II CHARACTERISTICS OF NEUTRALITY
Grotius, III. c. 17, § 3—Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. I. c. 9—Vattel, III. §§ 103-104—Hall, §§ 19-20—Lawrence, § 222—Westlake, II. pp. 161-169—Phillimore, III. §§ 136-137—Halleck, II. p. 141—Taylor, § 614—Moore, VII. §§ 1287-1291—Walker, § 54—Wheaton, § 412—Bluntschli, §§ 742-744—Heffter, § 144—Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 605-606—Gareis, § 87—Liszt, § 42—Ullmann, § 190—Bonfils, Nos. 1441 and 1443—Despagnet, No. 686—Rivier, II. pp. 368-370—Pradier-Fodéré, VIII. Nos. 3222-3224, 3232-3233—Nys, III. pp. 570-581—Calvo, IV. §§ 2491-2493—Fiore, III. Nos. 1536-1541, and Code, Nos. 1768-1775—Martens, II. § 129—Dupuis, No. 316—Mérignhac, pp. 349-351—Pillet, pp. 272-274—Heilborn, System, pp. 336-351—Perels, § 38—Testa, pp. 167-172—Kleen, I. §§ 1-4—Hautefeuille, I. pp. 195-200—Gessner, pp. 22-23—Schopfer, Le principe juridique de la neutralité et son évolution dans l'histoire de la guerre (1894).
Conception of Neutrality.
§ 293. Such States as do not take part in a war between other States are neutrals.[550] The term "neutrality" is derived from the Latin neuter. Neutrality may be defined as the attitude of impartiality adopted by third States towards belligerents and recognised by belligerents, such attitude creating rights and duties between the impartial States and the belligerents. Whether or not a third State will adopt and preserve an attitude of impartiality during war is not a matter for International Law but for International Politics. Therefore, unless a previous treaty stipulates it expressly, no duty exists for a State, according to International Law, to remain neutral in war. On the other hand, it ought not to be maintained, although this is done by some writers,[551] that every State has by the Law of Nations a right not to remain neutral. The fact is that every Sovereign State, as an independent member of the Family of Nations, is master of its own resolutions, and that the question of remaining neutral or not is, in absence of a treaty stipulating otherwise, one of policy and not of law. However, all States which do not expressly declare the contrary by word or action, are supposed to be neutral, and the rights and duties arising from neutrality come into and remain in existence through the mere fact that a State takes up and preserves an attitude of impartiality and is not drawn into the war by the belligerents themselves. A special assertion of intention to remain neutral is not therefore legally necessary on the part of neutral States, although they often expressly and formally proclaim[552] their neutrality.
[550] Grotius (III. c. 17) calls them medii in bello; Bynkershoek (I. c. 9) non hostes qui neutrarum partium sunt.
[551] See, for instance, Vattel, III. § 106, and Bonfils, No. 1443.
Neutrality an Attitude of Impartiality.
§ 294. Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality, it excludes such assistance and succour to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other, and, further, such injuries to the one as benefit the other. But it requires, on the other hand, active measures from neutral States. For neutrals must prevent belligerents from making use of their neutral territories and of their resources for military and naval purposes during the war. This concerns not only actual fighting on neutral territories, but also transport of troops, war materials, and provisions for the troops, the fitting out of men-of-war and privateers, the activity of Prize Courts, and the like.
But it is important to remember that the necessary attitude of impartiality is not incompatible with sympathy with one and antipathy against the other belligerent, so long as such sympathy and antipathy are not realised in actions violating impartiality. Thus, not only public opinion and the Press of a neutral State, but also the Government,[553] may show their sympathy to one party or another without thereby violating neutrality. And it must likewise be specially observed that acts of humanity on the part of neutrals and their subjects, such as the sending of doctors, medicine, provisions, dressing material, and the like, to military hospitals, and the sending of clothes and money to prisoners of war, can never be construed as acts of partiality, although these comforts are provided for the wounded and the prisoners of one of the belligerents only.