CHAPTER IV.
1824.
Bundoola—Retreat of Captain Noton—Defeat at Ramoo—Repulse of the Burmans—Burmese account of the War—Rangoon expedition—Description of Rangoon.
Maha Men-gyee Bundoola, the Burman general, was one of the best of the subjects of the monarch of Ava. He owed his proud position, not to the empty promoting system of a European court, but, like an adventurer in a brave and warlike country, he rose from the ranks, and, pioneer-like, cut away the overhanging branches between himself and his honourable goal. Such a change of fortune is not uncommon in Oriental countries; but it is uncommon to find little court favour at work in his elevation. He had fought and received honour and solid pudding, yet he had an end to expect, and the culminating point of his fame had now arrived, and cab-like, he would have to take care of the post at the corner. That post was the Anglo-Indian army, and he hazarded himself upon the chance of overthrowing it, with what success will afterwards be seen.
“It has been already noticed,” says Wilson,[269] “that a large Burman force had been assembled in Arakan, under the command of the chief military officer of the state of Ava, Maha Men-gyee Bundoola, an officer who enjoyed a high reputation, and the entire confidence of the court, and who had been one of the most strenuous advisers of the war; in the full confidence that it would add a vast accession of power to his country, and glory to himself. His head-quarters were established at Arakan, where, probably, from ten to twelve thousand Burmans were assembled. Early in May, a division of this force crossed the Naf, and advanced to Rutnapullung, about fourteen miles south from Ramoo, where they took up their position, and gradually concentrated their force to the extent of about eight thousand men, under the command of the four rajas of Arakan, Ramree, Sandaway, and Cheduba, assisted by four of the inferior members of the royal council, or atwenwoons, and acting under the orders of Bundoola, who remained at Arakan.
“Upon information being received of the Burmans having appeared, advancing upon Rutnapullung, Captain Noton moved from Ramoo with the whole of his disposable force, to ascertain the strength and objects of the enemy. On arriving near their position, upon some hills on the left of the road, in which the Burmans had stockaded themselves, they opened a smart fire upon the detachment, which, however, cleared the hills, and formed upon a plain beyond them. In consequence, however, of the mismanagement of the elephant-drivers, and the want of artillery details, the guns accompanying the division could not be brought into action; and as without them it was not possible to make any impression on the enemy, Captain Noton judged it prudent to return to his station at Ramoo, where he was joined by three companies of the 40th native infantry, making his whole force about one thousand strong, of whom less than half were regulars. With these, Captain Noton determined to await at Ramoo the approach of the Burmans, until the arrival of reinforcements from Chittagong.”
In this the captain was most decidedly wrong. It was not only injudicious to retreat before the barbarian Burmans, but it was reprehensible on his part to give them so much encouragement and breathing-time. The Burmans always looked upon the English as “wild foreigners,” and despised them on account of their creeping, sneaking policy. The first impression made on their minds by the unresented massacre of Negrais was not forgotten; and the mission of Alves, Symes, Cox, and Canning, with their undecided, un-English measures, had added to form the contempt with which they had learnt to regard the Anglo-Indian government into a tangible shape. These considerations, joined with the natural arrogance of a semi-civilised race, with the advantage of a victorious general, with the indecision of a British officer, all tended to prepare the Burmese for the victory which was soon to grace their arms. But, in recounting the events at Ramoo, it must ever be remembered, that the day was lost rather by British indecision, than gained by Burman valour. Indeed, up to this time, it is remarkable to what extent snail policy had obtained among the Indian authorities; and how, partly from want of accurate information, partly from this mean and truckling spirit, the Anglo-Indian government had lost consequence in the eyes of the king of Ava. Undoubtedly, the overcharged work of Colonel Symes had led to an incorrect estimate of the resources of the country; it is well, however, that I shall hardly have occasion to return to this, for soon I shall have to record—welcome task!—the daring scheme of Lord Amherst’s administration, and its successful, though less fortunate, accomplishment, by Sir Archibald Campbell. To continue the narrative in the words of the Professor:[270]—
“On the morning of the 13th of May, the enemy advanced from the south, and occupied, as they arrived, the hills east of Ramoo, being separated from the British force by the Ramoo river. On the evening of the 14th, they made a demonstration of crossing the river, but were prevented by the fire from the two six-pounders with the detachment. On the morning of the 15th, however, they effected their purpose, and crossed the river upon the left of the detachment, when they advanced, and took possession of a tank; surrounded, as usual, with tanks in this situation, by a high embankment, which protected them from the fire of their opponents.” However, the captain, who saw the necessity of action, soon took up a favourable position, and “a sharp fire was kept up on the Burmans as they crossed the plain to the tank; but they availed themselves with such dexterity of every kind of cover, and so expeditiously entrenched themselves, that it was much less effective than was to have been expected.” Honour is certainly due to the officers and men so perilously situated; and it gives us satisfactory proof that Captain Noton’s previous retreat was not caused by want of courage, but by an indecision, as unaccountable as it was finally disastrous.
The Professor proceeds:—“On the morning of the 17th, the enemy’s trenches were advanced within twelve paces of the picquets, and a heavy and destructive fire was kept up by them. At about nine A.M., the provincials and Muglevy abandoned the tank entrusted to their defence, and it was immediately occupied by the enemy. The position being now untenable, a retreat was ordered, and effected with some regularity for a short distance. The increasing numbers and audacity of the pursuers, and the activity of a small body of horse attached to their force, by whom the men that fell off from the main body were instantly cut to pieces, filled the troops with an ungovernable panic, which rendered the exertions of their officers to preserve order unavailing. These efforts, however, were persisted in until the arrival of the party at a rivulet, when the detachment dispersed; and the siphahis, throwing away their arms and accoutrements, plunged promiscuously into the water. In the retreat, Captains Noton, Trueman, and Pringle, Lieutenant Grigg, Ensign Bennet, and Assistant-surgeon Maysmore, were killed. The other officers engaged, Lieutenants Scott, Campbell, and Codrington, made their escape; but the two former were wounded: the loss in men was not ascertained, as many of them found their way, after some interval and in small numbers, to Chittagong: according to official returns, between six hundred and eight hundred had reached Chittagong by the 23rd of May; so that the whole loss, in killed and taken, did not exceed, probably, two hundred and fifty.”[271] This was, however, enough to arouse the slumbering ire in British hearts. Colonels Shapland and James speedily revenged the death of the captain, whose imprudence had cost him so much, and whose courage and endurance had availed him so little; soon the Burmese lost their temporary advantage, and never were they to regain it. At the end of July the enemy fled from all their positions on the Naf.