England, Canada and the Great War

by L. G. Desjardins

There was no need of calling meetings to adopt the preceding "Resolution" with its well defined preamble. It had been approved, in all its bearings, at the outset of the hostilities by the unanimous decision of the Canadian Parliament, by the almost unanimous consent of public opinion, by the religious, social, commercial, industrial and financial leaders of the country. It had been so approved by the four hundred thousand brave Canadians who rallied to the Colours; by the subscribers, by thousands, to the national war loans.

Since writing the above draft "Resolution", its full substance has been almost unanimously approved by the Canadian people in general elections, the two contending political parties entirely agreeing so far as the Justice of the cause of the Allies was concerned, differing only as to the best means for Canada to adopt to achieve final victory.

Without entering into any considerations respecting the divergence of the views of the leaders of political thought, in the still recent electoral campaign,—from which it is more advisable for me to abstain in the interest of the cause I am defending—I may be allowed to remark that only a small remnant of the "Nationalist" element dared to reaffirm his hostility to Canada's intervention in the conflict and to avow his opinion that the country had done enough.

What did those irreconcilable "Nationalists"—so few in numbers as the event ultimately proved—mean by their assertion that Canada had done enough for the war? According to its literal wording, it must have signified that no more sacrifices should have been incurred for the triumph of the Allied cause. If it was so, the conclusion to be drawn from such sayings was that, to put an end to any further Canadian contributions, orders should be given to bring back the Canadian Army from Europe, and to send home all the forces still on Canadian soil. It is plain that even if the new Canadian Parliament had decided not to increase our contribution of man-power, in order to maintain the efficiency of the Canadian divisions at the front, large sacrifices would have had to be made to keep on the theatre of war the forces which were still in the field.

To refuse to participate in the war would have been deserting the flag at the hour of danger, and a total misconception of our plain duty.

Giving up the fight, once engaged in the struggle, before triumphant victory, or irremediable defeat, in the very thick of the battle so heroically carried on by the Allies, would have been sheer cowardice—bolchevikism of the worst kind.

Whether they meant it or not, those few "Nationalists" dared not openly propose the recall of our troops. The solitary "Nationalist" candidate who had the nerve to face the electorate was defeated by a very large majority.

No better proof of the weakness of the hold of the doctrines of "Nationalism," on sound public opinion, is required than the decision of its most outspoken advocate and leader, Mr. Bourassa, to refrain from being a candidate in any constituency, and to advise all his supposed friends to do likewise. No one was deceived, with regard to this decision, by the reasons, or rather excuses, given to explain it.

Evidently, if the "Nationalist" group and their leader had been confident of the support of the large number of electors whose opinion they pretended to represent, they would certainly not have lost the chance to show their strength, and the opportunity to elect many candidates of their persuasion to enter Parliament free from any party allegiance but that of their own element. But any one somewhat posted with the currents of public opinion in the Province of Quebec, knew very well that if pure "Nationalist" candidates had been nominated in all the constituencies of the Province, running between the regular party nominees,—ministerial and opposition—the average number of ballots cast for them would scarcely have reached ten per cent. of the French Canadian votes, less than two per cent. of the whole Canadian electorate.

It was moreover highly probable that, had they tried the game, they would not have even succeeded, in two-thirds of the constituencies, in inducing citizens of sufficient standing to accept their nomination and their political program. Once engaged in such a hopeless electoral contest, they would have had either to humbly retire from the field, or to await the doomed day by nominating men of no weight whatever. Both alternatives would have led them to an equally disastrous defeat.