(1) That a system of reserved and transferred subjects similar to that proposed for the provinces, shall be adopted for the Central Government.
(2) That the reserved subjects shall be foreign affairs (excepting relations with the colonies and dominions) army, navy, and relations with Indian Ruling Princes, and subject to the declaration of rights contained in resolution IV, the matters directly affecting public peace, tranquillity and defence of the country, and all other subjects shall be transferred subjects.

(3) The allotments required for reserved subjects should be the first charge on the revenues.
(4) The procedure for the adoption of the budget should be on the lines laid down for the provinces.
(5) All legislation should be by Bills introduced into the Legislative Assembly, provided that, if, in the case of reserved subjects, the Legislative Council does not pass such measures as the Government may deem necessary, the Governor General-in-Council may provide for the same by regulations, such regulations to be in force for one year but not to be renewed unless 40 per cent. of the members of the Assembly present and voting are in favour of them.
(6) There shall be no Council of State, but if the Council of State is to be constituted, at least half of its total strength shall consist of elected members, and that procedure by certification shall be confined to the reserved subjects.
(7) At least half the number of Executive Councillors (if there be more than one) in charge of reserved subjects should be Indians.
(8) The number of members of the Legislative Assembly should be raised to 150 and the proportion of the elected members should be four-fifths.
(9) The President and the Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly should be elected by the Assembly.
(10) The Legislative Assembly should have power to make or modify its own rules of business and they shall not require the sanction of the Governor General.

(11) There shall be an obligation to convene meetings of the Council and Assembly at stated intervals, or on the requisition of a certain proportion of members.
(12) A statutory guarantee should be given that full responsible government should be established in the whole of British India within a period not exceeding 15 years.
(13) That there should be no Privy Council for the present.		 (V) (a) ‘This Conference, while making due allowance for the necessities or drawbacks of transitional scheme, urges that, having regard to the terms of the announcement of August 20, 1917, and in order that the progress of India towards the goal of a self-governing unit of the British Empire may be facilitated and not unduly delayed or hampered, as also with a view to avoid the untoward consequences of a legislature containing a substantially elected popular element being allowed merely to indulge in criticism unchecked by responsibility, it is essential that the principle of responsible government’ should be introduced also in the Government of India, simultaneously with a similar reform in the provinces. There should, therefore, be a division of functions in the Central Government into ‘reserved’ and ‘transferred’ as a part of the present instalment of reforms and the Committee on division of functions should be instructed to investigate the subject and make recommendations.
(b) While, as suggested above, some measures of transfer of power to the Indian Legislature should be introduced at the commencement, provision should be made for future progress towards complete responsible government of the Government of India by specifically authorizing the proposed periodic Commissions to inquire into the matter and to recommend to Parliament such further advance as may be deemed necessary or desirable in that behalf.
(c) The power of certification given to the Governor-General should be limited to matters involving the defence of the country’s foreign and political relations, and peace and order and should not be extended to ‘good government’ generally or ‘sound financial administration.’
(e) This Conference recommends that the composition of the Council of State should be so altered as to ensure that one half of its total strength shall consist of elected members.
(f) The Indian element in the Executive Government of India should be one-half of the total number of that Government.

