The History and Antiquities of the Doric Race, Vol. 2 of 2

by Karl Otfried Müller

Chapter VI.

§ 1. The Gerusia of Sparta, a council of elders. § 2. The Spartan Gerontes were irresponsible. § 3. Functions of the Spartan Gerusia. § 4. Gerusia of Crete and of Elis. § 5. Character of the Spartan royalty. § 6. Honours paid to the Spartan kings, and the mode of their succession. § 7. Powers of the Spartan kings in domestic; § 8. and in foreign affairs. 9. Revenues of the Spartan kings. § 10. Heraclide princes in Doric states other than Sparta.

1. This result was chiefly brought about by the aristocratical counterpoise to the popular assembly, the gerusia, which was never wanting in a genuine Doric state, the “council of elders,” as the name signifies.[376] In this respect it is opposed to the senate [pg 094] (βουλὴ), which represented the people; although the latter name, as being the more general term, is sometimes used for the council, but never the converse. Thus in the Persian war a senate assembled at Argos, which had full powers to decide concerning peace and war;[377] this was therefore of an aristocratic character, since the government of Argos had not then become democratical. The Homeric assembly, which was of a purely aristocratical form, is called βουλὴ γερόντων or γερουσία;[378] it consisted of the older men of the ruling families, and decided both public business and judicial causes conjointly with the kings, properly so called,[379] frequently, however, in connexion with an ἀγορά. In this assembly lay, but as yet undeveloped, the political elements of the Doric gerusia. At Sparta the name was taken in the strictest sense, as the national opinion laid the greatest importance upon age in the management of public affairs; the young men were appointed for war;[380] [pg 095] and accordingly none but men of sixty or more years of age had admission to this council.[381] The office of a councillor was, however, according to the expression both of Aristotle and Demosthenes,[382] the prize of virtue, and attended with general honour;[383] none but men of distinguished families, blameless lives, and eminent station, could occupy it.[384] Being an office which was held for life,[385] it never could happen that more than one individual was elected at a time, and the eyes of the whole state were directed towards the choice of this one person. Distinguished men, therefore, bordering upon old age, probably always from the oba to which the person whose place was vacated had belonged,[386] offered themselves upon their own judgment[387] before the tribunal of the public voice. Their advanced age enabled the electors to consider and examine a long public life, and ensured to the state the greatest prudence and experience in the elected. To provide against the weakness of age, which Aristotle considers as a defect attendant on this mode of election, was unnecessary for a time and a state whose inhabitants enjoyed the highest bodily health. The aristocratic tendency of the office required that the candidates should be nominated by [pg 096] vote, not by lot, but yet by the whole people;[388] and that they themselves should meet with the good-will of every person; which was particularly required for this dignity.

2. When they had passed through this ordeal they were for ever relieved from all further scrutiny, and were trusted to their own conscience.[389] They were subject to no responsibility, since it was thought that the near prospect of death would give them more moderation,[390] than the fear of incurring at the cessation of their office the displeasure of the community; to whom in other states the power of calling the highest officers to account was intrusted. The spirit of this aristocratic institution was, that the councillors were morally perfect, and hence it gave them a complete exemption from all fear as to the consequences of their actions. To later politicians it appeared still more dangerous that the councillors of Sparta acted upon their own judgment, and not according to written laws; but only because they did not take into account the power of custom and of ancient habit (the ἄγραφα νόμιμα, πάτριοι νόμοι),[391] which have an absolute sway, so long as the internal unity of a people is not separated and destroyed. Upon unwritten laws, which were fixed in the hearts of the citizens, and were there implanted by education, the whole public and legal transactions of the Spartans depended; and these were doubtless most correctly delivered through [pg 097] the mouths of the experienced old men, whom the community had voluntarily selected as its best citizens. Thousands of written laws always leave open a door for the entrance of arbitrary decision, if they have not by their mutual connexion a complete power of supplying what is deficient; this power is, however, alone possessed by the law, connate with the people, which, in the ancient simple times, when national habits are preserved in perfect purity, is better maintained by custom fixed under the inspection of the best men, than by any writing.

