[859] It was also preferred in the first edition of this work. But it was necessary to abandon further resistance on account of the fact that after the official adoption, in the translation of the Declaration of London, of the term unneutral service it was useless to oppose it.

The Declaration of London puts the whole matter upon a new and very much enlarged basis, for Chapter III. treats in articles 45 to 47, under the heading De l'assistance hostile—the official English translation of which is unneutral service—not only of the carriage of persons for the enemy on the part of a neutral vessel, but also of the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy, the taking of a direct part in the hostilities, and a number of other acts on the part of a neutral vessel. Accordingly the Declaration of London makes a distinction between two kinds of unneutral service, meting out for the one a treatment analogous in a general way to contraband, and for the other a treatment analogous to that of enemy merchant vessels. Carriage of individual members of the armed forces of the enemy and a certain case of transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy constitute the first kind, and four groups of acts creating enemy character for the vessel concerned constitute the second kind.[860]

[860] Although—see above, §§ [173] and [174]—prevention of unneutral service to the enemy is a means of sea warfare, it chiefly concerns neutral commerce, and is, therefore, more conveniently treated with neutrality.

Carriage of Persons for the Enemy.

§ 408. Either belligerent may punish neutral vessels for carrying, in the service of the enemy, certain persons.

Such persons included, according to the customary rules of International Law hitherto prevailing, not only members of the armed forces of the enemy, but also individuals who were not yet members of the armed forces but who would have become so as soon as they reached their place of destination, and, thirdly, non-military individuals in the service of the enemy either in such a prominent position that they could be made prisoners of war, or who were going abroad as agents for the purpose of fostering the cause of the enemy. Thus, for instance, if the head of the enemy State or one of his cabinet ministers fled the country to avoid captivity, the neutral vessel that carried him could have been punished, as could also the vessel carrying an agent of the enemy sent abroad to negotiate a loan and the like. However, the mere fact that enemy persons were on board a neutral vessel did not in itself prove that these persons were carried by the vessel for the enemy and in his service. This was the case only when either the vessel knew of the character of the persons and nevertheless carried them, thereby acting in the service of the enemy, or when the vessel was directly hired by the enemy for the purpose of transport of the individuals concerned. Thus, for instance, if able-bodied men booked their passages on a neutral vessel to an enemy port with the secret intention of enlisting in the forces of the enemy, the vessel could not be considered as carrying persons for the enemy; but she could be so considered if an agent of the enemy openly booked their passages. Thus, further, if the fugitive head of the enemy State booked his passage under a false name, and concealed his identity from the vessel, she could not be considered as carrying a person for the enemy; but she could be so considered if she knew whom she was carrying, because she was then aware that she was acting in the service of the enemy. As regards a vessel directly hired by the enemy, there could be no doubt that she was acting in the service of the enemy. Thus the American vessel Orozembo[861] was in 1807, during war between England and the Netherlands, captured and condemned, because, although chartered by a merchant in Lisbon ostensibly to sail in ballast to Macao and to take from there a cargo to America, she received by order of the charterer three Dutch officers and two Dutch civil servants, and sailed, not to Macao, but to Batavia. And the American vessel Friendship[862] was likewise in 1807, during war between England and France, captured and condemned, because she was hired by the French Government to carry ninety shipwrecked officers and sailors home to a French port.

[861] 6 C. Rob. 430.

[862] 6 C. Rob. 420.

According to British practice hitherto prevailing, a neutral vessel was considered as carrying persons in the service of the enemy even if she were, through the application of force, constrained by the enemy to carry the persons, or if she were in bona-fide ignorance of the status of her passengers. Thus, in 1802, during war between Great Britain and France, the Swedish vessel Carolina[863] was condemned by Sir William Scott for having carried French troops from Egypt to Italy, although the master endeavoured to prove that the vessel was obliged by force to render the transport service. And the above-mentioned vessel Orozembo was condemned[864] by Sir William Scott, although her master was ignorant of the service for the enemy on which he was engaged: "... In cases of bona-fide ignorance there may be no actual delinquency; but if the service is injurious, that will be sufficient to give the belligerent a right to prevent the thing from being done or at least repeated," said Sir William Scott.[865]

[863] 4 C. Rob. 256.