The siege of Cherbourg had proved to be one of the most interesting episodes in the military operations of Henry’s second campaign. On the one hand, the decidedly superior metal of the French guns foreshadowed the transference of the best arm from the English to the French side in this war; on the other, the whole siege served to illustrate the peculiar military genius of the Duke of Gloucester. His conduct of the operations betrayed a great knowledge of the theory of siege warfare, while it showed that he had not served under his brother in vain. Again and again we find traces of Henry’s tactics adapted with great skill to the needs of the present case by some slight elaboration. Without any of the endowments of character which made the elder brother a great general, the younger had, if possible, more of the qualities of a soldier. A greater grasp of the situation is shown in the operations of the siege of Cherbourg than in the case of any of Henry’s sieges, more adaptability to the needs of the moment. Gloucester took his risks and justified them by success. No mere book-learned warcraft would have dared the wedge formation on the day when the English were so hard pressed, but the success of the movement justified its use. Gloucester was an able man and a brave soldier, but he could never have become even a passable commander. Within circumscribed limits he had no equal; there was no captain in the English army who could have surpassed him before Cherbourg, but under no circumstances could he have taken the position which his great brother holds in military history. The natural bent of his mind was inclined to the interests of the moment, and he could never have planned out a campaign, or nursed his men up to a supreme effort, as did Henry on the march to Agincourt. Courage, military skill, and the power to appreciate any situation which confronted him he had in plenty, but in him determination was swallowed up in rashness, and ability fled before constitutional unsteadiness. As a leader of a forlorn hope, or in the performance of a definite piece of work, he was pre-eminent, but his natural characteristics removed any chance of his being in any sense a general. In his military life, even as later in his stormy political career, he displayed great ingenuity and cleverness, but here, as ever, he lacked that vivifying touch of determination which alone could have moulded the incidents of his life into one concentrated policy. At Cherbourg his defects had had but slight chance of display, and it was with increased fame, and with the reputation of a successful commander, that towards the end of October he arrived at Rouen.
While Gloucester had been besieging Cherbourg, and reducing the Côtentin, the King had not been idle. He had spent three months at Bayeux and Caen in creating the machinery for the administration of the duchy, which hitherto had been under military law. At the same time he sent to England for reinforcements, and on their arrival in May he marched eastwards, joining Clarence and Exeter, who had been opening the way to Rouen; the former having completed his work by the capture of the Abbey of Bec Hellouin, the latter having taken Evreux. Taking Louviers and Pont de l’Arche, Henry arrived at Rouen by easy stages on July 29.[280] Rouen had lately turned Burgundian,[281] but this did not entail any inclination to become unpatriotic. Indeed at this moment Burgundy himself was playing the patriotic game, for he had returned to power. The oppression of the Armagnacs, who governed Paris in the name of the Dauphin, together with their unreasonable refusal of terms of agreement with Burgundy, had so enraged the Parisians that a mob revolution in favour of Burgundy and Queen Isabella, who had come to terms with one another in 1417, was made easy. In June Bernard, Count of Armagnac, and many of his adherents were murdered by the populace. Tanneguy du Châtel and the Dauphin escaped from the city with difficulty, and Burgundy was acclaimed with shouts of welcome as he entered Paris.[282] In this position his answer to a pursuivant sent by Henry was a declaration of war.[283]
1418] SIEGE OF ROUEN
The siege of Rouen was more than three months old when Gloucester arrived in November, fresh from the capture of Cherbourg.[284] The abbey and fortress of St. Katharine just outside the town, which had been a great source of inconvenience to the besiegers, keeping open, as it did, communication between the town and the outside world, had capitulated on August 22, and on September 7 Caudebec, which guarded the river approach, surrendered to Warwick,[285] so that now Rouen was shut in on every side. The blockade was strictly kept. Gloucester found the King safely housed in the Carthusian Monastery of Notre-Dame-de-la-Rose, on the east side of the town, about a mile distant from the Porte St. Hilaire, the custody of which was committed to Sir William Porter. Further south, at the Porte Martinville, lay Warwick, with his troops reaching down to the Seine, and behind him the newly acquired fort of St. Katharine. Across the Seine, on the south, Salisbury and Huntingdon guarded ‘La Barbacane.’ On the west, Clarence lay at the ruined abbey of St. Gervais, guarding the Porte Cauchoise and the walls as far as the river. The Earl Marshal lay opposite the castle on the north-west, with Talbot and Sir John Cornwall joining up his men and those of Clarence. Exeter lay at the Porte Beauvassine on the north, while the Lords Willoughby, Ross, and Fitz Hugh completed the circle of the besiegers to the Porte St. Hilaire.[286] Gloucester himself, on his arrival, was given command of the forces which lay at the Porte St. Hilaire,[287] and he justified his selection for a post of danger and importance by that reckless bravery for which he was already well known. He lay nearer to the enemy than any of the besiegers by ‘40 rode and more in spas,’ and supervised his men with great ability, exposing himself to the fire from the town, and repelling the frequent sorties made on his side.[288] Indeed the fighting seems to have been heaviest at the Porte St. Hilaire, for Gloucester casualties were more numerous than in any other part of the army.[289]
Henry’s arrangements for the safety of his army could not have been more carefully or more wisely made. His men were securely entrenched against the daily attacks of the town, whilst he himself, caring neither for fog nor wintry weather, frequently visited the outposts at night. With great care a bridge had been built across the river, thus affording easy and safe communication with Salisbury and Huntingdon. The capture of Caudebec had opened the river, and provisions came pouring in from London;[290] also some of the ships were dragged overland for three miles so as to get above the town bridge, which blocked the way. By this means the French boats were driven to take refuge within the port of Rouen, and while the town lost all hope of a replenished supply of provisions, the English had food in abundance, communication being kept up with England by a fleet lent by Henry’s kinsman, King John of Portugal.[291] No assault was made on the town. Henry was far too wise to attempt to take so strong a fortress by any means but starvation, for Rouen had splendid walls, numerous towers, and plenty of guns, with a garrison, so say the French chroniclers, of four thousand soldiers and sixteen thousand armed citizens, and the most courageous and enterprising leader the English had yet met in the person of Guy le Bouteiller.[292]
The English therefore confined themselves to resisting the almost hourly sorties of the besieged, and to harassing the country with the light troops which had been brought from Ireland.[293] As November passed into December the besieged began to feel a shortage of provisions, and they turned out the non-combatants from the city. It could hardly be expected that Henry would let these pass, and they were driven back to the walls, though the English soldiers gave them food to save them from utter starvation.[294] At the same time, however, the garrison was cheered by the news that an old priest had managed to pass the English lines, and to return with a promise of help from Burgundy. This news also reached Henry, who fortified his camp behind as well as before, in case he had to meet a relieving force;[295] yet this was but a measure of precaution, for he well knew that Burgundy was not strong enough to leave Paris open to the Armagnacs whilst he campaigned in Normandy.
Towards Christmas the garrison were in sore straits;
‘They etete doggys, they ete cattys,
They ete mysse, horse and rattys,’