That a racial distinction underlay the difference in social position and standing is suggested by the current penalties for assault, in accordance with which a noble could demand an exact retaliation for injuries from one of his own class, whereas he merely paid a money compensation to any man of the middle class he might have injured. Thus if one noble happened to knock out the eye or the tooth of another, his own eye or his own tooth was knocked out in return, and if he broke the limb of one of the members of his own class, he had his corresponding limb broken; but, if he knocked out the eye of a member of the middle class, or broke his limb, he was fined one maneh of silver, and for knocking out the tooth of such a man, he was fined one-third of a maneh. Other regulations point to a similar cleavage in the social strata, which can best be explained by a difference in race. Thus if two members of the same class quarrelled and one of them made a peculiarly improper assault on the other, the assailant was only fined, the fine being larger if the quarrel was between two nobles. But if such an assault was made by a member of the middle class upon a noble, the assailant was punished by being publicly beaten in the presence of the assembly, when he received sixty stripes from an ox-hide scourge.

The third and lowest class in the community were the slaves, who were owned by both the upper classes, but were naturally more numerous in the households of the nobles and on their estates. The slave was his master's absolute property, and on the contract-tablets he is often referred to as "a head," as though he were merely an animal. He constantly changed hands, by sale, bequest, or when temporarily pledged for a debt. For bad offences he was liable to severe punishment, such as cutting off the ear, which was the penalty for denying his master, or for making an aggravated assault upon a noble. But, on the whole, his lot was not a particularly hard one, for he was a recognized member of his master's household, and, as a valuable piece of property, it was obviously to his owner's interest to keep him healthy and in good condition. In fact, the value of the slave is attested by the severity of the penalties exacted for abducting a male or female slave from the owner's house and removing one from the city; for the death penalty was imposed in such a case, as also on anyone harbouring and taking possession of a runaway slave. On the other hand, a fixed reward was paid by the owner to anyone by whom a runaway was captured and brought back. Special legislation was also devised with the object of rendering the theft of slaves difficult and their detection easy. Thus, if a brander put a mark upon a slave without the owner's consent, he was liable to have his hands cut off; and, if he could prove that he had done so through being deceived by another man, that man was put to death. There was a regular trade in slaves, and no doubt their numbers were constantly increased by captives taken in war.

Though the slaves, as a class, had few rights of their own, there were regulations in accordance with which, under certain circumstances, they could acquire them, and even obtain their freedom. Thus it was possible for an industrious slave, while still in his master's service, to acquire property of his own, or a slave might inherit wealth from relatives; and, in such circumstances, he was able with his master's consent to purchase his freedom. Again, if a slave were captured by the enemy and taken to a foreign land and sold, and were then brought back by his new owner to his own country, he could claim his liberty without having to pay compensation to either of his masters. Moreover, a slave could acquire certain rights while still in slavery. Thus, if the owner of a female slave had begotten children by her, he could not use her as payment for a debt; and, in the event of his having done so, he was obliged to ransom her by paying the original amount of the debt in money. It was also possible for a male slave, whether owned by a noble or by a member of the middle class, to marry a free woman, and if he did so his children were free and did not become the property of his master. His wife, too, if a free woman, retained her marriage-portion on her husband's death, and supposing the couple had acquired property during the time they lived together as man and wife, the owner of the slave could only claim half of such property, the other half being retained by the free woman for her own use and for that of her children. The mere fact that such a union was possible suggests that there was no very marked cleavage between the social status of the better class of slaves and that of the humbler members of the middle class.

