A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention / For Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at Washington, D.C., in February, A.D. 1861

by L. E. Chittenden

It is a Constitution which binds the people of every State, as the supreme law of the land, until it can be changed by the action, in the first instance, of those who are sworn to support it. No amendments can, consistently with the letter or the spirit of the Constitution, be proposed by Congress, unless two-thirds of both houses, acting under the responsibility of their official oaths, shall "deem them necessary." No interference or pressure by any extraneous body unknown to the Constitution, was contemplated, or can be allowed with safety to the people, to impair the exercise of this function under all the responsibilities and official sanctions that properly appertain to it. The judgment of two-thirds of both houses of Congress in regard to the necessity of the amendments, must precede their proposal to the States for ratification.

The Government of the United States, in its sphere of duties, is supreme. The State Governments, when they consented to its formation by the people of the United States, surrendered so much of their separate sovereignties as was essential to its strength and efficiency. To that extent we became one people. This Government, for all national purposes, took the place of the State Governments, as well in regard to the paramount allegiance as to the duty of protection of the people of every State in the enjoyment of all their federal rights. Its powers can neither be enlarged nor diminished, except in the constitutional mode, without violating the rights of the States as well as of the people.

Any attempt from without, by combinations and associations not responsible to the people, to coerce or overawe Congress, or in any way to impair the free and deliberate exercise of its judgment in proposing amendments "as deemed necessary" by Congress, is a palpable violation of the privileges of the people. They elected the members of the House of Representatives with the intention that they should freely and deliberately, under their official oaths, propose amendments, or not, to the Constitution, as they might deem necessary, and not at the dictation of States even, who cannot themselves propose amendments, but can only require of Congress to call a Convention of all the States for that purpose. Much less can a convention of delegates from the Legislatures, or the Executive of a part only of the States—a body unknown to, and unauthorized by, the Constitution—assume to exercise, or dictate to Congress the exercise of this high prerogative.

We do not represent the people of the United States. This Government, for every purpose for which it was established, is a separate, and in some sense a foreign government to the States. It operates directly on the people, and is itself their true protector in all their Federal rights.

Any number of States, less than two-thirds, have no more right to call into action the power of Congress either to call a Convention, or to propose amendments, than the individual members of their Legislatures in their private capacities; and Congress might as well, and probably would, treat our interference with their official duties as an usurpation; as much so as if we should seek to interfere with the appropriate duties of the Legislatures of Virginia or Massachusetts. And, sir, I cannot but regard it, so far as the free action of Congress should be influenced by the recommendations of this body, as in the nature of a revolutionary proceeding for which there is no sufficient cause or justification. Sir, all the States are not here represented. All have not even had an opportunity to be here. And yet we are endeavoring to influence the action of Congress in a manner which may deeply affect their interests. If, under any circumstances, a body so convened, would have a right to act upon Congress, by the expression of our opinions as a Convention of States, ought not all to have an opportunity to participate in our deliberations? Most certainly they ought.

But it is said some of the States are threatening to secede from the Union; others have seceded, and must be induced to come back, by the speedy action of Congress on the amendments recommended by the committee. Does the Constitution authorize amendments under such circumstances, with less care and deliberation than in time of peace and tranquillity?

This Government, sir, cannot recognize the fact that States have seceded. It is not a Government over States, but over the people of the United States, irrespective of the State in which they live. This Government, and not the States, protects them in their Federal rights, and requires allegiance and obedience from the people in every State, to the Constitution and laws of the United States as the supreme law of the land, any thing in the laws or ordinances of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. It is the people and not the States that are governed by that law, within the sphere of its constitutional operation.

I have said that the course proposed by the majority of the committee is, in my judgment, not only against the letter, but the spirit of the Constitution. The State of Kentucky, ever patriotic and conservative, must have so regarded it, when, instead of asking Congress to propose the amendments they desired, they requested their sister States to unite with them in an application in the mode prescribed by the Constitution to Congress to call a Convention for that purpose.

Our fathers, who framed that Constitution, and the people of the United States, who ratified it, set it forth in the preamble as their first great purpose "to form a more perfect Union." They intended to establish thereby a Government of perpetual obligation and of self-sustaining vigor. They did not contemplate the necessity of amendments for any other causes than such as, after calm, deliberate, undisturbed consideration should be judged necessary. They did not intend that it should be exposed to the danger of hasty action under the influence of excited passions or timid and groundless apprehension. They would not trust the entire people even with the right of amendment, except in the mode prescribed, with all the delays incident to that mode; and then only by the action, in every stage of the proceeding, of persons bound by solemn oath to support it.

The Constitution, in prescribing the modes of proposing amendments, endeavored to provide against irregular combination of a part only of the States to effect them. Hence it prohibited all agreements or compacts between the States; and it made no provision for the recognition of any action by a convention, except when called on the recommendation of two-thirds of the States applying to Congress, by separate action of their Legislatures, for that purpose.