Mr. McCURDY:—There is really but one question that ought to engage the attention of this Conference. All others may be settled in half an hour. This question is a great one, and assumes a variety of forms. I wish to vote upon it understandingly, and I want some information from the committee which has had it in charge.
I ask that committee whether they are not proposing a change in the Constitution, which, if adopted, will operate as a direct and effectual protection of slavery in all the territories of the United States? This appears to me to be the true question for our consideration. I wish to know what meaning is attached by its friends to one part of the proposed article.
It states that "the status of persons owing service or labor as it now exists shall not be changed by law," &c.; and again, "that the rights arising out of said relations shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts according to the common law." The status, then, shall not be changed. By that term I suppose condition is intended. I understand that perfectly. There shall be no law to change the condition, to impair the rights of the slaveholder; but shall there be no law to protect these rights? Now, what is intended by this? Why not make this provision plain, and not leave it open to any question of construction? The ghost of the old trouble rises here, and will not down at the bidding of any man. I believe under this article the institution of slavery is to be protected by a most ingenious contrivance. The common law, administered according to the pro-slavery view, is to be called in for its protection.
Now I ask the chairman of the committee reporting these propositions what he means by the common law? The common law, as we understand it, is the law of freedom—not of slavery. But I do not here propose to discuss that question. I wish to know how the truth really is. How does the committee, how do the friends of this proposition understand it?
By the common law a slave is still a man: a person, and not a personal chattel. He may owe service, as a child to its parent, an apprentice to his master, but he is still a person owing service. He is all the time recognized as a man. As such he may own and hold property, take it by inheritance and dispose of it at pleasure, by will or by contract. All these rights, all the principles on which they are founded, are in direct antagonism to slavery. The argument may be carried much farther, but this is far enough for my purpose. By the slave law, all this is reversed. The master owns the body of the slave, may sell or otherwise dispose of him, may make him the subject of inheritance. The slave loses all the attributes of a person, and becomes property as much as the horse or the ox that feeds at his master's crib. These, in a condition of slavery are the rights of the master over the slave. These rights the common law, under this proposition, is to recognize, protect, and enforce. I believe I am not mistaken in this. What other construction can you give the article? It is a distinct proposal to engraft slavery upon the common law: to declare in the Constitution that slavery is recognized and protected by the common law.
Now, the North has always protested against this. She will never consent to it. She understands all the consequences as well as you. No doubt it would be a great point gained for you, to have the Constitution recognize the institution of slavery as part of the common law. For then slavery goes wherever the common law goes. Its rights under this provision are not confined to the territories. Once established, these may be enforced in a free State just as well. It is the old proposition over again, which has come before the American people so many times under so many different guises. It makes slavery national, freedom sectional. If this is so, if such is the construction which it is intended this section shall receive, why not state it openly? why leave it as a question of construction?
This construction involves other considerations. This new kind of common law is to be substituted for the old. The latter has been understood for centuries almost. Its principles have been discussed and settled. It is a system founded by experience, and adapted to the wants of the people subject to it. Its very name implies that it was not created by legislative authority. A strange common law indeed that would be which is created by the Constitution.
But this is not all. Other principles of the common law are subject to change. They are adapted to the advance of civilization, to the wants of communities. Change is the universal law of nature. This new kind of common law is alone to be perpetual.
It is not my purpose to enter into a general discussion of the subject. This point struck me as important, as needing elucidation. If I am wrong in this construction, the committee will correct me.