History of biology

by L. C. Miall

The many amateurs of the eighteenth century naturally demanded books written to suit them, and illustrated books with coloured plates, coming out in parts, found a ready sale. Some were devoted to insects, others to microscopic objects. In accordance with prevalent belief, the writers made a point of tracing the hand of Providence in the minutest organisms; many popular treatises were altogether devoted to natural theology. Some few of these natural history miscellanies contained original work, which has not yet lost its interest. The best is Roesel's Insecten-belustigungen (four vols. 4to., 1746-61), memorable among other things for containing the original description of Amœba. For English readers Henry Baker wrote The Microscope Made Easy (1743) and Employment for the Microscope (1753).

Intelligence and Instinct in the Lower Animals.

The period with which we are now concerned (1741-1789) initiated the profitable discussion of the mental powers of animals. We are unable for lack of space to follow the investigation from period to period, and must condense into one short section whatever its history suggests.

In the year 1660 Aristotelians were still discoursing about the vegetative and sensitive souls which bridged the gulf between inanimate matter and the thinking man. Descartes had tried to prove that the bodies of men and animals are machines actuated by springs like watches. Man, however, according to Descartes, possesses a soul wholly different in its properties from his body, and apparently incapable of being acted upon by it. Man only can think; animals are capable only of physical sensations, and have no consciousness. Into speculations like these we shall not venture, being- content, like Locke, "to sit down in quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination are proved to be beyond the reach of our capacities." We shall merely note here and there facts ascertained by observation or experiment, and plain inferences drawn from such facts.

Swammerdam and Réaumur, besides many naturalists of less eminence, recorded a host of observations on the activities of insects. They contributed little to the discussion except new facts, for habit led them to ascribe without reflection every contrivance to the hand of Providence or else to Nature. Some of their facts, however, made a deep impression, none more than the exact agreement of the cells of the honeycomb with the form which calculation showed to be most advantageous.[23] The coincidence has lost some of its interest since the discovery that the theoretically best form of cell is hardly ever realised.[24] Réaumur,[25] in describing the process by which a certain leaf-eating caterpillar makes a case for itself out of the epidermis of an elm-leaf, showed that the caterpillar is not devoid of that kind of intelligence which adapts measures to circumstances. He cut off the margin where the upper epidermis of the leaf passes into the lower one, a margin which the insect had intended to convert into one side of its case; the caterpillar sewed up the gap. He cut off a projection which was meant to form part of the triangular end of the case; the caterpillar altered its plan, and made that the head-end which was originally intended to lodge the tail. This observation anticipates a better-known example taken from the economy of the hive-bee by Pierre Huber, which is mentioned below.

Buffon[26] heard with impatience all expressions of admiration for the works of insects. His poor eyesight and his repugnance to minutiæ disinclined him to pay much attention to creatures so small, and he had set himself up as the rival of Réaumur in physics and natural history. To pour contempt upon insects gratified both feelings at once. Bees, he said, show no intelligence at all; their actions are purely automatic, and their much-vaunted architecture is merely the result of working in a crowd. The cells of the honeycomb are hexagonal, not by reason of forethought or contrivance, but because of mutual pressure; soaked peas in a confined space form hexagonal surfaces wherever they touch.

The elder Huber seems to have denied to bees every trace of intelligence, but his son Pierre found it hard to go so far.[27] He remarked that the storage-cells of a honeycomb are not always exactly alike; they may be lengthened, cut down, or curved, when requisite. Cells which had been rudely trimmed with a knife were repaired with such dexterity and concert as to suggest that even the hive-bee has "le droit de penser." Bees would under compulsion build upwards or sideways, instead of downwards, as they like to do. Finding that they sought to extend their combs in the direction of the nearest support, he covered the support with a sheet of glass, on which they could get no footing. They swerved at once from the straight line, and prolonged their comb towards the nearest uncovered surface, though this obliged them to distort their cells. He was driven to the conclusion that bees possess "a little dose of judgment or reason." In our own time, when all conscious adaptation of means to ends is believed to be worthy of the name of reason, it requires no great courage to ask why we deny such an attribute to all the lower animals.

In spite of examples like this, the favourite expression "blind instinct" helped to strengthen the conviction that the mental processes of animals are unsearchable. It is impossible to deny that the epithet blind is appropriate in many cases. A bird will sit an addled egg all summer, or vainly but repeatedly attempt to make its tunnel in the insufficient breadth of a mud wall (Geositta). Of course such instances do not show that all the acts of the lower animals are devoid of intelligence.