6. A similar body in the Cretan states really consisted of horsemen; the Spartans were called horsemen, and were in fact heavy-armed infantry[1161]; the cause of which was, the low estimation of the cavalry-service among the Lacedæmonians. The country was fitted rather for the production of men than of horses; and although the citizens furnished both the horse and accoutrements, they were ridden only by weak and inferior persons.[1162] Thus the horsemen of Sparta, the number of whom in the Peloponnesian war was at first 400, and afterwards rose to 600,[1163] effected nothing against the better mounted and practised cavalry of Bœotia, which as the light-armed riders sometimes mounted behind, sometimes vaulted off rapidly, was doubly formidable to the enemy.[1164] Among the other Doric states, Tarentum in particular had a numerous[1165] and very excellent light cavalry.[1166] The preference for a force of this description is a proof, according to the principles of antiquity, of an unstable and effeminate character, exactly the reverse of that exhibited by the heavy-armed soldiery of the Lacedæmonians.
In the Lacedæmonian army the Sciritæ formed a separate body,[1167] of whom there were 600 in the Peloponnesian [pg 254] war.[1168] In marches they went in front, in the camp they occupied the extreme place,[1169] and in the battle they formed the left wing.[1170] Although we have no express statement of their mode of arms, we can hardly suppose that they were heavy-armed troops, since they were particularly employed when a rapid change of position, or a vigorous attack, such as storming of heights, &c., was required[1171]; they were often at the post of greatest danger.[1172] Originally, doubtless, they were, as they were called, inhabitants of the district Sciritis, on the confines of Laconia, towards Parrhasia[1173]; their rights and duties appear to have been defined by agreement; their mode of fighting was also perhaps Arcadian. The other Periœci appear only to have taken part in large expeditions, and such as were prepared for a considerable time beforehand; and they probably served for the most part as hoplitæ[1174]; the ratio of their number, as well as that of the neodamodes and others, to the citizens of Sparta, was not governed by any fixed rule.[1175]
It is not by any means clear in what manner the [pg 255] Peloponnesian armies were accompanied by such numerous bodies of light-armed soldiers, more particularly of Helots.[1176] It must at the same time be borne in mind that the Persian war was the only time, that is, on a general summons of the nation, when so many as seven attended upon every Spartan[1177]; on this occasion, when the numbers of the enemy were so excessive, they might have served to protect the rear of the long line of battle, and to resist the pressure; in addition to which they also annoyed the enemy from behind with slings, javelins, and stones. A large part of them, in the capacity of attendants (θεράποντες, ἐρυκτῆρες, ὑπασπισταὶ), were also destined exclusively for the service of the hoplitæ, and to rescue them in danger[1178]; another portion was probably detached to convoy and cover the baggage (στρατὸς σκευοφορικός). The Peloponnesians in early times never attempted to form separate divisions of light-armed soldiers, such as the peltasts were, who, in addition to the javelin, bore the small shield of the Thracians and Illyrians.[1179] The perfection of this species of troops, especially after the improvement of Chabrias and Iphicrates, was the cause of severe injury to the heavy-armed tactics of the Spartans; and the Peloponnesians dreaded them for a long time, [pg 256] according to the Laconian expression, as children fear a bugbear.[1180]
7. The attention of Sparta was almost exclusively directed to the heavy infantry; and it can scarcely be denied that this was carried by them to the highest pitch of perfection. The arms[1181] consisted of a long spear,[1182] a short sword only used in the closest single combat,[1183] a brazen shield,[1184] which covered the body from the shoulders to the knees,[1185] and was in other respects also more similar to the shield of the heroic age than that of the other Greeks. For while the Greeks in general had adopted the Carian handle (ὀχάνη) in order to direct the motion of the shield, of which the size had been considerably reduced, the Spartan buckler was probably suspended upon a thong (τελαμὼν) laid round the neck, and was only managed by a ring (πόρπαξ) fastened to the concave side, which in time of peace could be taken out.[1186] Cleomenes the Third first introduced the handles of [pg 257] shields in Lacedæmon, and in general a less heavy armour.[1187]