Provincial Governments

1. There should be no additionalmembers of the Executive Government without portfolios.
2. From the commencement of the first Council the principleof responsibility of the ministers to the legislature shall come into force.
3. The status and salary of the ministers shall be the sameas that of the members of Executive Council.
4. At least half the number of Executive Councillors in chargeof reserved subjects (if there be more than one) should be Indians.
5. The Budget shall be under the control of the Legislaturesubject to the contribution to the Government of India, and during the life-time of thereformed Councils, to the allocation of a fixed sum for the reserved subjects; and shouldfresh taxation be necessary, it should be imposed by the provincialGovernments, as a whole for both transferred and reserved subjects.		 (e) The proposal to appointan additional Member or Membersfrom among the seniorofficials, without portfolios andwithout vote for purposes ofconsultation and advice only,but as Members of the ExecutiveGovernment, in the provinces should be dropped.
(1)
(a) The status and emoluments of Ministers should beidentical with those of Executive Councillors, and the Governorshould not have greater power of control over them than overthe latter.
(b) Whatever power may be given to the Governor-in-Councilto interfere with the decisions of the Governor and Ministers onthe ground of their possible effects on the administration ofthe reserved subjects, corresponding power should be givento the Governor and Ministers in respect of decisions of theGovernor-in-Council affecting directly or indirectly the administrationof the transferred subjects.
(d) Heads of provincial Governments in the major provincesshould ordinarily be selected from the ranks of publicmen in the United Kingdom.
(e) No administrative control over subjects vested inprovincial Governments should be ‘reserved’ in the centralGovernment particularly in respect of ‘transferred’ heads.
(f) The Government of India should have no power to make asupplementary levy upon theprovinces; they may only takeloans from the latteron occasions of emergency.
(2) This Conference recommends that the largest possible number of subjects should beincluded in the ‘transferred’ list in every province as theprogress and conditions of each province may justify and that none mentioned in the IllustrativeList No. 11 appended to the Report should, as far as possible, be ‘reserved’ in anyprovince.
IX (c) The Legislative Councils should have the right to elect their own Presidents andVice-Presidents.
VIII (b) The elected element in the Provincial LegislativeCouncils should be four-fifths of the total strength of the Councilsat least in the more advanced provinces.
IX. 1 (a) It should be provided that when a Council isdissolved by the Governor, a fresh election should be held andthe new Council summoned not later than four months after the dissolution.
VIII (a) The Franchise should be as wide and the compositionof the Legislative Council should be as liberal as circumstancesmay admit in each province, the number of representatives of thegeneral territorial electorates being fixed in every case at notless than one-half of the whole council.
(c) The franchise should be so broad and the electorates so devised as to secure to all classesof tax-payers their due representation by election and the interests of those communitiesor groups of communities in Madras and the Bombay Deccan and elsewhere who at presentdemand special electoral protection should be adequately safeguardedby introducing a system of plural constituencies in whicha reasonable number of seats should be reserved for those communities.
(e) In the case of any community for which separate special electorates may be deemed atpresent necessary, participation in the general territorial electorates,whether as voters or candidates, should not be permitted.
(f) It shall be left to the option of an individual belonging to a community which is givenseparate representation to enrol himself as a voter either in the general or the communal electorate.
Legislature
1. While holding that the people are ripe for the introductionof full provincial autonomy the Congress is yet prepared with a view to facilitating thepassage of the Reforms, to leave the departments of Law, Police and Justice, (prisonsexcepted) in the hands of the Executive Government in all provinces for a period of sixyears. Executive and Judicial Departments must be separated at once.
2. The President and the Vice-Presidentshould be elected by the Council.
3. That the proposal to institute a Grand Committee shall be dropped. The ProvincialLegislative Council shall legislate in respect of all matters within the jurisdiction of provincialGovernment, including Law, Justice and Police but where the Government is notsatisfied with the decision of the Legislative Council in respect of matters relating to Law,Justice and Police, it shall be open to the Government to refer the matter to the Governmentof India. The Government of India may refer the matter to the Indian Legislatureand the ordinary procedure shall follow. But if Grand Committees are instituted, this Congressis of opinion, that not less than one-half of the strength shall be elected by the Legislative Assembly.
4. The proportion of elected members in the Legislative Council shall be four fifths.
Elections
5. Whenever the Legislative Assembly, the Council of State, or the Legislative Council is dissolved, it shall beobligatory on the Government as the case may be, to order the necessary elections, and to resummon the body dissolved within a periodof three months from the date of dissolution.
6. The Legislative Assembly should have power to make ormodify its own rules of business and they shall not require the sanctionof the Governor-General.
7. There should be an obligation to convene meetings of theCouncil and Assembly at stated intervals, or on the requisitionof a certain proportion of members of the Assembly.
8. No dissolution of the legislature shall take place exceptby way of an appeal to the electorate and the reason shallbe stated in writing countersigned by the Ministers.

Parliament and India Office

(e) The control of Parliament and of the Secretary of State must only be modified as the responsibility of the Indian and provincial Governments to the electorates is increased. No power over provincial Governments now exercised by Parliament and by the Secretary of State must be transferred to the Government of India, save in matters of routine administration until the latter is responsible to the electorates.
(d) No financial or administrative powers in regard to reserved subjects should be transferred to the provincial Governments until such time as they are made responsible regarding them to electorates, and until then the control of Parliament and the Secretary of State should continue.
(b) The Council of India shall be abolished, and there shall be two permanent Undersecretaries to assist the Secretary of State for India, one of whom shall be an Indian.
(c) All charges in respect to the India Office establishment shall be placed on the British estimates.
(d) The committee to be appointed to examine and report on the present constitution of the Council of India shall contain an adequate Indian element.		 (XI) This Conference, while generally approving of the proposals embodied in the Report regarding the India Office and Parliamentary control, urges:—
(a) That the administrative control of Parliament over the Government of India exercised through the Secretary of State should continue except in so far as the control of the legislature on the spot is substituted for the present Parliamentary control.
(d) That until the India Council can be abolished by substituting Indian control for the control of Parliament over the affairs of India, it should be a mere advisory body with its strength reduced to 8 members, four of whom should be Indians.
(c) That at least a major part of the cost of the India Office should be borne by the British Exchequer.
(b) That Indian opinion should be represented on the Committee appointed to report upon the organisation of the India Office and the evidence of Indian witnesses invited.

Mahomedan Representation

Resolution VII. The proportion of Mahomedans in the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly as laid down in the Congress-League Scheme must be maintained. (VIII) (d) Mahomedan representation in every legislature should be in the proportions mentioned in the Scheme adopted by the Congress and the Muslim League at Lucknow in 1916.

Army Commissions

Resolution XII. This Congress places on record its deep disappointment at the altogether inadequate response made by the Government to the demand for the grant of commissions to Indians in the army, and is of opinion that steps should be immediately taken so as to enable the grant to Indians at an early date of at least 25 per cent. of the commissions in the army, the proportions to be gradually increased to 50 per cent. within a period of ten years. (b) This Conference strongly urges that Indians should be nominated to 20 per cent., to start with, of King’s commissions in the Indian Army and that adequate provision for training them should be made in this country itself.

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