Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester: A Biography

by Kenneth Hotham Vickers

1440] ATTACK ON BEAUFORT

To a man who had seen half France conquered owing to the dissensions of the French Court this method of crippling England’s enemy must have seemed a chance not to be missed. Whatever the unacknowledged motive of the project, the question of the moment was the release of Charles of Orleans, and it was this which brought Humphrey from the seclusion of his books, once more to mix in the party politics which he had for the time abandoned. However honest Gloucester’s objection to the peace policy might be, his dislike of his uncle, and the traditions of fifteen years’ faction fight, could not be forgotten; he strongly resented the position of authority which the recent negotiations had given Beaufort in the councils of the nation, and his first step towards asserting himself once more in party politics was to draw up a heavy indictment of the Cardinal, his policy, and his adherents.[913] He drew up a lengthy document, in which—probably as a taunt to the Duke of Burgundy—he styled himself Duke of Gloucester, Holland, Zealand, and Brabant, Earl of Pembroke, Hainault, and Flanders, and addressed the King with a warning that some were imposing on his youth, ‘in derogation of your noble estate.’ He began his attack by a renewal of the old complaint that Beaufort had accepted the Cardinal’s hat which Henry V., well knowing his pride and ambition when merely a Bishop, had denied him. He took his stand on the rights of the see of Canterbury, declaring that Henry V. would not have objected to one who was not a Bishop becoming a Cardinal. Though the King might summon a Cardinal to his Council Board, yet in Parliament he ought to be present merely as a Bishop and in no other capacity; moreover, the Statute of Provisors had been infringed by the licence to retain his bishopric obtained by Beaufort from the Pope. The Cardinal had manœuvred to get the crown-jewels into his possession by encouraging the war, and he had secured rights in Southampton in such a way as to constitute a standing danger and disgrace to the kingdom. He had procured the release of James of Scotland without the consent of Parliament, and had turned this to his advantage by marrying his niece to the Scotch King; he had wrongfully recovered his jewels when forfeited to the Crown; he had evaded paying the dues of his cathedral church at Winchester, and by securing grants of land he was rapidly stripping the King of his possessions. From whence came all this wealth, which could not be drawn from his see, nor from an inherited patrimony which he did not possess? He had become wealthy from the sale of offices in France and in England, and, grown arrogant by these ill-gotten gains, he had assumed the pomp and magnificence of royalty, though he neither had nor could have any interest in the Crown.

Together with Beaufort in this indictment was included the Archbishop of York, who also had recently received a Cardinal’s hat. It was generally accepted in the country, so Humphrey maintained, that together they were practically governing the kingdom, and had estranged the King from himself, the Duke of York, the Earl of Huntingdon, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, the last of whom by his position ought to be counted amongst the King’s chief advisers. The policy of these two men was injurious to the kingdom, for had they not procured the sending of ambassadors to Arras, where the only results had been an enormous expense to the nation and the reconciliation of the Duke of Burgundy with Charles of France? More recently other envoys had been sent to Calais, without his knowledge or sanction, where Burgundy and Orleans had been allowed to make up their differences. Had not also the Archbishop with the connivance of Beaufort encouraged the King to renounce all his claims on France, when the French ambassadors were lately at Windsor, and what but evil results could come from the forthcoming negotiations in March, for it was rumoured that these two prelates intended to release the Duke of Orleans, whom Henry V. had ordered in his will to be kept in confinement till the conquest of France was complete? The whole foreign policy of the King’s advisers was unwise and corrupt, for, though he himself had frequently offered his services for the defence of France, Beaufort had always secured the refusal of the offer, sending in his stead favourites of his own with unfortunate results. This long ‘complaynte’ concluded with an urgent appeal for the dismissal of the two Cardinals from the Council.[914]

No stronger evidence than is afforded in this indictment could be found to prove Beaufort’s complete ascendency over the policy of the nation, and though we may hesitate to acquit the Cardinal of many of the charges off-hand, the whole document betrays the hopeless incapacity of its composer to take a broad and statesmanlike view of affairs, and shows him to be the mere politician which he had already proved himself. The inquiry as to whence came the Cardinal’s wealth is pertinent, and has never been adequately answered; in his contention that the Bishop had been despoiling the King of his possessions, Humphrey was supported by that eminent observer, Sir John Fortescue,[915] but the question of the cardinalate had been discussed and settled, and no useful end could be reached by its resuscitation, and the attempt—if attempt it was—on the part of the Cardinal to increase the power of his house by the marriage of Joan Beaufort to the unhappy King of Scotland had ended in such dismal failure that it might well be left out of the reckoning. It was, however, in the matter of foreign policy that Gloucester so patently showed his lack of insight. Without touching on the question of the release of Orleans, to which reference will be made later, it cannot be denied that the Cardinal’s peace policy was wise, and if so far it had not met with success, it was owing to misfortune rather than to any inherent defect, whilst Gloucester’s opposition to it was based on a blind misreading of the lessons taught by past events. Nevertheless the inference to be drawn from the language of the indictment is that hitherto the Duke had had but little part in the rejection of the French terms, though he acknowledged that he had refused his consent to the suggestion that Henry should surrender his title of King of France. The complaint as to the waste of money at the Congress of Arras was amply justified, for the fabulous sum of £22,000 was spent on the Conference.[916] Still it must be confessed that the document as a whole is violent beyond the limits of judiciousness, and it seems to be the appeal of an angry man to a larger audience than that to which it was addressed.[917] In view of Gloucester’s recent retirement from active life it is inexplicable, unless that retirement was the result of compulsion and not of choice, and together with his protest against the release of Orleans, which quickly followed, it stands as the last cry of a disappointed and helpless man.

