APPENDIX III.—Extracts from a Letter to the 'Daily News,' in February, 1852, by a, "HUNGARIAN EXILE," in reply to a Letter from SZEMERE, to the 'London Examiner.'
[I am personally acquainted with the accomplished and intelligent "Exile;" but as he is absent from England, I cannot obtain permission to publish his name.]
It was more than two months after the civil war had been raging in the Banat and Transylvania that the question of giving fresh troops for the suppression of the Italian war was brought before the Assembly at Pesth, July 22, 1846. Now, what are the accusations M. Szemere brings forth against Kossuth in reference to the Italian question? The pith of M. Szemere's reasoning is, that the ministry agreed, in the protocol of July 5, upon construing the Pragmatic Sanction as binding Hungary to protect the integrity of Austria; "yet that Kossuth, as the organ of the ministry, spoke in a way as if he did not approve of the policy, and sought to make the public believe that the protocol was merely a moral demonstration:" further, that when the opposition denied the obligation of Hungary to defend Austria, the ministry refused to enter into any discussion on an acknowledged principle of constitutional law.
In order to show the utter hollowness of this attack, it may be sufficient to look at the date and circumstances M. Szemere talks of. The protocol in question was agreed upon on July 5th, the day when the parliament met to provide for the defence of the country. The members, inexperienced in foreign politics and ignorant of the cabals of courts, although presuming that the civil war was kindled in Vienna, were at first blinded by the royal convocation of the Diet to provide for the safety of the country; putting, moreover, implicit confidence in the sagacity and goodwill of the ministry. When however Kossuth opened the debate on the Italian question, July 22, affairs looked quite different from what they appeared to be when the protocol was drawn up. The treachery of the dynasty broke upon the mind of the most careless, and its connexions with the leaders of the rebellious tribes had become undeniable facts. It was during that short time, from July 5 to July 22, that our national forces met in the Serbian entrenchments of St. Thomas, Földvar, and Turia, regular Austrian soldiers: Meyerhofe, the Austrian consul at Belgrade, was openly recruiting bands of Servians to reinforce the insurgents; nay, it became even evident that General Bechtold, appointed by His Majesty to lead the faithful Hungarians against the rebellious Serbs, led them on in order to get them the sooner decimated and broken. Some members of the opposition, headed by General Perczel, declaimed loudly against the cowardly and fallacious policy of the ministry, resolving to compel ministers to resign or to induce them to take some more efficacious measures. In short, during this space of time, the government and people found themselves in quite a new position. Kossuth, in concert with the ministry, moved a levy of 200,000 men (July 11), which motion the Assembly hailed with unparalleled enthusiasm, and which the people witnessed with approval, as affording a guarantee of their liberties. It was in the midst of these moments of excitement and temporary distress that Kossuth, as the most popular member of the cabinet, was pointed out as the person most fitted to undertake the very difficult task of speaking on the Italian question alluded to by M. Szemere. Public opinion, aided by the opposition of the house, was convinced that Austria, after having subjugated the Lombard-Venetians with Hungarian troops, would then turn to Hungary, the enslavement of which might more easily be executed by the country's being bereft of a number of stout arms indispensable to her own defence. Kossuth therefore, as a man of true liberal principles, while acknowledging the ground to be right upon which the opposition moved, professed in the speech alluded to that he had agreed then with his colleagues in respect to the Italian question, on the ground that the moral power of the protocol would suffice, although as a private individual he could not help rejoicing at the victories of the Italian people. Now, I submit it to every enlightened Englishman to decide whether Kossuth evinced a want of civic virtue in declaring that, as a man who wished freedom for himself, he could not rejoice in the sending of troops to subjugate another people struggling against the same tyrant?
Referring to the policy of the ministry, M. Szemere says "that Count Louis Bathyanyi declared, on the 31st March, that the obligation enjoined by the Pragmatic Sanction was such that Hungary was bound thereby to defend the territorial integrity of the Austrian monarchy, but that they (the ministers) would carefully avoid interfering in the internal affairs of the states that constituted this monarchy." Irrespective of this—that Count Bathyanyi explained the policy in March, when Hungary enjoyed perfect peace, whereas the debate on the Italian question happened in the midst of most threatening civil wars carried on directly by Austria—it must be remembered that if by the 1st article of the Pragmatic Sanction Hungary was bound to afford aid to Austria etiam contra vim externam, that same article provided that the States composing the realm of Hungary were to be preserved by the monarch aeque indivisibiliter as his hereditary estates; and that by the 3d article of that celebrated law the Sovereign promised, for himself and his successors, to compel his subjects of every state and degree to observe the laws and rights of Hungary. It is therefore evident that the infraction of this law, by the countenance and aid furnished to the Serbs (as also to Jellachich), fully exonerated the Hungarians from sending troops to Italy before they had provided for the safety of their country, and fully justified them and their responsible minister for drawing the attention of their Sovereign to it in the address to the Crown. M. Szemere talks of protecting the integrity of the Austrian empire, and carefully avoiding to interfere with the internal affairs of other states. The Czar may indeed exclaim, with M. Szemere, that in sending his Cossacks into Hungary he never intended to interfere in our internal affairs.
The second charge, as to Kossuth's striving to concentrate in his person all power and authority, is, I fear, indicative of the animus which prompted M. Szemere to write these letters, namely, jealousy of his great countryman. The charge, however, is entirely without foundation: and the only question is, as to how Kossuth acquired such unbounded influence over his countrymen of every rank and station. The means by which Kossuth gained such an ascendancy over his colleagues, M. Szemere himself must own, were, the implicit confidence the country placed in his patriotism, and the conviction it had acquired of his genius and indefatigable activity. In moments of extreme danger no name was heard but that of Kossuth. I am far from asserting that all Kossuth has done is exempt from censure; but it must, on the other hand, be admitted that all that was grand in our revolution happened by his instrumentality. His mere appearance, as, for instance, in Debreczin, January, 1849, when the second danger seemed to overwhelm the country, roused the frightened people of the Thesis, who crowded under the national standard and shattered to pieces the Austrian forces.
The fall of Hungary can only be traced to the following three circumstances:—1st. That it was not believed that European diplomacy would allow Russian intervention. 2d. That our plan of warfare, directed by the council of war, and not by Kossuth, wanted that concentration which could alone have ensured success. 3d. That the character of Görgei, whom our generals never accused of treacherous designs, was a mystery: nay, the patriotic General Perczel, who proclaimed loudly Görgei's treachery from the very beginning, had the satisfaction to be laughed at and hooted down. To impute these disastrous circumstances to Kossuth alone, is to render one's self guilty of the greatest perversion of generally acknowledged and incontrovertible facts.