(2) The terms used in a treaty must be interpreted according to their usual meaning in the language of every-day life, provided they are not expressly used in a certain technical meaning or another meaning is not apparent from the context.
(3) It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable, something adequate to the purpose of the treaty, and something not inconsistent with generally recognised principles of International Law nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a stipulation is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable, the adequate meaning to the meaning not adequate for the purpose of the treaty, the consistent meaning to the meaning inconsistent with generally recognised principles of International Law and with previous treaty obligations towards third States.
(4) The principle in dubio mitius must be applied in interpreting treaties. If, therefore, the meaning of a stipulation is ambiguous, such meaning is to be preferred as is less onerous for the obliged party, or as interferes less with the parties' territorial and personal supremacy, or as contains less general restrictions upon the parties.
(5) Previous treaties between the same parties, and treaties between one of the parties and third parties, may be alluded to for the purpose of clearing up the meaning of a stipulation.
(6) If there is a discrepancy between the clear meaning of a stipulation, on the one hand, and, on the other, the intentions of one of the parties declared during the negotiations preceding the signing of a treaty, the decision must depend on the merits of the special case. If, for instance, the discrepancy was produced through a mere clerical error or by some other kind of mistake, it is obvious that an interpretation is necessary in accordance with the real intentions of the contracting parties.
(7) In case of a discrepancy between the clear meaning of a stipulation, on the one hand, and, on the other, the intentions of all the parties unanimously declared during the negotiations preceding the signing of the treaty, the meaning which corresponds to the real intentions of the parties must prevail over the meaning of the text. If, therefore—as in the case of the Declaration of London of 1909—the Report of the Drafting Committee contains certain interpretations and is unanimously accepted as authoritative by all the negotiators previous to the signing of the treaty, their interpretations must prevail.
(8) If two meanings of a stipulation are admissible according to the text of a treaty, such meaning is to prevail as the party proposing the stipulation knew at the time to be the meaning preferred by the party accepting it.
(9) If it is a matter of common knowledge that a State upholds a meaning which is different from the generally prevailing meaning of a term, and if nevertheless another State enters into a treaty with the former in which such term is made use of, such meaning must prevail as is upheld by the former. If, for instance, States conclude commercial treaties with the United States of America in which the most-favoured-nation clause[912] occurs, the particular meaning which the United States attribute to this clause must prevail.
(10) If the meaning of a stipulation is ambiguous and one of the contracting parties, at a time before a case arises for the application of the stipulation, makes known what meaning it attributes to the stipulation, the other party or parties cannot, when a case for the application of the stipulation occurs, insist upon a different meaning. They ought to have previously protested and taken the necessary steps to secure an authentic interpretation of the ambiguous stipulation. Thus, when in 1911 it became obvious that Germany and other continental States attributed to article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations respecting the Laws and Usages of War on Land a meaning different from the one preferred by Great Britain, the British Foreign Office made the British interpretation of this article known.