England, Canada and the Great War

by L. G. Desjardins

Napoleon the First, whose power was the legitimate result of his wonderful genius and of his eminent services to France, wanted his dynasty to rest on the plebiscitary foundation. Millions of votes—almost the unanimity of French public opinion—answered enthusiastically to his call. He was not such a man as to refuse the chance offered him to exercise a supreme power so manifestly tendered to him. All know that he very soon unbridled his devouring ambition and ruled France with all the might of an absolutism strengthened by the glories of military campaigns truly marvellous. To any attempt at freedom of criticism, he could reply that his Imperial power—mightily supported by his commanding genius—was strongly entrenched on the unanimity of opinion of the French nation expressed by the result of the plebiscit.

Napoleon III, favoured by the immortal prestige of his glorious uncle, but far behind him in genius, though intellectually well gifted, as he proved it during his Presidential term of the second French Republic and during the first years he occupied the Imperial Throne of France, used the plebiscit to have his famous coup d'Etat of the second day of December 1851, prepared with consummate skill and carried out with great energy, ratified by the nation by an overwhelming majority of several millions of votes. He lost no time in drawing the final result of this first great success and in reaching the term of his ambition. The tide of popular enthusiasm was all flowing his way, carrying him to the Throne elevated for his uncle who had lost it after the hurricane which exhausted its strength at Waterloo. On the second of December of the following year—1852—the second French Empire was proclaimed to the international world. Following the example and the precedent of the first Bonaparte, Napoleon III also decided to use the plebiscit to legitimate his Imperial power. He triumphantly carried the day by some seven millions of votes—almost the unanimous voice of the French people.

Thus, in less than half a century, after having twice tried the Republican system of government, and, in both cases, having overdone by deplorable excesses the experiment of Political Liberty—more specially during the years of terrorism of the first Republic—France, by a regular reaction, went back to the other extreme, and reestablished arbitrary power not, in the two instances, upon the principle of the Divine Right of the ancient Monarchy, but on that of the Sovereignty of the people, as expressed by the certain will of the whole nation. But absolutism, whether the outcome of Divine Right or of popular sovereignty, is always the same and steadily works against the true principles of Political Liberty.

It is a great mistake to suppose that absolutism is possible only under monarchical institutions. The terrorist republican epoch, in France, from 1792 to 1795, was absolutism of the worst kind, really with a vengeance. As much can be said of the present political situation in Russia, which has substituted revolutionary absolutism to that of the decayed Imperial regime, suddenly brought to a tragic end by the pressure of events too strong for its crumbling fabric, shaken to its foundation by a most unwise reactionary movement which only precipitated its downfall, instead of averting it, as extravagantly expected by the Petrograd Court, which betrayed Russia in favour of Germany, and unconsciously opened the road which led the weak and unfortunate Czar to his lamentable fate.

In my humble opinion, plebiscitary cæsarism is not compatible with a system of ministerial responsibility for all the official acts of the Sovereign.

The frequent use of the plebiscit would certainly tend to diminish in the mind of political leaders the true sense of their responsibility. It would too often offer an easy way out of an awkward position without the consequence of having to give up power.

If I understand right the real meaning of the two words: plebiscit and referendum, the first would be used to try and ascertain how public opinion stands upon any given question of public policy, of proposed public legislation: the second would be employed for the ratification by the electorate of a law passed by Parliament. I have less objection to the second system which, in reality, is an appeal from Parliament to the Electorate. But to the well practised, the adverse vote of a majority of the electors should have the same result as a vote of the majority of the House of Commons rejecting an important public measure upon the carrying of which the Cabinet has ventured their existence.

Without the immediate resignation of the ministers meeting with a reverse in a referendum, I consider that ministerial responsibility would soon become a farce destructive of constitutional government. The defeat of a Cabinet in a referendum would be equivalent to one in general elections and should bear out the same consequence.

Surely, no one having some clear notions of what ministerial responsibility means, will pretend for a moment that a Cabinet who, on being defeated in the House of Commons, advises the Sovereign—or his representative in Canada—to dissolve Parliament for an appeal to the people, could remain in power if the Electorate approved of the hostile stand taken by the House of Commons.

I can see no difference whatever in the meaning of an hostile referendum vote and that following a regular constitutional appeal from an adverse majority of the popular House of representatives. In both cases, the downfall of the defeated ministers should be the result.