4. Paragraph 4 is altogether denied. Stonehenge is not and never was subject to any trust for user or access by the public or to any public trust.
5. As to paragraphs 5 and 6 the Defendant has for the better preservation of Stonehenge erected and maintains a fence round the land lying within the triangle formed by the said two public roads and the way or track from Netheravon to Lake not obstructing or interfering with any public right of way. Save as aforesaid paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Statement of Claim are denied.
F. VAUGHAN HAWKINS.
Delivered the 27th day of April 1904 by Farrer & Co. of 66 Lincoln’s Inn Fields in the County of Middlesex Solicitors for the Defendant.
This case commenced in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, on Tuesday, March 28th, and continued on the 29th and 30th. Again on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 11th and 12th of April. Mr. Justice Farwell delivered his considered judgment on the 19th, concluding as follows:—
“I hold, therefore, that the access to the circle was incident only to the permission to visit and inspect the stones, and was, therefore, permissive only, and, further that the tracks to the circle are not thoroughfares, but lead only to the circle, where the public have no right without permission, and, therefore, are not public ways. The action accordingly fails, and ought never to have been brought. It is plain that the vicinity of the camp and the consequent increase of visitors compelled the defendant to protect the stones if they were to be preserved; and he has done nothing more than is necessary for such protection. I desire to give the relators credit for wishing only to preserve this unique relic of a former age for the benefit of the public, but I fail to appreciate their method of attaining this. The first claim to dispossess the defendant of his property is simply extravagant, so much so that, although not technically abandoned, no serious argument was addressed to me in support of it. The rest of the claim—for rights of way over the network of tracks shown on the plaintiffs’ plan—if successful would defeat the relators’ object. If these ways were left unfenced and heavy traffic passed through the circle, there would be great risk of injury, and even without such traffic there is great risk from the increased numbers of passers-by. As Sir Norman Lockyer (whose interesting application of the Orientation theory to Stonehenge has recently appeared) says in one of his articles:—‘The real destructive agent has been man himself—savages could not have played more havoc with the monument than the English who have visited it at different times for different purposes.’ I feel no confidence that the majority of tourists have improved, nay, rather,—‘Aetas parentum, pejor avis, tulit Nos nequiores.’ It is only fair to the defendant to say that he is not acting capriciously but on expert advice for the preservation of the stones. If, on the other hand, the roads are all fenced off, the general appearance would be ruined, and no human being would be in any way the better. It is not immaterial to remark that this is not the action of the District or the County Council to preserve rights of way, but is brought on the relation of strangers on the score of the public interest in Stonehenge. The action is dismissed with costs.”
Mr. Warmington:—“My Lord, there is only one matter with regard to costs I think, and that is the question of the Commission. [52] My Lord, those were reserved, and they will be costs in the action.”
Mr. Justice Farwell:—“Yes. I may say this—it sometimes saves trouble, and it is not unusual, I have done it before, and I think I may say it now—that this is a case in which the taxing master should allow three counsel.”
Mr. Warmington:—“If your Lordship pleases. I was instructed to apply; but according to the practice it is done after taxation.”
Mr. Justice Farwell:—“I know it is. But I have done it before. You see the matter is now fresh in my recollection, and a summons to vary might come before other Judges.”