The Jesuits of Brazil were expelled in 1760, in the most cruel and arbitrary manner. Those of the Spanish American colonies eight years later. Whatever might have been their faults, or even their crimes, in other countries, in these their conduct had been exemplary. They had been the protectors of a persecuted race, the advocates of mercy, the founders of civilisation; and their patience under their unmerited sufferings forms not the least honourable trait in their character.
The history of Brazil, for the next thirty years, is composed of the mismanagement and decay of the Jesuit establishments; the enlargement of the mining districts, particularly in the direction of Mato Grosso; some disputes with the French on the frontier of Cayenne; and the more peaceful occupations of opening roads, and the introduction of new branches of commerce, and the improvement of the old.
This tranquillity was for a moment interrupted by a conspiracy in the province of Minas Geraes, headed by an officer named Joaquim Jose de Silva Xavier, commonly called Tiradentes. The project of the conspirators was to form an independent republic in Minas, and, if possible, to induce Rio de Janeiro to unite with it. But their measures were most inadequate for the end proposed, and their conduct so imprudent, that, although there was a pretty general feeling of discontent on account of the taxes and some other grievances, the conspirators were all seized before they had formed anything like a party capable of resistance, much less of beginning the meditated revolution.
The direct effects upon Brazil of the first thirteen years of the revolutionary war in Europe were confined to some slight disputes regarding the boundaries of the Portuguese and French Guiana, and concerning the limits of which, there was an article in Lord Cornwallis's negotiations with France, or rather the peace of Amiens in 1802.
The indirect effects were greater. Being a good deal left to themselves, the colonists had leisure to discover what sort of cultivation and crops suited best with the climate, and were fittest for the market; and some branches of industry were introduced, and others improved, to the great advantage of the province. Foreign ships, and even fleets, had also begun to resort thither[18]: so that, though the ports had as yet been closed against foreign traders, the entrance of men of war, and such merchant ships as could find no others to refit in, introduced a virtual freedom, which it would afterwards have been impossible not to have confirmed.
The court of Portugal meanwhile, as if infatuated by the negotiations of France, consented to buy a disgraceful neutrality at the price of 1,000,000 of livres or 40,000l. per month, besides granting free entrance to French woollens into the kingdom.
It was in vain that frequent representations were made to the ministry at Lisbon on the subject; that the armament at Bayonne, and the refusal of Spain to forbid the passage of French troops through her territories, were pointed out. The Portuguese forces were marched to the sea-coast, as if they apprehended an invasion from England; thus leaving the kingdom defenceless on the land side, and the ports were shut against English commerce, by a proclamation, dated 20th October, 1807. But the importance of Portugal to England, as neutral ground, or, in the event of a French government in Spain, as a point whence to attack the great enemy, was such, that the resentment which at another time would certainly have been openly declared, was suppressed; but a strong squadron was always kept up off the coast, partly to watch the proceedings on shore, partly to prevent the Portuguese vessels from coming out of port, and joining the French and Spaniards.
While this system of watchfulness was kept up in Europe, the English ministry was not less attentive to the designs of France on the South American colonies. As long as Spain and Portugal continued to pay the enormous price in money for their neutrality, which France had demanded, the views of Napoleon were better answered than they could have been by the possession of all their territory and all their colonies. But the moment in which they should become unable or unwilling to pay that price, would of course be that of aggression and invasion. So early as 1796, Mr. Pitt had contemplated the advantages that must arise to Britain from the possession of a port in South America, and particularly in the Rio de la Plata, nor did he ever afterwards lose sight of it. Some circumstances occurred in December, 1804, to draw his attention, particularly towards the subject, inasmuch as he had intelligence that France was about to attempt to seize on one of the Spanish settlements on the first opportunity. But we were then at peace with Spain, and however willing to prevent such an aggression on the part of France, and to assist General Miranda in his intended expedition to South America, it was impossible to co-operate with him, as he earnestly pressed the ministry to do, although the advantage to England of securing such a market for her manufactures was clearly perceived. Among the officers who had been most confidentially consulted by Mr. Pitt, on the practicability of obtaining a settlement on the La Plata, was Sir Home Popham; and it was probably his knowledge of the views so long entertained by that minister, that induced him to take the hazardous step, of leaving the Cape of Good Hope so soon after it had been occupied by the English forces, in 1806, and taking Buenos Ayres without orders to that effect. His immediate motive was, the intelligence he had procured, that the squadron of the French admiral, Guillaumez, had intentions of touching on the coast of Brazil, entering the La Plata, and, if possible, seizing, or forming a settlement there; and some North Americans whom he had met, encouraged the undertaking, by observing, that to throw open the ports of South America would be a common benefit to all commercial nations, but particularly to England.[19]
In 1806, the demonstrations of hostilities against Portugal on the part of France were so evident, that Lord Rosslyn was despatched thither on a special mission, in which Lord St. Vincent and General Simcoe were joined with him. His instructions from Mr. Fox, then prime minister, were to lay before the ministry of Lisbon, the imminent danger which threatened the country, and to offer assistance in men, money, and stores from England, to put Portugal in a state of defence, in case the government should decide on a vigorous and effective resistance. If, on the other hand, Portugal should think itself too weak to contend with France, the idea that had once occurred to King Don Alfonso of emigrating to Brazil, and there establishing the capital of the empire, was to be revived, and promises made of assistance and protection for that purpose. If, however, Portugal insisted on rejecting assistance in either case, the troops under General Simcoe were to be landed, the strong forts on the Tagus occupied by them, and the fleet was to enter the river and secure the Portuguese ships and vessels, taking care to impress the government and people with the feeling that this was done from regard to the nation, and by no means for the sake of selfish aggrandisement on the part of England. It appears, however, that the French preparations for the invasion were not at that time so far advanced as had been imagined, and at the earnest entreaty of the court of Lisbon, the troops and the fleet were withdrawn from the Tagus.
On the 8th of August, the next year, however, (1807) Mr. Rayneval, the French chargé d'affaires at Lisbon, received orders from his court to declare to the Prince Regent of Portugal, that if by the first of September he did not declare war against England, and send back the English minister, recalling the Portuguese ambassador from London, and did not seize all the English residents, confiscate their property, and shut the ports of the kingdom against the English; and lastly, if he did not, without delay, unite his armies and fleets with those of the rest of the continent against England, he had orders to demand his passports and to declare war.