[35:2] It is characteristic that Nansen in his review of the negotiations (page 76 and following) does not mention one of the Swedish demands. It can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on the subject, as to whether its decisions, as Nansen (page 77) insists, imply the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale.
[35:3] In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and regulations would have remained unwritten!
V.
Norwegian accusations aganist the Swedish government. The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway, and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.
Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden. Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe — thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the European Press — resounded with accusations against the Swedish government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.
Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?
The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations. The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally, therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum, did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side, that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of points of minor importance.
The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting only on the grounds that it illustrates the Norwegian method of negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their lawful rights.