8. The principles of the Lacedæmonian tactics may be deduced from what has been already said on the subject of the enomoty, and of its movements; the deployment of the enomoty (the ἐξελιγμὸς) was the chief means of opposing the best soldiers to the enemy,[1188] and it was from this movement in particular that victory was expected. A particular kind of this manœuvre was called the Laconian; it began from the enomotarchs, who faced about to the right, and passed in an oblique direction between their own and the next file; the whole file, following its leader, placed itself in front of the uragus, who merely faced to the right about. So that the whole phalanx, by this means, turning their faces towards the enemy who appeared in the rear, advanced at the same time in that direction by the depth of the order of battle. The Macedonian mode was different from this; for in that the movement began from the uragus, and therefore the phalanx lost, instead of gained, the same space of ground as it covered; and the Cretan (called also Choreus) differed from both, as the enomotarch and uragus both moved, until they changed places, and consequently, according to this method, the phalanx remained on the same ground.[1189] In a charge it was [pg 258] the duty of the general to take care that the army constantly inclined somewhat further to the right than the exact line of its intended direction, since each man naturally endeavoured to bring his unprotected side under the shield of his neighbour, and the last man on the right wing to turn away that side from the danger, and therefore to outflank the left of the enemy:[1190] this was also the cause of the weakness of the right wing, which they endeavoured to remedy by putting in it the best troops, and by protecting it with cavalry. Before Epaminondas discovered the art of concentrating the battle in the spot in which he was strongest, and of keeping the rest of the enemy's troops unengaged, the general had to attend to two points. In the first place, that the chief charge of his own men should be made upon that part where it appeared most easy and advantageous to break the line; and that at the same time his own line should withstand the charge of the enemy: and, secondly, he might endeavour to obtain the victory by extending his front so as to outflank the enemy; a manœuvre which the Spartans seldom indeed attempted, being content to hinder the enemy from effecting it. The chief point was to keep the whole body of men in compact order, both in rapid advance and in pretended flight:[1191] no bravery could excuse a man for quitting his post.
9. The chief characteristic of the warriors of Sparta was great composure and a subdued strength; the violence (λύσσα) of Aristodemus[1192] and Isadas[1193] being considered as deserving rather of blame than praise; [pg 259] and these qualities in general distinguished the Greeks from the northern Barbarians, whose boldness always consisted in noise and tumult.[1194] The conduct of the Spartans in battle denotes a high and noble disposition, which rejected all the extremes of brutal rage; the pursuit of the enemy ceased when the victory was completed;[1195] and, after the signal for retreat had been given, all hostilities ceased.[1196] The spoiling of arms, at least during the battle, was also interdicted;[1197] and the consecration of the spoils of slain enemies to the gods,[1198] as in general all rejoicings for victory were considered as ill-omened;[1199] ancient principles of Greek humanity which we cannot but admire. War was as much as possible confined to a measure of strength; and battle, as Mardonius in Herodotus describes that of the Greeks in general,[1200] was a kind of duel upon the principles of honour. In Peloponnesus, as well as in Eubœa,[1201] the use of the different species of arms had perhaps been regulated by the appointment of general councils; Sparta also retained with a religious veneration the ancient institutions of sacred truces; as, for instance, the Olympic armistice: it wished not only to celebrate its native festivals in quiet,[1202] but even respected [pg 260] foreign solemnities; thus, at so late a period as 391 B.C., that state allowed itself to be delayed and deceived by an appeal of the Argives to “the sacred months.”[1203] If then the state, so long as it remained true to these principles, did not slaughter its enemies without aim or object, so much the more sparing was it of its own soldiers, every moderate loss being severely felt; but even in the engagements of the hoplitæ few of the victorious party were lost. Every one knows of the tearless battle between the Spartans and Arcadians, in which the state had no dead to mourn.[1204] Nothing therefore can be less laid to the charge of Sparta than a violent passion for war, a foolhardy and reckless desire of conquest. The latter was also guarded against by the maxim of Lycurgus,[1205] “not to go often against the same enemy,” the non-observance of which was a charge brought against Agesilaus. With what unwillingness the Lacedæmonians engaged in great wars is generally known. And yet in every action in the open field, up to the battle of Leuctra, Sparta had nearly a certainty of success,[1206] since the consciousness of skill in the use of arms was added to the national feeling of the Doric race, that victory over the Ionians was not a matter of doubt.[1207] With what timidity did the Athenians attack [pg 261] the hard-pressed and exhausted Spartans in Sphacteria! Their feeling towards the captives was nearly the same as that of the Achæans in Homer to the corpse of Hector.
