The expedition to Fort Wayne had already set off before any counter orders arrived. It was a troublesome and difficult journey of several hundred miles into the enemy's country, but its capture was important as being the base of supplies for the left division of the American army. It was at this time invested by a body of Indians. Captain Muir of the 41st, with one hundred and fifty men of that regiment, the same number of militia, some field guns and a howitzer, crossed Lake Erie to the Miami River, thence to the village of that name, where they were joined by three hundred Indian warriors. They had proceeded only about half way to the fort when they were met by some Indians who informed them that two thousand five hundred Ohio and Kentucky volunteers under General Winchester were advancing to the Miami, and were then only about three miles distant. As a proof of this story they produced the scalps of five Americans, part of the advance guard, whom they had treacherously killed while engaged in friendly conversation. Under the circumstances it would have been folly to proceed, so Captain Muir conducted an orderly retreat, expecting at any moment to be attacked by the advancing force. He at last reached his boats without the loss of a man or any of his supplies, and returned to Amherstburg after a fruitless absence of three weeks. As it turned out afterwards the Americans had avoided an engagement, thinking the British had a much superior force.
In the meantime Sir George Prevost was again complicating affairs by his vacillating and contradictory orders. He wrote on September 7th finding fault with General Brock's conduct of affairs on the Detroit frontier. It drew from the general the following reply, dated September 18th: "I have been honoured with your Excellency's despatch, dated the 7th inst. I have implicitly followed your Excellency's instructions, and abstained under the greatest temptations and provocations from every act of hostility." He enclosed a letter from Colonel Procter containing the information of the force sent under Captain Muir against Fort Wayne, and continued: "I gave orders for it previous to my leaving Amherstburg, which must have induced Colonel Procter to proceed upon receiving intelligence of the recommencement of hostilities, without waiting for further directions. I regret exceedingly that this service should be undertaken contrary to your Excellency's wishes, but I beg leave to assure you that the principal object in sending a British force to Fort Wayne is with the hope of preserving the lives of the garrison. By the last accounts the place was invested by a numerous body of Indians, with very little prospect of being relieved. The prisoners of war, who knew perfectly the situation of the garrison, rejoiced at the measure, and give us full credit for our intentions. The Indians were likewise looking to us for assistance. They heard of the armistice with every mark of jealousy. Had we refused joining them in this expedition I cannot calculate the consequences. I have already been asked to pledge my word that England would enter into no negotiation in which their interests were not included. Could they be brought to imagine that we should desert them, the consequences must be fatal." General Brock added that the attack of the enemy on his frontier could not be long delayed, and that he thought the militia could not be kept together without such a prospect.
Prevost's advice
On the 14th Sir George Prevost wrote again, evidently in a panic, and advised General Brock to take immediate steps for evacuating Detroit, together with the territory of Michigan. This must have indeed been galling to the second in command. The reason for this advice, Sir George said, was a despatch dated July 4th from Lord Bathurst, which seems to have been somewhat belated. It said that His Majesty's government trusted he would be able to suspend with perfect safety all extraordinary preparations for defence which he might have been induced to make, also that every special requisition for warlike stores and accoutrements had been complied with, except the clothing of the corps proposed to be raised from the Glengarry emigrants, and that the minister had not thought it necessary to direct the preparation of any further supplies.
Sir George adds: "This will afford you a strong proof of the infatuation of His Majesty's ministers upon the subject of American affairs, and show how entirely I have been left to my own resources in the event which has taken place." He informed Brock that he could not expect any more reinforcements.
The latter did not agree with Sir George Prevost's opinion as to the advisability of evacuating Detroit and the Michigan territory, the fruits of his splendid victory. He wrote from York on September 28th to the commander-in-chief: "I have been honoured with your Excellency's despatches dated the 14th inst. I shall suspend, under the latitude left by your Excellency to my discretion, the evacuation of Fort Detroit. Such a measure would most likely be followed by the total extinction of the population on that side of the river, as the Indians, aware of our weakness and inability to carry on active warfare, would only think of entering into terms with the enemy.
"The Indians, since the Miami affair in 1793, have been extremely suspicious of our conduct, but the violent wrongs committed by the Americans on their territory have rendered it an act of policy with them to disguise their sentiments. Could they be persuaded that a peace between the belligerents would take place without admitting their claim to an extensive tract of country fraudulently usurped from them, and opposing a frontier to the present unbounded views of the Americans, I am satisfied in my own mind that they would immediately compromise with the enemy. I cannot conceive a connection more likely to lead to more awful consequences. Should negotiations of peace be opened I cannot be too earnest with your Excellency to represent to the king's ministers the expediency of including the Indians as allies, and not to leave them exposed to the unrelenting fury of their enemies.
"The enemy has evidently assumed defensive measures along the strait of Niagara. His force, I apprehend, is not equal to attempt the expedition across the river with any probability of success. It is, however, currently reported that large reinforcements are on their march. Should they arrive an attack cannot be long delayed. The approach of the rainy season would increase the sickness with which the troops [of the United States] are already afflicted. Those under my command are in perfect health and spirits."
Army discipline