The truce between Humphrey and his uncle could not be a final settlement of the bad blood that had been aroused, and on All-hallows Even[631] the latter wrote to Bedford in hurried, but emphatic, terms, urging him to come to England without delay, ‘for by my troth,’ he wrote, ‘if you tarry, we shall put this land in adventure with a field,[632] such a brother you have here; God make him a good man.’[633] He forgot to mention that it was he that had taken the first step to ‘put this land in adventure with a field,’ for even as he had been the first, in the days when the Protector’s privileges were being arranged, to provoke that duel for power which, in its later manifestation, was to develop into the Wars of the Roses, so was he now the first to appeal to armed force as a means of emphasising the righteousness of his cause. The statement that Gloucester made the first move to arms cannot be substantiated.[634] It was against the force which Beaufort had already mustered in the suburbs of Southwark that he appealed to the Mayor of London, and in so doing he acted as any wise Protector of the kingdom would have done, when he saw the capital threatened by the armed retainers of a too powerful subject. Moreover, while Beaufort’s force was specially organised, Gloucester was prepared with no retainers to protect himself or his ambitions, but in the time of need he was forced to appeal on the spur of the moment to the loyalty of the citizens. In point of fact, too, the first hostile move was made by the Bishop, for the action of the Mayor in guarding the gates of the city was merely a defensive precaution, unknown to the Beaufort retainers, who did not expect to meet with any resistance when they tried to cross the bridge. Thus both the hostile intent and the hostile action originated with the Chancellor, while the support given to the Protector, apart from the guarding of the gates overnight, was entirely spontaneous on the part of the great mass of the citizens.
The fact that Beaufort so promptly appealed to the arbitrament of Bedford has also been counted unto him for righteousness,[635] whereas it merely displays the cleverness of his play in the game of politics. From Bedford he might hope for support, since the folly of the Hainault campaign would tend to make the Regent in France suspicious of his brother’s actions, and ready to believe that the fault of the recent disturbances lay with him. Moreover, no one knew better than Bedford the usefulness of the Bishop’s purse, and the impolicy of alienating one who could always produce ready money, while Humphrey had no such claim to a statesman’s consideration. Beaufort also had nothing to lose, and a possibility of much to gain, by this appeal. Public opinion in London had spoken against him; it is more than probable that this feeling extended outside the city, and for the time at least he had to acknowledge defeat. On the other hand, if it is true that the Protector refused to formulate complaints against his opponent when asked to do so by envoys from his brother,[636] it was only natural that he should adopt such an attitude. He looked on himself, both by right of birth and by right of the will of Henry V., as the lawful Protector of England, and though he was compelled to accept the restrictions imposed on him by Parliament, he was not likely to acknowledge the supremacy of his brother more than he could help. To indict Beaufort before Bedford would not only be a confession of weakness, but also, in his eyes, an insult to his position. By law as well as by right he was Protector in England so long as Bedford remained in France, and under the circumstances he could recognise no superior tribunal; he had no wish to bring Bedford to England to settle the matter, and thus be compelled to take the second place. Though this attitude was undoubtedly selfish, and based on too high an opinion of his own importance, it does not therefore prove that in the quarrel with Beaufort he was in the wrong.
