8. It is remarkable that during this whole time, in which Sparta founded her empire, we read of no serious contest between Dorians and Ionians. For although the border-states, Megara and Ægina (the latter after its revolt from Epidaurus), carried on a continued war with Athens, the whole race took no part in the contest, and Sparta herself fulfilled the office of an impartial arbitrator between Athens and Megara. Even before the time of Solon, the Athenians and Megarians fought in the territory of Eleusis.[757] The chief struggle was for the island of Salamis, which Solon is supposed to have gained by the well known stratagem,[758] a fact however which was denied by Daimachus of Platæa.[759] According to the Megarian account, some refugees from their own city (named Δορύκλειοι) betrayed the island to the Athenians.[760] So much is certain, that five Spartan arbitrators (Critolaidas, Amompharetus, Hypsechidas, Anaxilas, [pg 195] and Cleomenes), in obedience to ancient traditions and fables respecting the original owners of Salamis, adjudged the possession of Salamis to the Athenians. Yet in the troubles which succeeded the banishment of Megacles, this island was again lost, as well as the harbour Nisæa, which had been before conquered.[761] They soon however regained it, and Megara appears from that time forth to have given up all hopes of recovery: as in this age the power of Athens increased so rapidly, that Megara could no longer think of renewing her ancient contests.

Since it is not my object to give a continuous and general narration of facts, but only to extract what is most instructive for the condition of the Doric race, I shall not carry on the history of the Dorians out of Peloponnesus to a lower point, as their local connexions would lead us far astray into other regions. For the same reason I will only touch upon a few events of the Persian wars, confining myself to the internal affairs of Peloponnesus during that period, among which the supremacy of Sparta is the most important and remarkable.


Chapter IX.

§ 1. Sparta the head of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Its members and their order of precedence. § 2. Mode in which the supremacy of Sparta was exercised. § 3. Congress of the confederacy. § 4. Non-interference of the confederacy with the internal affairs of the confederate States. § 5. Sparta the head of the confederacy by general acknowledgment. § 6. Hellenic league during the Peloponnesian war. § 7. Sparta withdraws from the command of the Allied Army. § 8. Ionia never completely liberated by Athens from the power of Persia. § 9. War between Sparta and Arcadia. § 10. Revolt of the Helots; third Messenian war. § 11. Dissolution of the alliance between Sparta and Athens. Battles of Tanagra and Œnophyta. Five years' truce. Thirty years' truce. § 12. Origin of the Peloponnesian war. § 13. Opposite principles of the contending parties in the Peloponnesian war. § 14. Its influence upon Sparta.

1. Sparta, by the conquest of Messenia and Tegea, had obtained the first rank in Peloponnesus, which character she confirmed by the expulsion of the tyrants, and the overthrow of Argos. From about the year 580 B.C. she acted as the recognised commander, not only of Peloponnesus, but of the whole Greek name. The confederacy itself however was formed by the inhabitants of that peninsula alone, on fixed and regular laws; whereas the other Greeks only annexed themselves to it temporarily. The order of precedence observed by the members of this league may be taken from the inscription on the footstool of the statue of Zeus, which was dedicated at Olympia after the Persian war, the Ionians, who were only allied for a time, being omitted.[762] It is as follows: Lacedæmon, [pg 197] Corinth, Sicyon, Ægina, Megara, Epidaurus,[763] Tegea, Orchomenus, Phlius, Trœzen, Hermione, Tiryns, Mycenæ, Lepreum, and Elis; which state was contented with the last place, on account of the small share which it had taken in the war. The defenders of the Isthmus are enumerated in the following order;[764] Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleans, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, nearly agreeing with the other list, only that the Arcadians, having been present with their whole force, and also the Eleans, occupy an earlier place; and the Megarians and Æginetans are omitted, as having had no share in the defence. This regular order of precedence is alone a proof of a firm union. The Tegeates, since they had joined the side of Lacedæmon, enjoyed several privileges, and especially the place of honour at the left wing of the allied army.[765] Argos remained excluded from the nations of Peloponnesus, as it never would submit to the command of Sparta; the Achæans, indifferent to external affairs, only joined themselves momentarily to the alliance:[766] but the Mantineans, though latterly they followed the policy of Argos,[767] were long attached to the Peloponnesian league; for at the end of the Persian war they sent an army, which arrived too late for the battle of Platæa;[768] having before, together with the other Arcadians, helped to defend the Isthmus;[769] they had also been engaged in the first days of the action at [pg 198] Thermopylae;[770] and they were at this time still the faithful allies of the Lacedæmonians.[771] Their subsequent defection from Sparta may be attributed partly to their endeavours to obtain the dominion of Parrhasia, which was protected by Lacedæmon;[772] to their hostility with Tegea,[773] which remained true to Sparta after the great war with Arcadia, which began about 470 B.C. and to the strengthening of their city (συνοικισμὸς), and the establishment of a democratic government, through the influence of Argos.[774]

