"It is impossible not to sympathise with General Gatacre's obvious determination that, whatever happened to the other parts of the assault, the British Brigade should burst into the enclosure at all costs.[[1]]
[[1]] The River War, vol. i. p. 457.
This feeling of exaggerated personal responsibility led the General to take up his position at the head of his Brigade. In his letter written four days later he anticipates the criticism that would be levelled against him on this account, and shows that he had weighed the point, and had deliberately forsaken the traditional place. Scientific soldiers may criticise his action, but, according to Mr. Churchill, there was to a civilian a certain grim splendour in the spectacle.[[2]]
[[2]] Ibid., vol. i. p. 468.
In the General's last letter before the fight we find the following words:
"My men are ready. I have taught them all I know. We shall do our best, and I think my regiments will do all I expect of them; God bless you."
The assault
The battle of the Atbara was fought on Good Friday, April 8, 1898. It was a brilliant victory, and resulted in the capture of Mahmoud and the total defeat of his army. The enemy's losses were estimated at 40 Emirs and 3,000 Dervishes killed. On our side the losses were 24 killed and 101 wounded in the British Brigade, and 56 killed and 371 wounded in the Egyptian Army. It is interesting to note that the casualties in the two Egyptian Brigades, which took part in the assault on the zariba simultaneously with the British regiments, amount to 381, which gives a higher ratio per Brigade than the figure for the British troops, which is 125. So that it is scarcely possible to maintain that the formation adopted in Gatacre's brigade was peculiarly destructive.
The General's own letter of April 14 from Darmali furnishes a very graphic account of the engagement and the return march:
"They all did very well, but I had to get a bit forward to watch that all went well. Between you and me, a General Officer should not get up into the firing line of his Brigade without good reason; this I know, but I had good reasons for going there. When your whole Brigade only covers a space of 200 yards by 200 yards, it is immaterial where you are, so far as the penetration of bullets is concerned, but what is important is that the G.O.C. should be where he can watch any important point.... Well, our men started the ball, and we pushed straight on over the stockade. It was pretty hot when we were pulling away the zariba fence; the ground was flying up as if it was being harrowed all round me, with the fire of the riflemen, and I lost a terrible bunch of men at that spot. Of course I saw the sooner we got to the stockade the sooner we should stop the rifle fire, so we rushed it, and as soon as we were in we soon killed all the riflemen and the spearmen there, but we had a real good fight. The general operations of the day, however, were as follows: On evening of the 7th (Thursday) the British Brigade and three Egyptian Brigades moved out from Abadar at 6 p.m., my Brigade leading; we moved in square about three miles, sat down in the Desert, had some food and water, and slept in square till 1 o'clock a.m. Of course we took no blankets or anything with us, merely one day's food, ammunition, and water. At one o'clock we moved on in square, the other brigades following; it was moonlight, and a curious sight to see these three enormous hollow squares moving solemnly on with not a note or a whisper even—no smoking. We went on till just before dawn, then halted and deployed into line; a fine line it was—the Camerons, Seaforths, and Lincolnshires, with the Warwicks in column on the left flank at right angles.