These opinions necessarily experienced innumerable modifications when Sparta engaged in foreign warfare, and moved out of her own orbit into an unknown region; this was particularly the case in maritime war, which, although followed in early times by Corinth, Ægina, and Corcyra, never agreed with the nature of the Doric tribe. For this reason Sparta, although after many unsuccessful attempts she gave birth to men who had considerable talents for this service, as Callicratidas and Lysander, and for a time her fleet was very numerous, and the commander of it a second king,[1208] never showed any particular inclination for it. A disinclination equally strong, and formed upon the same grounds, was shown by the Spartans to the storming of walled places (πυργομαχεῖν[1209]) for which reason they never in early times constructed any defences of this kind; and despised the use of machines, by which Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, thought that “man's strength was annihilated.”
10. We conclude with the assertion with which we prefaced this chapter, though in a different point of view, that no nation ever considered war as an art in the same sense and to the same degree as the Doric Spartans. Indeed every nation, of a military disposition, and addicted to warlike pursuits, considers war not merely as a means of repelling the attacks of [pg 262] enemies, or of gaining plunder or territory by being itself the invader. The mere act of fighting, the common and disciplined movement of thousands directed to the same end, the “pomp, pride, and circumstance of glorious war,” arouse the feelings, and inspire the mind with the noblest and most elevated thoughts; and there is a certain affinity between the art of war and the more regular and peaceful arts; thus a military body resembled, in its movements and array, a large choral dance. These feelings and views were among all nations most natural to the Greeks, and, of the Greek races, familiar to the Dorians in particular.
The agreement which some moderns[1210] have found between the Greek chorus and the lochus is not a mere creation of the fancy; the large chorus was a pentecostys in number, which was divided into enomoties (hemichoria); it advanced in certain divisions, like an army, and had corresponding evolutions.[1211] Both the dance and the battle were the object of the Pyrrhic, which was particularly practised in Sparta and Crete.[1212] In early times it was a preparation for battle, an use of it which was neglected in a later age; in the soldier heavy-armed for the battle was also seen the practised dancer of the Pyrrhic. The same connexion is alluded to by Homer, where Æneas hopes to overthrow Meriones of Crete, however good a dancer he may be:[1213] thus also the Thessalians called the soldiers [pg 263] of the front ranks “principal dancers;” and said of a good fighter, that “he had danced well.”[1214] For the same reason Homer calls hoplitæ by the name πρυλέες[1215] the war-dance having been called πρύλις by the Cretans.[1216] Now this latter expression is used by Homer in the passages in which both Greeks and Trojans give up the usual method of fighting, and the heroes descend from their chariots and form themselves into a body on foot; and therefore of that very mode of battle which became prevalent in Greece through the influence of the Dorians. For the same reason the Spartans sacrificed to the Muses before an action,[1217] these goddesses being expected to produce regularity and order in battle; as they sacrificed on the same occasion in Crete to the god of love, as the confirmer of mutual esteem and shame.[1218]
The whole existence of the Spartans in the camp appears to have been easy and tranquil; and therefore resembled the mode of living in Sparta, as that city was to a certain degree always a camp.[1219] The bodily [pg 264] exercises were regularly continued, and repeated twice in each day;[1220] but with less severity than at home;[1221] and the discipline in general was less strict. The Persian spy found the Spartans in the evening before the battle of Thermopylæ employed, some in gymnastic exercises, and some in arranging their hair,[1222] which they always wore long after their entrance into manhood. Every man put on a crown[1223] when the band of flute-players gave the signal for attack; all the shields of the line glittered with their high polish,[1224] and mingled their splendour with the dark red of the purple mantles,[1225] which were meant both to adorn the combatant, and to conceal the blood of the wounded; to fall well and decorously being an incentive the more to the most heroic valour.