 72).