2. The supremacy of Sparta[775] was exercised in the expeditions of the whole confederacy, and in transactions of the same nature. In the first, a Spartan king—after it had been thought proper never to send out two together—was commander-in-chief, in whose powers there were many remains of the authority of the ancient Homeric princes. Occasionally, however, Sparta was compelled to give up her privilege to other commanders, especially at sea, as, for instance, the fleet at Salamis to Eurybiades. When any expedition was contemplated, the Spartans sent round to the confederate states,[776] to desire them to have men and stores in readiness.[777] The highest amount which each state could be called on to supply was fixed once for all, and it was only on each particular occasion to be determined [pg 199] what part of that was required.[778] In like manner, the supplies in money and stores were regularly appointed;[779] so that an army, with all its equipment, could be collected by a simple summons. But agricultural labour, festivals, and the natural slowness of the Doric race, often very much retarded the assembling of this army. The contributions, chiefly perhaps voluntary, both of states and individuals, were registered on stone: and there is still extant an inscription found at Tegea, in which the war supplies of the Ephesians, Melians, &c, in money and in corn, are recorded.[780] But the Lacedæmonians never exacted from the Peloponnesian confederacy a regular annual contribution, independent of circumstances; which would have been in fact a tribute: a measure of this kind being once proposed to king Archidamus, he answered, “that war did not consume according to rule.[781]” Pericles, however, properly considers it as a disadvantage to the Peloponnesians that they had no paid troops, and that neither in common nor in the several states they had amassed any treasure.[782] The object of an expedition was publicly declared: occasionally however, when secrecy was required, it was [pg 200] known neither to the states nor to their army.[783] The single allied states, if necessity demanded it, could also immediately summon the army of the others;[784] but it is not clear to what extent this call was binding upon them. The Spartan military constitution, which we will explain hereafter, extended to the whole allied army; but it was doubtless variously combined with the tactics of the several nations.[785] To the council of war, which moreover only debated, and did not decide, the Spartan king summoned the leaders of the several states, together with other commanders, and generally the most distinguished persons in the army.[786]

3. According to the constitution of the Peloponnesian league, every common action, such as a declaration of war, or the conclusion of a peace or treaty, was agreed on at a congress of the confederates. But, as there was no regular assembly of this kind, the several states sent envoys (ἄγγελοι), like the deputies (πρόβουλοι) of the Ionians, who generally remained together only for a short time.[787] All the members had legally equal votes;[788] and the majority sometimes decided against a strong opposition;[789] Sparta was often [pg 201] outvoted, Corinth being at all times willing to raise an opposition.[790] We have however little information respecting the exact state of the confederacy; it is probable indeed, from the aristocratic feelings of the Peloponnesians, that, upon the whole, authority had more weight than numbers; and for great undertakings, such as the Peloponnesian war, the assent of the chief state was necessary, in addition to the agreement of the other confederates.[791] When the congress was summoned to Sparta, the envoys often treated with a public assembly (ἔκκλητοι)[792] of the Spartans; although they naturally withdrew during the division. Of these envoys, besides Sosicles the Corinthian, we also know the name of Chileus of Tegea, who prevailed upon the ephors, after a long delay, to send the army to Platæa, and who did much to allay the differences existing between the members of the then numerous confederacy.[793]

4. But upon the internal affairs, laws, and institutions of the allied states, the confederacy had legally no influence. It was a fundamental law that every state (πόλις) should, according to its ancient customs (καττὰ πάτρια), be independent and sovereign (αὐτόνομος καὶ αὐτόπολις);[794] and it is much to the credit of Sparta, that, so long as the league was in existence, she never, not even when a favourable opportunity offered, deprived any Peloponnesian state of this independence. Nor were disputes between [pg 202] individual states brought before the congress of the allies, which, on account of the preponderance of Sparta, would have endangered their liberty; but they were commonly either referred to the Delphian oracle, or to arbitrators chosen by both states.[795] When Elis claimed an ancient tribute from Lepreum, both states agreed to make Sparta their arbitrator by a special reference. In this character Sparta declared that Lepreum, being an independent member of the confederacy, was not bound to pay the tribute: and Elis acted unjustly in refusing to abide by her agreement, on the plea that she had not expected the decision.[796] For disputes between citizens of different states there was an entirely free and equal intercourse of justice (commercium juris dandi repetendique).[797] The jurisdiction of the states was also absolutely exempt from foreign interference (αὐτόδικοι).[798] These are the chief features of the constitution of the Peloponnesian confederacy; the only one which in the flourishing times of Greece combined extensive powers with justice, and a respect for the independence of its weaker members.