[12:1] It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days, when it has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry out a general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of »the land of Free Trade» Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all.
[14:1] The question as to when a matter shall be discussed in a Joint Cabinet or not, has not been the smallest of the stumbling blocks in the thorny path of the Union negotiations. In Norway, to quote Mr Hagerup, there has been quite a »sickly» fear of having matters settled there. On the Norwegian Left Side they have defended the opinion, that only those matters which, being expressly mentioned in the Act of Union, as being distinctively Union-matters ought to be brought there. In Sweden it has been held, that the Act of Union has no power to give an exhaustive account as to what matters belong to the Union and which do not. Whether it can be considered a matter which concerns both the Kingdoms depends entirely on the exact nature of the matter itself. This latter conception has been adopted of old.
[15:1] Compare No. I §§ 5, 15, 30, 31.
[18:1] The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the Act of Union, wherevy it became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a fixed minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union.
[18:2] Nansen says (page 71) »Divisions arose partly over the resistance from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian delegates for a separate Consular Service.» This is, as plainly apparent, an extremely modified version of the truth.
III.
His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim’s Proposal. His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim’s proposal implied an attempt to settle the Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this, he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent the old attempts on Norway’s side »to take matters into her own hands», to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs.
In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt. The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom and independence[19:1]. It was certainly on that account that their courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been acceptable.
But Mr Lagerheim’s experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable difficulties through which to pilot its way.
The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the Consular Question. In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since deviated in any way.