"I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose, we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that, because we had entered into that engagement, there was an obligation of honour upon the country."
The British House of Commons, had they considered it to be their duty, had the right to disapprove the foreign policy of the Cabinet and to censure the ministers for the advice they had given, or had decided to give, to the Sovereign. On the other hand, the House of Commons had the right to approve the stand taken by the Government. They did so unanimously, and were most admirably supported by the people.
I must say that I consider it would be very difficult, if not absolutely impracticable, to have questions of war or peace dealt with by way of "Referendum." Crises suddenly created lead almost instantly to declarations of war. But this outcome could hardly be so rapidly produced that Parliament could not be called to deal with the emergency.
How could France have been able to oppose the crushing German invasion, in 1914, if her Government and her representative Houses had been obliged to wait for the result of a "Referendum" whether she would fight or kneel down?
But the whole world—outside the Central Empires and their Allies—witnessed with unbounded delight the spontaneous and unanimous decision of the heroic French nation to fight to the last. She threw herself with the most admirable courage against the invading waves of Teutonic barbarism, and succeeded by the great and glorious Marne victory in forcing them to ebb, thus giving England and the other Allies the time necessary to organize and train their armies which, by their united efforts will save Civilization from destruction and the world from the threatened German domination.
CHAPTER XXXV.
The Intervention of the United States in the War.
The hostilities, once opened as the direct consequence of Germany's obduracy, many of the most influential leaders of public opinion in the United States foresaw that the conflict taking such a wide range, the great American Republic was most likely to be, sooner or later, involved in the European struggle. They were of two classes. Those out of office, holding for the time no official position, were, of course, not bound to the same careful discretion in judging the daily developments of the military operations, and their far reaching consequences, as those who were at the helm of State.