[52:1] This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction. The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical representatives.
[52:3] Nansen (page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as it did not include »the same guarantees we had before». It must nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained far greater guarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet, partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince’s programme was far easier to carry out than the programme of the Communiqué, which implied that the Consular question would solve itself. Nansen also mentions that »the last Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of the Norwegian Commissioners». To this it must be observed that this Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than the Norwegian majority’s proposal had been in the last Union Committee. Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?
[56:1] Nansen (pag. 93).
[58:1] Nansen page 93.