[942] Thus Great Britain, France, and Russia have guaranteed, by the Treaty with Denmark of July 13, 1863, the independence (but also the monarchy) of Greece (Martens, N.R.G. XVII. Part. II. p. 79). The United States of America has guaranteed the independence of Cuba by the Treaty of Havana of May 22, 1903 (Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXII. p. 79), and of Panama by the Treaty of Washington of November 18, 1903 (Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXI. p. 599).
[943] Thus the integrity of Norway is guaranteed by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia by the Treaty of Christiania of November 2, 1907; see Martens, N.R.G. 3rd Ser. II. p. 9. A condition of this integrity is that Norway does not cede any part of her territory to any foreign Power.
Effect of Treaties of Guarantee.
§ 575. The effect of guarantee treaties is the creation of the duty of the guarantors to do what is in their power in order to secure the guaranteed objects. The compulsion to be applied by a guarantor for that purpose depends upon the circumstances; it may eventually be war. But the duty of the guarantor to render, even by compulsion, the promised assistance to the guaranteed depends upon many conditions and circumstances. Thus, first, the guaranteed must request the guarantor to render assistance. When, for instance, the possession of a certain part of its territory is guaranteed to a State which after its defeat in a war with a third State agrees as a condition of peace to cede such piece of territory to the victor without having requested the intervention of the guarantor, the latter has neither a right nor a duty to interfere. Thus, secondly, the guarantor must at the critical time be able to render the required assistance. When, for instance, its hands are tied through waging war against a third State, or when it is so weak through internal troubles or other factors that its interference would expose it to a serious danger, it is not bound to fulfil the request for assistance. So too, when the guaranteed has not complied with previous advice given by the guarantor as to the line of its behaviour, it is not the guarantor's duty to render assistance afterwards.
It is impossible to state all the circumstances and conditions upon which the fulfilment of the duty of the guarantor depends, as every case must be judged upon its own merits. And it is certain that, more frequently than in other cases, changes in political constellations and the general developments of events may involve such vital change of circumstances as to justify[944] a State in refusing to interfere in spite of a treaty of guarantee. It is for this reason that treaties of guarantee to secure permanently a certain object to a State are naturally of a more or less precarious value to the latter. The practical value, therefore, of a guarantee treaty, whatever may be its formal character, would as a rule seem to extend to the early years only of its existence while the original conditions still obtain.
Effect of Collective Guarantee.
§ 576. In contradistinction to treaties constituting a guarantee on the part of one or more States severally, the effect of treaties constituting a collective guarantee on the part of several States requires special consideration. On June 20, 1867, Lord Derby maintained[945] in the House of Lords concerning the collective guarantee by the Powers of the neutralisation of Luxemburg that in case of a collective guarantee each guarantor had only the duty to act according to the treaty when all the other guarantors were ready to act likewise; that, consequently, if one of the guarantors themselves should violate the neutrality of Luxemburg, the duty to act according to the treaty of collective guarantee would not accrue to the other guarantors. This opinion is certainly not correct,[946] and I do not know of any publicist who would or could approve of it. There ought to be no doubt that in a case of collective guarantee one of the guarantors alone cannot be considered bound to act according to the treaty of guarantee. For a collective guarantee can have the meaning only that the guarantors should act in a body. But if one of the guarantors themselves violates the object of his own guarantee, the body of the guarantors remains, and it is certainly their duty to act against such faithless co-guarantor. If, however, the majority,[947] and therefore the body of the guarantors, were to violate the very object of their guarantee, the duty to act against them would not accrue to the minority.
[945] Hansard, vol. 183, p. 150.