The argument that it is unjust that private enemy citizens should suffer through having their property seized has no weight in face of the probability that fear of the annihilation of its merchant fleet in case of war may well deter a State intending to go to war from doing so. It is a matter for politicians, not for jurists, to decide whether Great Britain must in the interest of self-preservation oppose the abolition of the rule that sea-borne private enemy property may be confiscated.
However this may be, since the end of the nineteenth century it has not been the attitude of Great Britain alone which stands in the way of the abolition of the rule. Since the growth of navies among continental Powers, these Powers have learnt to appreciate the value of the rule in war, and the outcry against the capture of merchantmen has become less loud. To-day, it may perhaps be said that, even if Great Britain were to propose the abolition of the rule, it is probable that a greater number of the maritime States would refuse to accede. For it should be noted that at the Second Peace Conference, France, Russia, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama, besides Great Britain, voted against the abolition of the rule. And there is noticeable a slow, but constant, increase in the number of continental publicists[354] who oppose the abolition of the once so much objected to practice of capturing enemy merchantmen.
[354] See, for instance, Perels, § 36, pp. 195-198; Röpcke, Das Seebeuterecht (1904), pp. 36-47; Dupuis, Nos. 29-31; Pillet, p. 119; Giordana, La proprieta privata nelle guerre maritime, etc. (1907); Niemeyer, Prinzipien des Seekriegsrechts (1909); Boidin, pp. 144-167. On the other hand, the Institute of International Law has several times voted in favour of the abolition of the rule; see Tableau Général de l'Institut de droit International (1893), pp. 190-193. The literature concerning the question of confiscation of private enemy property on sea is abundant. The following authors, besides those already quoted above at the commencement of § [173], may be mentioned:—Upton, The Law of Nations affecting Commerce during War (1863); Cauchy, Du respect de la propriété privée dans la guerre maritime (1866); Vidari, Del rispetto della proprietà privata fra gli stati in guerra (1867); Gessner, Zur Reform des Kriegsseerechts (1875); Klobukowski, Die Seebeute oder das feindliche Privateigenthum zur See (1877); Bluntschli, Das Beuterecht im Kriege und das Seebeuterecht insbesondere (1878); Boeck, De la propriété privée ennemie sous pavillon ennemi (1882); Dupuis, La guerre maritime et les doctrines anglaises (1899); Leroy, La guerre maritime (1900); Röpcke, Das Seebeuterecht (1904); Hirst, Commerce and Property in Naval Warfare: A Letter of the Lord Chancellor (1906); Hamman, Der Streit um das Seebeuterecht (1907); Wehberg, Das Beuterecht im Land und Seekrieg (1909); Cohen, The Immunity of Enemy's Property from Capture at Sea (1909); Macdonell, Some plain Reasons for Immunity from Capture of Private Property at Sea (1910). See also the literature quoted by Bonfils, No. 1281, Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3070-3090, and Boeck, Nos. 382-572, where the arguments of the authors against and in favour of the present practice are discussed.
Impending Codification of Law of Sea Warfare.
§ 179. Be that as it may, the time is not very far distant when the Powers will perforce come to an agreement on this as on other points of sea warfare, in a code of regulations regarding sea warfare as a pendant to the Hague Regulations regarding warfare on land. An initiative step was taken by the United States of America by her Naval War Code[355] published in 1900, although she withdrew[356] the Code in 1904. Meanwhile, the Second Peace Conference has produced a number of Conventions dealing with some parts of Sea Warfare, namely: (1) the Convention (VI.) concerning the status of enemy merchantmen at the outbreak of hostilities; (2) the Convention (VII.) concerning the conversion of merchantmen into warships; (3) the Convention (VIII.) concerning the laying of automatic submarine contact mines; (4) the Convention (IX.) concerning the bombardment by naval forces; (5) the Convention (XI.) concerning restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war.
[355] See above, [vol. I. § 32].
[356] See above, § [68, p. 83, note 1].
II ATTACK AND SEIZURE OF ENEMY VESSELS
Hall, §§ 138 and 148—Lawrence, § 182—Westlake, II. pp. 133-140, 307-331—Phillimore, III. § 347—Twiss, II. § 73—Halleck, II. pp. 105-108—Taylor, §§ 545-546—Moore, VII. §§ 1175-1183, &c.,—Walker, § 50, p. 147—Wharton, III. § 345—Bluntschli, §§ 664-670—Heffter, §§ 137-139—Ullmann, § 188—Bonfils, Nos. 1269-1271, 1350-1354, 1398-1400—Despagnet, Nos. 650-659—Rivier, § 66—Nys, III. pp. 467-478—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3155-3165, 3176-3178—Calvo, IV. §§ 2368-2378—Fiore, III. Nos. 1414-1424, and Code, Nos. 1643-1649—Pillet, pp. 120-128—Perels, § 35—Testa, pp. 155-157—Lawrence, War, pp. 48-55, 93-111—Ortolan, II. pp. 31-34—Boeck, Nos. 190-208—Dupuis, Nos. 150-158, and Guerre, Nos. 74-112—U.S. Naval War Code, articles 13-16—Bernsten, §§ 7-8.
Importance of Attack and Seizure of Enemy Vessels.