First: That as between the new States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, no right of reclamation exists, or can exist, there being no power in Congress, as the South admit, to alter the compact in the ordinance of 1787, which denies this right.
Second: That no person, escaping from those States into any other State or Territory, can be reclaimed as a fugitive slave, because no person can be held as a slave under their laws.
Third: That no slave escaping from the slave States of Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, or Florida, into Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, or Missouri, can be lawfully reclaimed as a fugitive slave, because Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida are not original States.
Fourth: If slaves escape from any State or Territory other than the original States, into the States of the northwestern territory, no lawful power can touch them. The moment they reach those States they become free, because labor or service cannot lawfully be claimed of them in an original State.
Fifth: After the Missouri Compromise of 1820, slaves escaping from Arkansas and Missouri, for example to Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota, could be reclaimed, but escaping to Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio, they could not be. And the Congress of 1820 so understood it. The particular in which the Missouri proviso was altered in copying from the ordinance of 1787, is proof enough of this.
But did the framers of the Government intend to distinguish in this manner between new and original slave States? Certainly not; and the reason is, they did not mean to have any new slave States. Otherwise they certainly did mean to make this distinction, for nothing can be clearer than that Louisiana and Missouri cannot go to Ohio to recover fugitive slaves within the meaning of this "compact of the fathers;" while Georgia can. Manifestly we have departed from the system devised by the fathers in allowing Missouri, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Florida to be admitted with slavery, which explains, and nothing else can, this anomalous condition of things.
There can be no escape from these conclusions, but to deny that the ordinance has ever had any validity under the Constitution; which would be scarcely less than to deny that the Constitution itself had ever been a valid instrument. Having the like unequivocal sanction of national authority, and expressing alike in the words of Mr. Toombs, "the collective will of the whole," they must stand or fall together.
Originally the territory was not divided by the line of 36° 30´, or by any other line giving part to freedom and part to slavery. It was all secured, and by consent of the South, to freedom. There is nothing, therefore, in the original compromise, to justify the remark of the Editor of the Boston Courier in a recent number of that paper, that "below the line of 36° 30´, the South have the right of prescription." Freedom has an older prescriptive right to all the Territories. The line established by the compromise, between slavery permitted and slavery prohibited, was the boundary line between the then existing States and the Territory of the United States; or the line between exclusive national jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the States. It is an erroneous assumption, therefore, that the free States, by the introduction of slavery south of 36° 30´, as well as north of it, would receive more than a fair share or moiety of rights and privileges, as between States or parties entitled to equal privileges. The idea that the extension of slavery under the Federal Government can be claimed by anybody south or north as a right, is wholly inadmissible. The Courier will hold the following declarations from Mr. Webster to be good authority, if others do not:
"Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from becoming slave territory, I am ready to assert the principle of excluding slavery." "We are to use the first and last, and every occasion which offers, to oppose the extension of slave power."
"I have to say, that while I hold with as much integrity, I trust, and faithfulness, as any citizen of this country, to all the original amendments and compromises in which the Constitution under which we now live was adopted, I never could, and never can persuade myself to be in favor of the admission of other States into this Union as slave States with the inequalities which were allowed and accorded to the slaveholding States then in existence by the Constitution. I do not think that the free States ever expected, or could expect, that they would be called upon to admit further slave States.... I think they have the clearest right to require that the State coming into the Union, shall come in upon an equality; and if the existence of slavery be an impediment to coming in on an equality, then the State proposing to come in should be required to remove that inequality by abolishing slavery or take the alternative of being excluded. I put my opposition on the political ground that it deranges the balance of the Constitution."