Chile has been blamed for making hard terms with the two sister states, but the fact is undeniable that despite the struggle made by the allies, to which Chilean historians have frequently given credit, they were utterly out-fought. Chile was completely victorious on sea and land, and she took the fruits of victory; she had, she considered, been menaced, and she disposed of future menace. If she was severe, she had many great examples to follow. It is at least a little curious to find the United States, with the record of acquisitions of Mexican territory, constantly raising a minatory finger to Chile. This finger appeared during the progress of the War of the Pacific, and upon several subsequent occasions including a curious incident in 1920, when a flutter of local feeling on the West Coast was made the occasion of a tactless message from the State Department. These admonitions are resented by and are embarrassing to no one more than American comerciantes and miners operating in Chile. It is unfortunate both for the United States and the peace of the West Coast that a non-comprehension of Chilean intentions and sentiment should not only add fuel to the flame, but should keep alive ideas of forcible intervention in the minds of the losers in the war, encouraged to contemplate restoration of part of their former territory.

It is, however, not the finally ceded provinces, but the uncertain status of Tacna, that causes the chief heart-burning. The terms made with Bolivia gave Chile her present great province of Antofagasta, with its wealth in nitrate, silver and copper, but in order to conciliate Bolivian feeling and legitimate commercial ambition, Chile agreed to build, and built, a railway outlet from La Paz to Arica, the Bolivian section of which will become Bolivian property in 1928. Bolivian prosperity dates from the operation of this excellent line, and Chilean commercial and financial relations with Bolivia have been increasingly cordial. I have yet to see in any Chilean publication or to hear from any Chilean expressions of other than the greatest goodwill to Bolivia; it is almost equally the rule to encounter a sincere desire for the amicable settlement of outstanding questions with Peru, and the display of a frank and moderate appreciation of Peruvian feeling. But while Bolivians in general have accepted their loss, for Peru the war is not yet over. This is chiefly due to the Tacna barrier.

Tarapacá, rich in nitrate and metals, was ceded to Chile absolutely, but the little provinces of Tacna and Arica went under Chilean control with the proviso that a plebiscite, to determine by popular vote the final ownership of the region, should be held after ten years—i.e., after 1894; the gainer of the territory promised to pay ten million pesos to the loser. This plebiscite has never been held.

In 1894 the two countries mutually agreed to a postponement, and attempts to hold the plebiscite later have been frustrated by the difficulty of arranging voting conditions. Questions as to the nationality of the persons permitted to vote, and of the constitution of the tribunal of judges, have long awaited solution. Chile has repeatedly declared that the Chancellery of the Moneda is ready to hold the plebiscite, and meanwhile occupies and develops the territory, creating irrigation systems and planning vast extensions of sugar and cotton production. Since there were in 1907 in Tacna out of a total of 25,000 people only 4000 non-Chileans, it can scarcely be doubted that the result of a plebiscite held, let us say, in 1923, would leave Tacna definitely under the Chilean flag.

In November, 1920, Peru and Bolivia asked the League of Nations assembled at Geneva to examine the treaties signed with Chile in 1884 and 1904—with a view to obtaining international influence in the direction of modification of terms. Peru afterwards withdrew her request, while the commission appointed to consider Bolivia’s case came unanimously to the conclusion that no intervention was possible in the case of a definitely signed treaty, handing down this decision in November, 1921. But the Chilean delegate, Don Agustin Edwards, made it clear that Chile was always ready to discuss amicably with Bolivia any suggestion for the economic improvement of Bolivia’s position compatible with Chilean interests, and the way was paved for friendly discussions.

Shortly afterwards Chile made a direct offer to the Peruvian administration (in the absence of diplomatic representatives) that the plebiscite should be held in accord with the terms agreed upon during discussions in 1912, when 1923 was fixed as the voting year. Peru did not find this suggestion acceptable, in view of the fact that Chileanisation of Tacna proceeds with such rapidity that the Peruvian vote would be practically non-existent. All children born in the province since 1883 are counted as Chilean citizens, and the exodus of adult Peruvians from this and other regions has been marked since 1920, when a sudden access of local friction brought about the mutual withdrawal of consular officials.

At this moment, when it seemed unfortunately probable that the new attempt at settlement would meet with the fate of previous efforts, the United States interposed with the suggestion that representatives of Peru and Chile should meet for friendly discussions in Washington. This offer was accepted by both Lima and Santiago, and delegates were appointed in early 1922.

Peru wished to re-open the whole Treaty of Ancon, but Chile emphatically declared that only the terms of the Tacna plebiscite were matters for discussion; she also declined Bolivia’s request to take part in the meetings, although reiterating her readiness to exchange views directly with Bolivia.

Conversations between the able diplomats of the two countries took place in Washington during May, 1922, but without a decisive result, the delegates announcing early in June that no agreement concerning the holding of the plebiscite in Tacna had been reached.

The break-up of the conference appeared to be inevitable when the United States Government, in the person of Mr. Hughes, Secretary of State, offered to exchange its position of benevolent host of the delegates to that of mediator. An interchange of suggestions took place between Chile, Peru and the United States, ending in a hopeful agreement signed by the two former in July; this agreement terminated the first stage of the road to peace, and practically amounted to the acceptance of arbitration.