Still I consider, that a railway run along the edge of the Bactiari hills, would have a far better chance of attracting population towards it, than one in the Euphrates or Tigris valleys. The soil is naturally a very rich one, and the winter rainfall sufficient for agricultural purposes. Where-ever cultivation exists it is remunerative, and the soil has not been worked out, as is the case in the plains. The line would doubtless serve the better peopled districts of Shirazd and Luristan; and Bebaban, Shustar and Dizful, would become once more important entrepôts for the wealth of the interior. With the security a railway would give, immigrants might even gradually arrive, and it is conceivable that the district might in the course of years be reclaimed, for it is well worth reclaiming, but the prospect is a distant one.
On the whole I would suggest that all calculations as to traffic should be based strictly on existing circumstances. It may be, that the present population and production are sufficient for the support of a railway, (I myself considerably doubt it), but investors should trust to these only. The future has only delusions in store for them. It is idle to quote the precedent of those American railways, carried through waste places, which have speedily attracted population, and through population, wealth. In Asia there is no surplus population anywhere to attract. Moreover there are existing circumstances of misgovernment, which no system of railways can cure, and till these are changed, it is idle to hope for other changes. Railways in Europe or in America, serve the interests of the people. In Turkey or in Persia they would serve the interests of their rulers only.
That readers may judge what the actual condition is, of the lands lying between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, I have put in tabular form the amount of cultivated and uncultivated land, of pasture and desert, afforded by the various lines of route which have been suggested for a railway. These are:
1.—ThePalmyra Route, 555 miles. | |
| Miles. |
Tripoli to Homs, partial cultivation | 70 |
Homs to Palmyra, a pastoral desert | 120 |
Palmyra to Hitt, uninhabited desert | 250 |
Hitt to Seglawieh, partial cultivation | 65 |
Seglawieh to Bagdad, alluvial plain, uncultivated, for themost part uninhabited | 50 |
Total under partialcultivation | 135 |
,, desert or pastoral | 420 |
Total | 555 |
This route has nothing to recommend it except its shortness. It would pass through but one considerable town, Homs; it would serve no important agricultural district, and could count upon no local traffic. The greater part of its course is without water, fuel, inhabitants, or possibility of development. It would require considerable cutting and bridging (for ravines), and would have little strategical value.
2.—TheEuphrates Valley Route, 625 miles. | |
| Miles. |
Lattakia or Alexandretta to Aleppo, cultivation | 100 |
Aleppo to Deyr, pastoral | 210 |
Deyr to Abu Camal, pastoral, partly cultivated | 70 |
Abu Camal to Hitt, desert, with palm oases | 130 |
Hitt to Seglawieh, partial cultivation | 65 |
Seglawieh to Bagdad, alluvial plain, uncultivated, andmostly uninhabited | 50 |
Total cultivated and partlycultivated | 235 |
,, desert or pastoral | 390 |
Total | 625 |
This line passes through one town of eighty thousand inhabitants, Aleppo, and two small towns, Deyr and Ana, besides a few villages. It could count on very little local traffic; Deyr might export a little corn, Ana a few dates. Except in the northern portion it is not a sheep district. It has the advantages of water and fuel, but these would be to a certain extent neutralised if, as is probable, the line should have to pass along the desert above, instead of in the valley. In either case the construction would not be without expense, the river with its inundations causing constant obstruction below; while the desert above, is much broken with ravines. It could hardly pay the whole of its working expenses. Its principal advantage is, that in case of its being continued from Seglawieh to Bussorah, some miles would be saved, or a branch line might be made to Kerbela. The Euphrates line is strategically of advantage to Turkey, mainly as a check on the Bedouin tribes.
3.—TheMesopotamian or Tigris Valley Route, 700 miles. | |
| Miles. |
Alexandretta or Lattakia to Aleppo, cultivation | 100 |
Aleppo to Orfa, cultivation | 120 |
Orfa to Mosul, by Mardin, partial cultivation | 250 |
Mosul to Bagdad by the right bank of the Tigris,pastoral | 230 |
Total cultivated and partlycultivated | 470 |
,, pastoral | 230 |
Total | 700 |
This line has the advantage of passing through no absolutely desert district. It would be well watered throughout, and in the Tigris Valley would have a supply of fuel. It would, as far as Mosul, serve four large towns with an aggregate population of two hundred thousand inhabitants, besides numerous villages, and a nearly continuous agricultural population. Its stations would serve as depots for the produce of Upper Syria, Armenia, and Kurdistan from the north, and of a fairly prosperous pastoral district from the south. Below Mosul, however, there would be but two small towns, Samara, and Tekrit, and hardly a village. The engineering difficulties of this route, in spite of several small rivers besides the Euphrates (which all three lines would have to cross), would probably be less than in the others. Upper Mesopotamia is a more even plain than the Syrian Desert, and southwards is but little intersected with ravines. This route is strategically of immense importance to Turkey, and is perhaps the best. I would, however, suggest, that commercially, a better line would be from Mosul by Kerkuk to Bagdad. This would continue through cultivated lands, and is the route recommended by the very intelligent Polish engineer, who surveyed it some years ago.
Beyond Bagdad the routes to the Persian Gulf would be—