And so we say, pronounce, sentence, declare, ordain, condemn and reserve, in this and any other better way and form which we can and may lawfully employ.

So we the undersigned Cardinals pronounce.

Before proceeding to narrate the consequences of this sentence to the culprit (namely, his recantation and punishment), this seems to be the place to subject this memorable document to a critical review, to show how far the sentence pronounced on Galileo had a legal basis, even on Romish principles. To this end it will be necessary to follow the construction of the sentences step by step, for only in this way can a correct opinion be formed of the accordance of this cunningly devised structure with the actual state of things.

The sentence begins with a condensed historical review of the transactions of 1615, obviously based on the denunciations of Lorini, and the evidence of Caccini of 20th March, 1615. Immediately afterwards follows the well-known opinion of the theological Qualifiers on the principles of Copernicus. This is plainly to justify the measures taken in consequence by the ecclesiastical authorities against his doctrine and its most distinguished advocate. For immediately after follows, first a recapitulation of the report registered in the Vatican MS. of the events of 25th and 26th February, 1616, and then the decree of the Congregation of the Index of 5th March, 1616, “by which those books were prohibited which treat of the aforesaid doctrine, and the same was declared to be false and entirely contrary to Holy and Divine Scripture.” The sentence then comes to the occasion of the trial of Galileo, namely, his “Dialogues,”—and states: firstly, that by this book he had transgressed the special prohibition of 1616;[396] secondly, that his statement therein, which is almost incredible, that he had left the Copernican view undecided and as only probable, is a “gross error,” since a doctrine cannot in any way be probable (probalis) which has already been found and declared to be “contrary to Holy Scripture.”

The first point, from the standpoint of the Inquisition, which treated the note of 26th February, 1616, as an authentic document, is certainly correct; the second, even according to the maxims of Rome, is not to the purpose. According to these maxims a proposition can only be made into a dogma by “infallible” authority, namely, by the Pope speaking ex cathedra, or by an Œcumenical Council; and on the other hand, it is only by the same method that an obligation can be laid upon the faithful to consider an opinion heretical. But a decree of the Congregation of the Index does not entail the obligation; for, although by virtue of the authority conferred on it, it can enforce obedience and inflict punishment, its decrees are not “infallible.” They can, however, be made so, according to ecclesiastical views, either by the subsequent express confirmation of the Pope by a brief in his name, as supreme head of the Christian Catholic Church; or by the decree of the Congregation being originally provided with the clause: “Sanctissimus confirmavit et publicari mandavit.” But the decree of 5th March, 1616, is neither confirmed by a subsequent brief, nor does it contain that special formula; and, therefore, in spite of this decree, which declared the opinion of Copernicus to be “false and contrary to Holy and Divine Scripture,” it might still be considered as undecided, and even probable, because the decree might be fallible, and did not entail the obligation to adopt its sentence as an article of faith.[397] This must also have been the view of the ecclesiastical authorities of the censorship, who had given Galileo’s book the imprimatur, and thereby, as H. Martin justly remarks,[398] relieved the author of responsibility, not in anything relating to the assumed special prohibition, but concerning the accordance of the work with the published decree. Point 2, therefore, seems as unjustifiable as it is untenable. The sentence now gives a brief résumé of the confessions made by Galileo during the examination, which are employed to confirm his guilt. The twofold reproach is urged against him, as of special weight, that he began to write his “Dialogues” after the issue of the assumed prohibition, and that he said nothing about it in obtaining the imprimatur of the censors; thus the special prohibition was treated as an established fact—on the one hand, his disobedience to an injunction of the ecclesiastical authorities was proved, and on the other, the imprimatur was obtained on false pretences, and was null and void.

After a rather weak recapitulation of the declaration so unedifying to posterity, made by Galileo at his second hearing, the sentence proceeds to the discussion of an authentic document which formed the chief defence of the accused: the certificate given him in 1616 by Cardinal Bellarmine. The authors of the sentence had at this point a delicate and difficult task to perform. The object was to uphold the inviolability of the “note” of 26th February, 1616—this main support of the whole indictment—and by no means to make this attestation appear at variance with the actual circumstances, or it would have become an important argument in favour of the accused. Nay, to avoid this rock, material for the accusation had to be found in the words of the certificate itself. And thus we find this document, which, as Wohlwill pertinently remarks,[399] by the words “but only” directly denies the assumed stringent prohibition of 1616, singularly enough, thanks to the sophistry of the Roman lawyers, forming a weighty argument in the sentence for the Inquisitors: “But this certificate,” it says, “produced by you in your defence, has only aggravated your delinquency; since although it is there stated that the said opinion is contrary to Holy Scripture, you have nevertheless dared to discuss and defend it, and to argue its probability.”

But as here they again had to refer to the protecting imprimatur of the ecclesiastical censors, they hasten to add: “nor does the licence, artfully and cunningly extorted by you, avail you anything, since you did not notify the command imposed upon you.”

One cannot help drawing the conclusion, that if the attestation of Cardinal Bellarmine is accepted as true, “the command imposed” did not exist, and of course could not be communicated by Galileo to the censors.