1425] RETURN OF BEDFORD
For the time being Gloucester’s power was undisputed. On the same day that the letter of summons to England was despatched to Bedford the Council met at the Protector’s own house,[637] a fact which has its significance. It was probably with the consent of the Council that the Protector, with the Duke of Coimbra, journeyed down to Eltham on November 5, and brought the young King back to London to strengthen the hands of the executive there.[638] The same day yielded another illustration of Gloucester’s influence, when the Council, in consideration of his ‘great necessity,’ agreed to lend him five thousand marks on promise of repayment, when the King should reach his fifteenth year,[639] a sum probably used for the expedition to Hainault already described. Beaufort, it is to be presumed, took no part in these transactions, but was compelled to view his rival’s success in silence, eagerly awaiting the return of Bedford, who on December 20 landed on English soil. By virtue of his return Bedford became Protector of the kingdom, receiving the salary of eight thousand marks a year, which in his absence had been enjoyed by his brother,[640] who now was reduced to the rank of first councillor to the King, with an income of three thousand marks only.[641] The Bishop of Winchester hastened to meet Bedford, and together they entered London on January 10, proceeding at once to Westminster, where the new Protector was lodged in the King’s palace, while the Chancellor lay near by at the Abbey, desiring to keep watch over his nephew, lest any influence hostile to himself should be brought to bear on him.[642] So successfully did he put his case and justify the policy of his appeal to the Regent in France, that Bedford showed marked hostility to his brother, and when the citizens of London came to greet him on the morrow of his arrival, and presented him with a pair of ‘silver gilt basins, they received but a cold reception, in view of the hostility they had recently shown to the Chancellor and his proceedings.[643]
1426] COUNCIL AT ST. ALBANS
Already steps had been taken to summon Parliament, which was to meet on February 15 at Leicester,[644] the choice of this town being probably due to the Chancellor’s fears that in London public opinion would be too strongly against him, and in the meantime vigorous attempts were made to effect a reconciliation before the meeting took place. On January 29 a Council was held under the presidency of Bedford at St. Albans, whence a deputation, consisting of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Earl of Stafford, Lords Talbot and Cromwell, and Sir John Cornwall, was sent to Gloucester, who had refused to attend the meeting, though he might have counted on the support of public opinion in the neighbourhood of his chosen abbey. This deputation was commissioned to inform the Duke that another Council was to be held at Northampton on the 13th of the next month, and to offer him a pressing invitation to attend there, as the matters in dispute between him and the Chancellor were to be discussed with a view to a reconciliation, assuring him that ‘justice and reason shal duely and indifferently be mynystered unto him in all things that he hath said or shal say as for occasion or matter of the displesaunce or hevynesse abovesaid.’ To the demand which Humphrey had made, that as a condition of his coming the absence of his opponent must be assured, the Council gave a decided refusal, pointing out that there was no danger of a riot between the retainers of the respective parties, as the Bishop had agreed to restrain his men, and the King would ‘settle such rewle’ that peace would be maintained throughout the town. It is, however, probable that Gloucester feared more the hostile bias in Bedford’s mind produced by the machinations of his uncle, than personal violence to himself, and preferred a direct appeal to the Lords in Parliament, with whom his influence was much stronger than it had been earlier in the reign, to a judgment by the Council, now under the domination of his opponents.
This changed attitude of the Council, which before Bedford’s landing had been controlled by Gloucester, is seen in a secret instruction to the deputation. Should the Duke steadily refuse to go to Northampton under the assurances mentioned above, the commissioners were empowered to add, that at the request of Bedford and the Council Beaufort had promised to dismiss some of his men, and only bring such as were fitting for his position, on condition that Gloucester should do likewise. It is very strange that this condition should be kept in the background, and only produced under compulsion, for it seems a natural concession, and one which could only be refused by a man who was not acting in perfect honesty. If the Council had suspected the large retinue of the Earl of March in 1423, why should not the Chancellor’s evidently large body of retainers incur the same suspicion? It would be, of course, absurd to suggest that, had Gloucester gone to Northampton, the drama of 1447 at Bury St. Edmunds would have been anticipated; the mere presence of Bedford would refute such a suggestion; but this ‘card up the sleeve’ policy does not speak well for the honesty of those who adopted it.
If after their last magnanimous offer Gloucester still persisted in his refusal to attend if Beaufort were present, the messengers of the Council were to point out that it would be unreasonable in Gloucester, even if he were the King—surely a malicious insinuation—to refuse any man a hearing, and also that if he wished ‘to be esed as towards his griefs,’ as the Council assured him was their honest intention, it must be done either by an act of justice, or by a reconciliation, either of which required the presence of both parties. Moreover, to Gloucester’s demand that the Chancellor should resign the custody of the seals, it was answered that this was an attempt to coerce the King—for no official was ever dismissed except by the King’s wish, by his own request, or owing to some fault proved against him.[645] In their refusal of this request the Council were undoubtedly justified, and there is much that is wise and statesmanlike throughout the instructions, due undoubtedly to the influence of Bedford. But there is also ample evidence of Beaufort influence, and we cannot blame Gloucester if he regarded this communication more as a manifesto from his opponents than as a genuine offer of arbitration, and refused to go to Northampton, preferring to wait till the Parliament should be summoned at Leicester. One thing should not pass unnoticed in this offer of the Council. Though the Bishop had summoned Bedford from France, Gloucester had now assumed the rôle of accuser. It was as such that he was to appear at Leicester, having herein outmanœuvred his opponent, who, thinking to act on the aggressive, had been compelled to fall back on a defensive attitude.
1426] PARLIAMENT OF LEICESTER