To me, therefore, the gerusia appears to be a splendid monument of early Grecian customs: and, by its noble openness, simple greatness, and pure confidence, shows that it was safe to build upon the moral excellence and paternal wisdom of those who had experienced a long life, and to whom in this instance the people intrusted its safety and welfare.

3. The functions of the gerusia were double, it having at the same time an administrative and a judicial authority. In the first capacity it debated with the kings upon all important affairs, preparing them for the decision of the public assembly, and passed a decree in its first stage by a majority of voices,[392] the influence of which was doubtless far greater than at Athens: in the latter capacity it had the supreme decision in all criminal cases, and could punish with infamy and death.[393] Since, however, in [pg 098] both these directions the power of the council gradually came in conflict with that of the ephors, we must first enter into an investigation concerning these officers, before it will be possible to speak of the extent of the functions of the council at different periods. Another circumstance also, which renders a separate inquiry into the nature of the ephoralty requisite, is the inspection which it exercised over the manners of the citizens,[394] in which it manifests a great similarity with the ancient Athenian court of the Areopagus. As every old man had the right of severely censuring the habits of any youth, so every citizen was a youth in comparison with these aged fathers of the state. Hence the awe and veneration with which they were commonly regarded at Sparta. That, however, to an Athenian orator of the democratic times, the gerusia should appear possessed of despotic authority, is not surprising; for it is so far true, that this institution, if transplanted to Athens, would necessarily have caused a tyrannical dominion. In Sparta, however, so little was known of any despotic measure of the gerontes, that, on the contrary, the constitution was impaired when their antagonist office, the ephors, gained the ascendency in influence and power. The institution of the gerusia was in fact, in its main features, once established at Athens, when Lysander nominated the Thirty, who were to be a legislative body, and at the same time the supreme court of justice; with how little success [pg 099] is well known; so true is it, that every institution can only flourish in the soil in which it is first planted.[395]

4. In early times every Doric state must have had a gerusia; but Crete is the only place of whose council accounts have been preserved, and these represent it in precisely the same light as that of Sparta. It was, we are informed, armed with large political and legislative powers, and laid its decrees in a matured state before the general assembly, for its approval or rejection.[396] It decided, without appeal to written laws, upon its own judgment, and was responsible to no one.[397] The members were chosen from those persons who had before filled the supreme magistracy (the cosmi), not, however, until after a fresh examination of their fitness.[398] The office lasted for life, as at Sparta.[399] The princeps senatus was styled βουλῆς πρείγιστος.[400]

In Elis, also, whose government resembled that of Sparta, a gerusia was a very important part of the constitution. It consisted of ninety members, who were chosen for their lifetime from oligarchical families;[401] but in other respects the election was the [pg 100] same as at Sparta, and therefore they were chosen by the whole people. Yet there was also a larger council of 600,[402] which may have been an aristocratical committee selected from the popular assembly. Thus much at least is clear, that the power of the people was very limited; and that, as Aristotle says, there was one oligarchy within another.[403]

5. To the consideration of the gerusia may be joined the inquiry concerning the kingly office in Sparta and other Doric states, as being a cognate element of the constitution. The Doric royalty was a continuation of the heroic or Homeric; and neither in the one nor in the other are we to look for that despotic power, with which the Greeks were not acquainted until they had seen it in foreign countries. In those early times the king, together with his council, was supreme ruler and judge, but not without it; he was also chief commander in war, and as such possessed a large executive authority, as circumstances required. On the whole, however, his station with regard to the nobles was that of an equal; and his office, although for the most part hereditary, could yet be transferred to another family of the aristocracy. [pg 101] He ruled over the common people either in an arbitrary manner, as the suitors in Ithaca, or as a mild father, like Ulysses.[404] His office on the whole bore an analogy to the power of Zeus; and it received a religious confirmation from the circumstance of his presiding at and performing the great public sacrifices with the assistance of soothsayers.