[464] See Halleck, II. p. 476, on the one hand, and, on the other, Rivier, II. p. 436. Valuable opinions of Zachariae and Neumann, who deny that Count Platen was a Prussian subject, are printed in the "Deutsche Strafrechts-Zeitung" (1868), pp. 304-320.
[465] Both Westlake and Halleck state that the inhabitants must have a free option to stay or leave the country; but there is no rule of International Law which imposes the duty upon a subjugator to grant this option.
Different from the fact that enemy subjects become through annexation subjects of the subjugator is the question what position they acquire within the subjugating State. This question is one of Municipal, and not of International Law. The subjugator can, if he likes, allow them to emigrate and to renounce their newly acquired citizenship, and the Municipal Law of the subjugating State can put them in any position it likes, can in especial grant or refuse them the same rights as those which its citizens by birth enjoy.
Veto of third Powers.
§ 241. Although subjugation is an original mode of acquiring territory and no third Power has as a rule[466] a right of intervention, the conqueror has not in fact an unlimited possibility of annexation of the territory of the vanquished State. When the balance of power is endangered or when other vital interests are at stake, third Powers can and will intervene, and history records many instances of such interventions. But it must be emphasised that the validity of the title of the subjugator does not depend upon recognition on the part of other Powers. And a mere protest of a third Power is of no legal weight either.
[466] But this rule has exceptions, as in the case of a State whose independence and integrity have been guaranteed by one or more Powers.
XVI PRESCRIPTION
Grotius, II. c. 4—Vattel, I. §§ 140-151—Hall, § 36—Westlake, I. pp. 92-94—Lawrence, § 78—Phillimore, I. §§ 251-261—Twiss, I. § 129—Taylor, §§ 218-219—Walker, § 13—Wheaton, § 164—Moore, I. § 88—Bluntschli, § 290—Hartmann, § 61—Heffter, § 12—Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. p. 255—Ullmann, § 92—Bonfils, No. 534—Mérignhac, II. p. 412—Despagnet, No. 380—Pradier-Fodéré, II. Nos. 820-829—Rivier, I. pp. 182-184—Nys, II. pp. 34-39—Calvo, I. §§ 264-265—Fiore, II. Nos. 850-851, and Code, Nos. 1074-1077—Martens, I. § 90—G. F. Martens, §§ 70-71—Bynkershoek, "Quaestiones juris publici," IV. c 12—Heimburger, "Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit" (1888), pp. 140-155—Ralston in A.J. IV. (1910), pp. 133-144.
Conception of Prescription.
§ 242. Since the existence of a science of the Law of Nations there has always been opposition to prescription as a mode of acquiring territory. Grotius rejected the usucaption of the Roman Law, yet adopted the same law's immemorial prescription[467] for the Law of Nations. But whereas a good many writers[468] still defend that standpoint, others[469] reject prescription altogether. Again, others[470] go beyond Grotius and his followers and do not require possession from time immemorial, but teach that an undisturbed continuous possession can under certain conditions produce a title for the possessor, if the possession has lasted for some length of time.