§ 149. Now if we examine the various international duties out of which responsibility of a State may rise, we find that there is a necessity for two different kinds of State responsibility to be distinguished. They may be named "original" in contradistinction to "vicarious" responsibility. I name as "original" the responsibility borne by a State for its own—that is, its Government's actions, and for such actions of the lower agents or private individuals as are performed at the Government's command or with its authorisation. But States have to bear another responsibility besides that just mentioned. For States are, according to the Law of Nations, in a sense responsible for certain acts other than their own—namely, certain unauthorised injurious acts of their agents, of their subjects, and even of such aliens as are for the time living within their territory. This responsibility of States for acts other than their own I name "vicarious" responsibility. Since the Law of Nations is a law between States only, and since States are the sole exclusive subjects of International Law, individuals are mere objects[248] of International Law, and the latter is unable to confer directly rights and duties upon individuals. And for this reason the Law of Nations must make every State in a sense responsible for certain internationally injurious acts committed by its officials, subjects, and such aliens as are temporarily resident on its territory.[249]
[249] The distinction between original and vicarious responsibility was first made, in 1905, in the first edition of this treatise and ought therefore to have been discussed by Anzillotti in his able article in R.G. XIII. (1906), p. 292. The fact that he does not appreciate this distinction is prejudicial to the results of his researches concerning the responsibility of States.
Essential Difference between Original and Vicarious Responsibility.
§ 150. It is, however, obvious that original and vicarious State responsibility are essentially different. Whereas the one is responsibility of a State for a neglect of its own duty, the other is not. A neglect of international legal duties by a State constitutes an international delinquency. The responsibility which a State bears for such delinquency is especially grave, and requires, apart from other especial consequences, a formal expiatory act, such as an apology at least, by the delinquent State to repair the wrong done. On the other hand, the vicarious responsibility which a State bears requires chiefly compulsion to make those officials or other individuals who have committed internationally injurious acts repair as far as possible the wrong done, and punishment, if necessary, of the wrongdoers. In case a State complies with these requirements, no blame falls upon it on account of such injurious acts. But of course, in case a State refuses to comply with these requirements, it commits thereby an international delinquency, and its hitherto vicarious responsibility turns ipso facto into original responsibility.
II STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL DELINQUENCIES
See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § [148].
Conception of International Delinquencies.
§ 151. International delinquency is every injury to another State committed by the head and the Government of a State through violation of an international legal duty. Equivalent to acts of the head and Government are acts of officials or other individuals commanded or authorised by the head or Government.
An international delinquency is not a crime, because the delinquent State, as a Sovereign, cannot be punished, although compulsion may be exercised to procure a reparation of the wrong done.