But with the ordinary man, there must remain a balance of sexual inclination which cannot entirely be transmuted. Here we encounter the first process, and our problem, particularly in non-married life, becomes acute. Is it possible, and is it healthy, to deny the sex-instincts all satisfaction? Different answers are given by religious advisers and by men of the world, while even in the ranks of the medical profession there is no consensus of opinion.
I suggest that there is only one general principle which can be our guide.
The natural tendency of all sexual thought and emotion is to find its outlet in physical expression of some kind. If a man indulges in sexual thought, it is almost impossible for him to avoid a physical result. He may have recourse to prostitution or he may commit solitary practices. The tendency of Puritan morality is, as we have seen, to regard the physical act as the sin and to avoid the conclusion that the thought is evil; consequently the patient is urged at all cost to refrain from action. Let it be stated, quite frankly, that this attitude is scientifically and morally indefensible. It is the thought rather than the act on which the responsibility should be weighed. I have no hesitation whatever in asserting that it is worse, medically and morally, for the individual to indulge in sexual thought and repress the consequent action, than to commit it. The mere absence of physical conduct is harmful and deplorable if the mind is a seething mass of sexual energy which is being denied all outlet.
The first duty in such cases is, as we have seen, to apply the process of transmuting this sexual thought to non-sexual interests, so far as this can be done. The extent to which this is possible must vary in each individual nature. The comparative balance then remains. And here we must bring into play the moral principle to which I have already referred—namely that the morality of sex is determined by the extent to which love is the motive. Sex inspired by love is moral; sex inspired by any other motive is not. The part which the physical sex-force should alone play is the sacramental expression of pure love; so employed it is a perfect and divine activity. When the love-motive is absent, or is not the dominant incentive, the sex-force becomes comparatively immoral and abused.
This is a general principle which can be rigidly employed. And I do not want to escape from the consequences of this doctrine. It appears to me the one natural, fundamental principle upon which a moral standard can be based. Therefore I am ready to accept the conclusion that there are many marriages which are highly immoral because the sex-act is not an expression of love, but either a mere mechanical duty or the result of a physical and emotional excitement, as distinct from love. On the other hand there are many sex adventures, inspired by love, which do not occur within the matrimonial state. This principle alone must guide us in any moral estimate we draw.
Let us apply this doctrine by taking the simple case of a man and woman who are accused of having committed adultery. We inquire first, whether mutual love was the true motive, whether in fact the act of adultery was an unpremeditated incident which occurred as naturally as the kiss which a child gives to its mother. We draw a clear moral line between the sort of assignation which has for its one object the gratification of physical sensations, or the even lower motive, so far as the prostitute is concerned, of substituting for love the earning of a few shillings. But suppose we are satisfied that the physical act was not the object but the result, and that there was love. We go on to ask how deep was the love, and if a deep love is alleged, we ask why the parties are not married. For it is doubtful whether normal love can be wholly spasmodic. It seems contrary to the very nature of love that a man should love one woman for an hour and then throw her over for someone else. The essence of love tends to completeness and permanence.
But we will imagine that even these conditions are satisfied, and that financial difficulties or parental objections alone prevent the formal marriage. We have also discovered that the two people have loved each other for some time, and that there is not therefore simply a sudden fascination, but a love based on knowledge and matured by experience. We are then left with a technical and not a moral offence. In effect a marriage has taken place; there has been the consent which is the essence of the union. It is only when the Catholic conception of the sacrament of matrimony is abandoned that we find ourselves regarding the ceremony in Church or registry-office as the union, and that therefore a moral offence is committed in the sex-act where no such ceremony has taken place. It is true that the parties would be in honour bound to receive the blessing of the Church. The union is irregular; but it is a true union.
Incidentally, I suggest that this theory may be the basis of the scriptural exception in St. Matthew’s gospel made as regards divorce where there has been “fornication,” or a pre-marital sex-act—namely that by this act a natural marriage has been consummated, and that the subsequent marriage is therefore invalid.
One might almost draw up a schedule of the tests which should be applied whenever we may happen to be forced to adjudicate as to the morality of any sex-behaviour. For already there have emerged certain definite test-principles. There is the consideration of the standard of the relative degree of intelligence to which the particular individual has developed, and of the fact that there are many types of sex-temperament. On the other hand we see that the direction of absolute morality to which our faces should be set, is the raising of the sex-force to super-physical levels, so that the physical side becomes a mere incident, or is even eliminated altogether. Then we apply the rule that there must be an exercise of restraint and will-power, so that sex obsession is entirely avoided. The extent to which the mind can be diverted from sexual channels must depend on the stage of development which the individual has reached. Lastly, we apply the test of how far love, so deep and pure that it is permanent rather than spasmodic, a monopoly rather than promiscuous, is the motive.
Modern society has gone, I contend, as much astray in drifting to the extreme of considering all things permissible, as has Puritanism in regarding the sex-act outside marriage as in all circumstances a deadly evil. And I can only marvel that this latter attitude is taken up so often in the name of the Christian religion, when its Founder, while declaring that at the last day it would be “more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah than for the Scribes and Pharisees,” also said to the woman taken in adultery, “Neither do I condemn thee; go thy way, from henceforth sin no more.”