The cultivation of the land, which formed the principal source of the wealth of Babylonia,[6] was carried on mainly by slave labour, under the control of the two upper classes of the population. The land itself was largely in the hands of the crown, the temples, and the great nobles and merchants who were landed proprietors; and, including that still in communal or tribal possession,[7] a very large proportion was cultivated on lease. The usual practice in hiring land for cultivation was for the tenant to pay his rent in kind, by assigning a certain proportion of the crop, generally a third or a half, to the owner, who advanced the seed-corn.[8] The tenant was bound to till the land and raise a crop, and should he neglect to do so he had to pay the owner what was reckoned as the average rent of the land, and he had also to break up the land and plough it before handing it back. Elaborate regulations were in force to adjust the landowner's duties and responsibilities on the one hand, and what was due to him from his tenant on the other. As the rent of a field was usually reckoned at harvest, and its amount depended on the size of the crop, it would have been unfair that damage to the crop from flood or storm should have been made up by the tenant; such a loss was shared equally by the owner of the field and the farmer, though, if the latter had already paid his rent at the time the damage occurred, he could not make a claim for repayment. There is evidence that disputes were frequent not only between farmers and landowners, but also between farmers and shepherds, for the latter, when attempting to find pasture for their flocks, often allowed their sheep to feed off the farmers' fields in spring. For such cases a scale of compensation was fixed. If the damage was done in the early spring, when the plants were still small, the farmer harvested the crop and received a price in kind as compensation from the shepherd. But if it occurred later in the year, when the sheep had been brought in from the meadows and turned on to the common land by the city-gate, the damage was heavier; in such a case the shepherd had to take over the crop and compensate the farmer heavily.

The king himself was a very large owner of cattle and sheep, and he levied tribute on the flocks and herds of his subjects. The owners were bound to bring the young cattle and lambs, that were due from them, to the central town of the district in which they dwelt, and they were then collected and added to the royal flocks and herds. If the owners attempted to hold back any that were due as tribute, they were afterwards forced to incur the extra expense and trouble of driving the beasts to Babylon. The flocks and herds owned by the king and the great temples were probably enormous, and yielded a considerable revenue in themselves apart from the tribute and taxes levied upon private owners. Shepherds and herdsmen were placed in charge of them, and they were divided into groups under head-men, who arranged the districts in which the herds and flocks were to be grazed. The king received regular reports from his chief shepherds and herdsmen, and it was the duty of the governors of the larger towns and districts of Babylonia to make tours of inspection and see that due care was taken of the royal flocks. The sheep-shearing for all the flocks that were pastured near the capital took place in Babylon, and the king used to send out summonses to his chief shepherds to inform them of the day when the shearing would take place.[9] Separate flocks, that were royal and priestly property, were sometimes under the same chief officer, a fact that tends to show that the king himself exercised a considerable measure of control over the sacred revenues.

PORTION OF THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, COLS. 6-8.
After Délég. en Perse, Mém. IV, pl. 4.

In the regulation of the pastoral and agricultural life of the community, custom played a very important part, and this was recognized and enforced by royal authority. Carelessness in looking after cattle was punished by fine, but the owner was not held responsible for damage unless negligence could be proved on his part. Thus a bull might go wild at any time and gore a man, who would have no redress against its owner. But if the beast was known to be vicious, and its owner had not blunted its horns nor shut it up, he was obliged to pay compensation for damage. On the other hand, the owner of cattle or asses, who had hired them out, could exact compensation for the loss or ill-treatment of his beasts. These were framed on the principle that the hirer was responsible only for damage or loss which; he could reasonably have prevented. If, for example, a lion killed a hired ox or ass in the open country, or if an ox was killed by lightning, the loss fell upon the owner and not on the man who had hired the beast. But if the hirer killed the ox through carelessness or by beating it unmercifully, or if the beast broke its leg while in his charge, he had to restore to the owner another ox in its place. For less serious damage to the beast the hirer paid compensation on a fixed scale.[10] It is clear that such regulations merely gave the royal sanction to long-established custom.

Both for looking after their herds and for the cultivation of their estates the landed proprietors depended to a great extent upon hired herdsmen and farmers; and any dishonesty on the part of the latter with regard to cattle, provender, or seed-corn was severely punished. A theft of provender, for example, had to be made good, and the culprit ran the additional risk of having his hands cut off. Heavy compensation was exacted from any man, who, for his own profit, hired out oxen which had been entrusted to his charge; while, if a farmer stole the seed-corn supplied for the field he had hired, so that he produced no crop to share with the owner, not only had he to pay compensation but he was liable to be torn in pieces by oxen in the field he should have cultivated.[11] In the age of Hammurabi the heavier penalties were no doubt largely traditional, having come down from a more barbarous time when dishonesty could only be kept in check by strong measures. Their retention among the statutes doubtless acted as an effective deterrent, and a severe sentence, if carried out occasionally in the case of an aggravated offence, would have sufficed to maintain respect for the regulations.