Burmah and the Burmese

by Kenneth R. H. Mackenzie

“If you wish for peace, you may go away; but if you ask either for money or territory, no friendship can exist between us. This is Burmese custom.”

It is, indeed, Burmese custom! Nothing is to be obtained from them without force; not that they do not feel the demand just, but because they will hold doggedly to what they can get, though it benefit them not, nay, even if it be hurtful.

“The court of Ava,” observes Wilson, “indignant at the idea of conceding an inch of territory, or submitting to what, in oriental politics, is held a mark of excessive humiliation, payment of any pecuniary indemnification, breathed nothing but defiance, and determined instantly to prosecute the war.”[316] It was then that, on the numerous incursions of the Burmese, the definite reply was returned to the British commander-in-chief, proving that, after all, the advances made by the Burmese were only made to gain time.

The gallant general now determined to advance boldly on the enemy. His forces now amounted to 5,000 men, of whom 3,000 were British. Up to the 1st of December, operations were rather unfavourable than otherwise; on that day, however, fickle fortune again turned over to the English side. I shall give the events of the day in the words of Wilson:[317]

“Leaving four regiments of native infantry for the defence of Prome, General Campbell marched, early on the morning of the 1st of December, against the enemy’s left, while the flotilla, under Sir James Brisbane, and the 26th Madras native infantry, acting in co-operation, by a cannonade of the works upon the river, diverted the attention of the centre from the real attack.

“Upon reaching the Nawine river, at the village of Zeonke, the force was divided into two columns. The right, under Brigadier-General Cotton, formed of his Majesty’s 41st and 89th regiments, and the 18th and 28th native infantry, proceeding along the left bank of the river, came in front of the enemy’s intrenchments, consisting of a series of stockades, covered on either flank by thick jungle, and by the river in the rear, and defended by a considerable force, of whom 8,000 were Shans, or people of Laos, under their native chiefs. The post was immediately stormed. The attack was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, with the advanced guard of the right column, and the stockades were carried in less than ten minutes. The enemy left three hundred dead, including their general, Maha Nemyo, and all their stores and ammunition, and a considerable quantify of arms were taken. The left column, under the commander-in-chief, composed of his Majesty’s 13th, 38th, 47th, and 87th regiments, and 38th Madras infantry, which had crossed the Nawine river lower down, came up as the fugitives were crossing, and completed the dispersion of the Burman army.

“Following up the advantage thus gained, General Campbell determined to attack the Kyee Woongyee in his position, without delay. His force accordingly marched back to Zeonke, where they bivouacked for the night, and resumed their march on the following morning at daybreak. The nature of the country admitted of no approach to the enemy’s defences upon the hills, except in front, and that by a narrow pathway, accessible to but a limited number of men in line. Their posts at the foot of the hills were more readily assailable, and from these they were speedily driven; but the attack of the heights was a more formidable task, as the narrow road by which they were approached was commanded by the enemy’s artillery and breastworks, numerously manned. After some impression had been apparently made by the artillery and rockets, the first Bengal brigade, consisting of H.M.’s 13th and 38th regiments, advanced to the storm, supported on the right by six companies of H.M.’s 87th. They made good their ascent, in spite of the heavy fire they encountered, and to which scarcely a shot was returned; and when they had gained the summit, they drove the enemy from hill to hill, until they had cleared the whole of the formidable and extensive intrenchments. These brilliant advantages were not gained without loss; and in the affair of the 1st, Lieutenants Sutherland and Gossip, of H.M.’s 41st, and Ensign Campbell, of the royal regiment, were killed; and Lieutenant Proctor, of H.M.’s 38th; Lieutenant Baylee, of the 87th; and Captain Dawson, of H.M.’s ship Arachne, in that of the second. The division under General Cotton, which had made a circuitous march to take the enemy in flank, was unable to make its way through the jungle to bear part in the engagement. On the 5th a detachment from it proceeded across the river, and drove the right wing of the enemy, not only from their post upon the river, but from a strong stockade about half a mile in the interior, completely manned and mounting guns. The enemy were dispersed with severe loss in killed and prisoners, and their defences were set on fire.”

No time was now lost in advancing upon the retreating army. On the 9th of December the march of the British columns began, and their path lay along “dismal swamps,” and jungles, which, overrun with every kind of reeds and elephant-grass, presented a dreary and dispiriting aspect to the troops. Indeed, the effect of the marshy country was soon felt on the army, for on the 12th the cholera broke out among the troops, and, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch,[318] nearly two regiments were placed in an unfit condition for action. At Meaday the sight was sad enough. “Within and among the stockades,” says Mac Farlane,[319] “the ground was strewed with dead and dying Burmese lying promiscuously together, the victims of wounds, of disease, or of want. Several large gibbets stood about the stockade, each bearing the mouldering remains of three or four crucified Burmese, who had been thus barbarously put to death for having wandered from their posts in search of food, or for having followed the example of their chiefs in flying from the enemy.”[320]

I must pass briefly over subsequent events. Conferences for the purpose of settling a peace were sought and obtained by the Burmese; but the negotiations came to nothing. It seemed that all feelings of any kind had left them. They neither sought to conclude a peace, nor, on the other hand, did they prepare for contesting the advance of the army on the capital. At last, after much deliberation and little determination, a treaty of peace was concluded by commissioners appointed for that purpose, through the intervention of a priest. However, after all, it never reached the king for his ratification. “During the conferences,” however, “the Burman commissioners repeatedly declared their being furnished with full powers, and their firm persuasion, that whatever they agreed to, the king would ratify; they expressed their entire satisfaction with the spirit in which the negotiations had been conducted by the British commissioners, and their gratification at the prospect of a speedy renewal of friendly relations; they made no secret of their motives, and frankly and unreservedly admitted that the king had been ruined by the war, that the resources of the country were exhausted, and that the road to Ava was open to the British army. There appears every reason to credit their assertions, and all who had an opportunity of exercising personal observation were impressed with this conviction, that the negotiators were honest.”[321] I cannot, however, but point out to the reader that there appears to be a singular dash of cunning in their confessions. The king was ruined, at least so they said; thus it was useless ever to require money for expenses. Otherwise, there seems to be simplicity enough.

Still the war was not at an end. The treaty was not ratified; nor destined to be. Time was asked, and repeatedly granted; but treachery was found to be at work again in the Burman hearts. They felt no peace with the wild foreigners. At last they were told, that on their withdrawing from Melloon by the morning of the 20th, and their passage to Ava, hostilities would not be recommenced. But they refused; therefore they received intimation of an attack on the 18th. “Batteries were accordingly erected with such expedition,” says Wilson, “that by ten the next morning, eight and twenty pieces of ordnance were in position on points presenting more than a mile on the eastern bank of the Irawadi, which corresponded with the enemy’s line of defence on the opposite shore; nor had the Burmas been idle, having, in the course of the night, thrown up additional defences of considerable strength and extent, and well adapted to the purposes for which they were constructed.”[322]