Withdrawal by Notice.
§ 538. Treaties, provided they are not such as are concluded for ever, may also be dissolved by withdrawal, after notice by one of the parties. Many treaties stipulate expressly the possibility of such withdrawal, and as a rule contain details in regard to form and period in which notice is to be given for the purpose of withdrawal. But there are other treaties which, although they do not expressly stipulate the possibility of withdrawal, can nevertheless be dissolved after notice by one of the contracting parties. To that class belong all such treaties as are either not expressly concluded for ever or apparently not intended to set up an everlasting condition of things. Thus, for instance, a commercial treaty or a treaty of alliance not concluded for a fixed period only can always be dissolved after notice, although such notice be not expressly stipulated. Treaties, however, which are apparently intended, or expressly concluded, for the purpose of setting up an everlasting condition of things, and, further, treaties concluded for a certain period of time only, are as a rule not notifiable, although they can be dissolved by mutual consent of the contracting parties.
It must be emphasised that all treaties of peace and all boundary treaties belong to this class. It cannot be denied that history records many cases in which treaties of peace have not established an everlasting condition of things, since one or both of the contracting States took up arms again as soon as they recovered from the exhausting effect of the previous war. But this does not prove either that such treaties can be dissolved through giving notice, or that, at any rate as far as International Law is concerned, they are not intended to create an everlasting condition of things.
Vital Change of Circumstances.
§ 539. Although, as just stated, treaties concluded for a certain period of time, and such treaties as are apparently intended or expressly contracted for the purpose of setting up an everlasting condition of things, cannot in principle be dissolved by withdrawal of one of the parties, there is an exception to this rule. For it is an almost universally recognised fact that vital changes of circumstances may be of such a kind as to justify a party in notifying an unnotifiable treaty. The vast majority of publicists, as well as all the Governments of the members of the Family of Nations, defend the principle Conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus, and they agree,[902] therefore, that all treaties are concluded under the tacit condition rebus sic stantibus. That this condition involves a certain amount of danger cannot be denied, for it can be, and indeed sometimes has been, abused for the purpose of hiding the violation of treaties behind the shield of law, and of covering shameful wrong with the mantle of righteousness. But all this cannot alter the fact that this exceptional condition is as necessary for International law and international intercourse as the very rule pacta sunt servanda. When, for example, the existence or the necessary development of a State stands in unavoidable conflict with such State's treaty obligations, the latter must give way, for self-preservation and development in accordance with the growth and the necessary requirements of the nation are the primary duties of every State. No State would consent to any such treaty as would hinder it in the fulfilment of these primary duties. The consent of a State to a treaty presupposes a conviction that such treaty is not fraught with danger to its existence and development, and implies a condition that, if by an unforeseen change of circumstances the obligations stipulated in the treaty should imperil the said State's existence and necessary development, the treaty, although by its nature unnotifiable, should nevertheless be notifiable.
[902] See Bonucci in Z.V. IV. (1910), pp. 449-471. Many writers agree to it with great reluctance only and in a very limited sense, as, for instance, Grotius, II. c. 16, § 25, No. 2; Vattel, II. § 296; Klüber, § 165. Some few writers, however, disagree altogether, as, for instance, Bynkershoek, "Quest. jur. public.," II. c. 10, and Wildman, "Institutes of International Law," I. (1849), p. 175. Schmidt, op. cit. pp. 97-118, would seem to reject the clausula altogether, but can nevertheless not help recognising it in the end. A good survey of the practice of the States in the matter during the nineteenth century is given by Kaufmann, op. cit. pp. 12-37.
The danger of the clause rebus sic stantibus is to be found in the elastic meaning of the term "vital changes of circumstances," as, after all, a State must in every special case judge for itself whether or no there is a vital change of circumstances justifying its withdrawal from an unnotifiable treaty. On the other hand, the danger is counterbalanced by the fact that the frequent and unjustifiable use of the clause rebus sic stantibus by a State would certainly destroy all its credit among the nations.
Be that as it may, it is generally agreed that certainly not every change of circumstances justifies a State in making use of the clause. All agree that, although treaty obligations may through a change of circumstances become disagreeable, burdensome, and onerous, they must nevertheless be discharged. All agree, further, that a change of government and even a change in the form of a State, such as the turning of a monarchy into a republic and vice versa, does not alone and in itself justify a State in notifying such a treaty as is by its nature unnotifiable. On the other hand, all agree in regard to many cases in which the clause rebus sic stantibus could justly be made use of. Thus, for example, if a State enters into a treaty of alliance for a certain period of time, and if before the expiration of the alliance a change of circumstances occurs, so that now the alliance endangers the very existence of one of the contracting parties, all will agree that the clause rebus sic stantibus would justify such party in notifying the treaty of alliance.
A certain amount of disagreement as to the cases in which the clause might or might not be justly applied will of course always remain. But the fact is remarkable that during the nineteenth century not many cases of the application of the clause have occurred. And the States and public opinion everywhere have come to the conviction that the clause rebus sic stantibus ought not to give the right to a State at once to liberate itself from the obligations of a treaty, but only the claim to be released from these obligations by the other parties to the treaty. Accordingly, when a State is of the opinion that the obligations of a treaty have through a vital change of circumstances become unbearable, it should first approach the other party or parties and request them to abrogate the treaty. And it is only when such abrogation is refused that a State may perhaps be justified in declaring that it could no longer consider itself bound by the obligations concerned. Thus, when, in 1870, during the Franco-German War, Russia declared her withdrawal from such stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 as concerned the neutralisation of the Black Sea and the restriction imposed upon Russia in regard to men-of-war in that sea, Great Britain protested, and a conference was held in London in 1871. Although by a treaty signed on March 13, 1871, this conference, consisting of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris—namely, Austria, England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey—complied with the wishes of Russia and abolished the neutralisation of the Black Sea, it adopted in a protocol[903] of January 17, 1871, the following declaration:—"Que c'est un principe essentiel du droit des gens qu'aucune Puissance ne peut se délier des engagements d'un traité, ni en modifier les stipulations, qu'à la suite de l'assentiment des parties contractantes, au moyen d'une entente amicale."
[903] See Martens, N.R.G. XVIII. p. 278.