1440] RELEASE OF ORLEANS

No answer was vouchsafed to this ebullition of wrath, but more attention was paid to the protest which followed it. The release of the Duke of Orleans was already decided upon, and in June Humphrey demanded that his objections to such an act should be registered under the Great Seal, for he declared that, were it not officially made quite clear, no one would believe that a step of such importance would be taken without his consent. ‘I protest’—so runs this document—‘for myn Excuse and my Discharge, that I never was, am, nor never shall be Consentyng, Conseiling, nor Agreyng to his Deliverance or Enlargissement, nor be noon other manere of Meen, which shuld take effect, otherwise than is expressed in my seid Lord my Brother’s Last Will (whom God assoille), or els suerte of so grete good whereby my Lorde’s both Realmes and Subyetts shuld be encresed and easid.’ Clearly and succinctly he detailed the reasons which compelled him to oppose the policy of the King’s advisers at a time when Charles of France wanted men of ‘discretion and judgment to order his affairs.’ The advent of Orleans to his councils would give the necessary stability to the government, and help to reconcile those factions at the French Court which so greatly aided the English cause. Moreover, when once released, Orleans would be confronted with the alternative of breaking either his oaths to Henry, or his oaths to the man whom he considered to be his own sovereign, and if the articles of agreement between the two Kings were not observed, what remedy had Henry got? The English were defenceless, for it was more than probable that the men of Normandy, who had been put to great expense in carrying on the war, would revolt when the news of Orleans’ release reached them, whilst the recall of Huntingdon left Guienne, ‘his Majesties ancient heritage,’ defenceless. Besides this, the King had no alliance with any Christian prince save the youthful King of Portugal, a fact which emphasised the folly of releasing one who was likely to prove a ‘capital enemy’ to the crown of England. The project was not only contrary to the expressed wish of the late King, but was inimical to all the best interests of the kingdom, and if release was necessary, at least there might be an exchange of English prisoners for this prince of the blood royal of France. In any case such a step should not be taken without some kind of consultation with the French and Norman subjects of the King.[918]

Such were the arguments Gloucester brought against the release of Orleans from his confinement in England. It is easy to feel pity for the prisoner of war, who through no fault of his own had been kept in bonds in a strange country for the last twenty-five years, but it was no humanitarian spirit which suggested to the King’s advisers the project of his release. The war had become both a failure and a burden, and most men were agreed that some means of ending the long struggle must be found. The people had long since ceased to pine for those military glories which the sanctimonious ambition of the late King had taught Englishmen to regard as their birthright, and Humphrey could not be expected to be heard by willing ears if he preached a policy of mere aggression. In this second manifesto, therefore, there are no signs of that cry against all movement towards peace, which had characterised the indictment against Beaufort. On the contrary, the need for peace is treated almost as though it were a necessity, and objection is taken only to the method employed to reach that end; the success of the French forces is so far recognised that Charles is alluded to as the King of France. Humphrey has changed his ground; the Jingo policy of war to the bitter end has been abandoned, and the attack is levelled at the methods, not at the aims of his opponents. Viewed in this light it would be hard to deny that Gloucester was right; though the most disastrous result which he predicted would follow the release did not come to pass, none of the advantages urged by the other party resulted. The Duke of Orleans patched up his old quarrel with the House of Burgundy, and cemented it with a marriage; he received as a result the cold shoulder at the Court of his royal master, and he then retired to the quiet of a country retreat, and became famous as the centre of one of the most literary and polite societies of his age. His release did no good to England, whilst his retention might have been a strong card in the hands of English negotiators, and though we may rejoice that a simple soul found freedom, we must not, with modern sentimentality, condemn the man who did his best to spoil the idyll of the Court of Charles of Orleans.

Though Gloucester’s indictment of Beaufort and his opposition to the policy of peace had left the country cold, his arguments against the release of the Duke of Orleans had produced an effect, which the men who controlled the King hastened to counteract.[919] The King drew up a manifesto, impelled thereto, so he said, by the report that his people were complaining that so important a prisoner had been set at liberty. He desired it to be understood quite clearly that what had been done had been done at his own initiative, and that no one else was responsible for it, an assertion so emphatic and so contrary to his character, as to raise our doubts as to its veracity. His one object, he asserted, was to bring to an end this war, ‘that longe hath contyned and endured, that is to saye, an hundreth yeeres and more,’ and his arguments in favour of peace were obvious and convincing. Edward III. had failed, his father had been checked before he died, and his own efforts had met with but poor success. The best way to secure peace was to release Orleans, who would use his influence in the French councils to this end, and would remove the desire for a continuance of war amongst those in power in France, who only looked on the prolongation of the struggle as a means of keeping Orleans safely out of the way as a prisoner abroad. He argued that Orleans knew nothing of English plans, and therefore could not betray them even if he so desired, and he concluded with a pious declaration about the immorality of keeping a prisoner of war in perpetual confinement, probably the only sentiment uninspired by others in the whole manifesto.[920]

The fact that this refutation was considered necessary points to a strong public opinion in support of Gloucester, but the advocates of release had their way, and on All-Saints’ Day a solemn service was held, whereat Orleans swore on the Sacrament never to bear arms against England, in the presence of the King and the assembled Lords. Gloucester was there too, but to mark his disapproval of the whole proceedings, ‘qwan the Masse began he toke his barge,’ and left the scene of what he considered to be an act which could only assist the undoing of his country.[921] On November 3 the indentures were signed, and the Duke of Orleans was ready to return to his native land.[922]

1441] DECLINING IMPORTANCE