The Political Future of India

by Lala Lajpat Rai

“We have to provide for two other possibilities. Cases may occur in which the Legislative Assembly refuses leave to the introduction of a Bill or throws out a Bill which the Government regarded as necessary. For such a contingency we would provide that if leave to introduce a Government Bill is refused, or if the Bill is thrown out at any stage, the Government should have the power, on the certificate of the Governor General in Council that the Bill is essential to the interests of peace, order, or good government, to refer it de novo to the Council of State; and if the Bill, after being taken in all its stages through the Council of State, was passed by that body, it would become law without further reference to the Assembly. Further, there may be cases when the consideration of a measure by both chambers would take too long if the emergency which called for the measure is to be met. Such a contingency should rarely arise; but we advise that in cases of emergency, so certified by the Governor General in Council, it should be open to the Government to introduce a Bill in the Council of State, and upon its being passed there merely to report it to the Assembly.”

IV. Powers of dissolution, etc.: “The Governor General should in our opinion have power at any time to dissolve either the Legislative Assembly or the Council of State or both these bodies. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that the Governor General and the Secretary of State should retain their existing powers of assent, reservation, and disallowance to all Acts of the Indian legislature. The present powers of the Governor General in Council under section 71 of the Government of India Act. 1915, to make regulations proposed by local Governments for the peace and good government of backward tracts of territory should also be preserved; with the modification that it will in future rest with the Head of the province concerned to propose such regulations to the Government of India.”

V. Fiscal legislation: “Fiscal legislation will, of course, be subject to the procedure which we have recommended in respect of Government Bills. The budget will be introduced in the Legislative Assembly but the Assembly will not vote it. Resolutions upon budget matters and upon all other questions, whether moved in the Assembly or in the Council of State, will continue to be advisory in character.”

(d) Privy Council: “We have a further recommendation to make. We would ask that His Majesty may be graciously pleased to approve the institution of a Privy Council for India.... The Privy Council’s office would be to advise the Governor General when he saw fit to consult it on questions of policy and administration.”

(e) Periodic commissions: “At the end of the last chapter we recommended that ten years after the institution of our reforms, and again at intervals of twelve years thereafter, a commission approved by Parliament should investigate the working of the changes introduced into the provinces, and recommend as to their further progress. It should be equally the duty of the commission to examine and report upon the new constitution of the Government of India, with particular reference to the working of the machinery for representation, the procedure by certificate, and the results of joint sessions.”

III

India Office in London

The principal proposals under this head may be thus summarized;

“We advise that the Secretary of State’s salary, like that of all other Ministers of the Crown, should be defrayed from home revenues and voted annually by Parliament. This will enable any live questions of Indian administration to be discussed by the House of Commons in Committee of Supply.... It might be thought to follow that the whole charges of the India Office establishment should similarly be transferred to the home Exchequer; but this matter is complicated by a series of past transactions, and by the amount of agency work which the India Office does on behalf of the Government of India; and we advise that our proposed committee upon the India Office organization should examine it and taking these factors into consideration, determine which of the various India Office charges should be so transferred, and which can legitimately be retained as a burden on Indian revenues.