A Fantasy of Far Japan; Or, Summer Dream Dialogues

by Kencho Suematsu

Japan does not covet Indo-China. I have shown elsewhere that the French colonies in the Far East have no perceptible influence upon the situation of Japan, either from a political or an economical point of view. Japan has sufficient to do at home, she does not want to plunge into external adventures, such as meddling with Indo-China or picking a quarrel with a country like France. You may be sure that it would be more politic for France to cultivate amicable relations with Japan than irritate her by such accusations. Even if those accusations honestly represent the true sentiment of the French, the Japanese would only take them for malicious manœuvres directed to aid Russia, and they could not produce any good impression on the minds of the Japanese.

Is there any reason to believe that the so-called Kodama report was forged in Russia rather than in France?

I have demonstrated elsewhere that the document which was recently made public and attributed to Kodama containing some military indications on the plan of an invasion of Indo-China is a perfect forgery. I have exposed elsewhere several technical errors therein which would never appear in an authentic official document. But whether it is authentic or not, I do not attach any importance to the matter, from a political point of view at least. It is the duty of all the military and naval authorities to keep themselves ready for any emergency. For example, France ought to keep herself always prepared for any possible difficulties which may arise on her frontiers in the east, and in the south, and on the western coasts; the same with Germany, with Austria, with Italy, even with the United States.

It appears to me that, if the general staff-office of France or of Germany, or the military or naval authorities of any country whatever, were to remain without the least knowledge as to what measure should be taken in case of a danger, they would be neglecting their duty to their country. I can then say that all the Japanese officers, both in the army and in the navy ought to study constantly the measures which Japan should take in any emergency. I believe it is the same in every country in Europe. This, however, does not belong to the sphere of practical politics. It is the duty of statesmen and politicians to maintain a friendly relationship with all other countries as far as possible; and, consequently, to keep absolute control over their armies and navies. The army and navy ought to serve as instruments and machines in their hands, and not they, the civilians, become the instruments of the army and navy. You may be quite assured that in Japan the army and navy are the machines of the statesmen, and that the statesmen are not their machines.

Can the fabrication of the so-called Kodama report be demonstrated by a precise fact?

I shall not say whence the document emanated. I believe it was composed by some one who does not lack a certain knowledge of Japan, but who has drawn false deductions from his knowledge of similar matters of other countries. Here is the best example. The document speaks of the native contingents of Formosa. Now there exist no such forces in Formosa. The garrisons of Formosa are sent there from Japan. On the other hand, in the colonies belonging to other countries there are generally troops formed of native contingents. It is notably so in French colonies. The author of the document in question, reasoning from these facts, thought that it ought to be the same with Formosa.

Has Japan any fear of another alteration of the Treaty of Shimonoseki being imposed upon her?

The combined action of Russia, Germany and France, for imposing on Japan an alteration of the Treaty of Shimonoseki appears to us to have been a great error on their parts. I can positively say that there are many eminent persons in Germany and in France who regret that action. Even in Russia, in certain quarters, a belief seems to be entertained that, but for the fault then committed, the present misfortunes would not have happened. As to ourselves, we are not hypnotised by the errors then committed by those three powers. We intend to remain friends of France, of Germany, and even of Russia, in spite of the injustice we have suffered, provided, of course, those powers wish to keep friendship.

We do not overlook the possibility of another combination which those powers may have an idea of forming against us, and it behoves us to be watchful. Nevertheless, to tell you my candid opinion, it is scarcely possible that a similar intervention should be renewed. I do not think France would push her docility so far as to follow Germany a second time. It would be necessary that Germany should set the example, aided by Russia and France, to come out to the Far East, especially because the Russian fleets have ceased to exist. I admit that the German fleet is strong, but I do not believe it is powerful enough for one to say with certainty that it can easily crush Japan. At all events, what pretext has Germany to enter into war in the Far East? Among other things also she would have to count on the opinion and sentiments of two countries at least, I mean England and the United States. I do not, therefore, consider a new combination possible. Japan cannot be intimidated by mere barking.

If, however, Europe should choose to take such a course, we should gravely reflect. I do not believe your country for example would ever undertake an expedition against Japan. You have disapproved a small expedition to Tonkin and we are a little more serious than the Tonkinese. France might no doubt, if her honour demanded it, judge it worth the pain to engage in a war with Japan, but under no other circumstance do I believe her disposed to take such a part.