Before I conclude my remarks upon this part of the subject, allow me to make them obvious to the capacity of each of you, by one example. Suppose an individual told me, that this pen, which I now hold in my hand, was in reality a man; why, I should instantly deny the assertion, and say, this is impossible; for the united testimony of my senses and my reason tells me, that this pen is not a man, as it has neither the appearances nor properties of a man—that my senses and reason are the gifts of God—that, therefore, they cannot deceive me, with regard to an object so palpable, so perceptible to their powers, and that therefore I conclude, this pen is not a man. But, should the supposed individual go farther and say, “I would not tell you a lie, and will prove by miracles that the pen which you hold in your hand is really a man.” Miracles I would say! Is it not my senses that are to judge of your miracles; and if my senses deceive me with regard to this pen, what is to prevent them from deceiving me also with regard to your miracles; for if they be deceived in one case, a similar reason may imply deceit in the other? Therefore that the miracles of our Lord may not be exposed to uncertainty—that the death, resurrection and ascension of our Redeemer may not be liable to doubt—that the certainty of all human knowledge—the very consciousness of our own being, and that the very existence of the Deity may not be rendered dubious; in fine, that a doubt as to all things, and a belief as to nothing, may not follow, it is necessary to believe, that the senses could not deceive us with regard to objects so perceptible to their powers; and therefore, I consider, that the doctrine of Transubstantiation must be false, as being directly contrary to our senses and most repugnant to our reason.
Among the many reasons that influenced my disbelief as to the doctrine of Transubstantiation, there is another which I have considered to be of no trivial tendency on the subject. I could not conceive that a finite or material substance could be in two or more places at the same instant of time: that is, I could not imagine those years past, that the body of our Saviour, which the resurrection has not deprived of its humanity, could be wholly and substantially in my hands, and wholly and substantially over many portions of the globe, at the same identical moment; for I consider that finite substances, whether glorified or corruptible, must be subject to finite laws and regulations.
I know there are some however who would say, “that according to the principles of metaphysical or philosophical observations, that it could not be proved, that it is impossible for one body to be in many places at the same time.”
But, my friends, a primary truth or self evident principle is not to be lost among the mysterious windings of metaphysical subtleties; and when reason fully comprehends or clearly understands a subject, and pronounces truth over the object of its comprehension, the mad ravings of an unrestrained philosophy are not to be credited, when suggesting a mere suspicion of falsehood. Oh, my friends, to say that the same body could be wholly and substantially in my hands during the time of the mass, and wholly and substantially in the hands of thousands of others at the same identical moment, and to require a belief of such an assertion, would be demanding a complete surrender of common sense—a prostration of the human intellect—while it would be divesting man of that grand attribute, that noble characteristic of his being—I mean reason, which is the pure gift of God.
But Roman Catholics say, “we do not understand the meaning of the Trinity; that is, we do not understand how three persons constitute one God, and therefore say they, though we do not comprehend how the body of Christ could be in many places at the same time, still we should believe.”
But, my friends, there is no comparison between the two cases; for when I assert that three persons constitute the unity of a God, I do not mean to say that they constitute that unity in the self same sense, but that they constitute that unity in a distinct sense; and therefore it is not impossible, nor contradictory to my senses, nor repugnant to my reason to make use of such an assertion. But that three or a thousand material bodies should constitute one body, and that one body should constitute three or thousands of bodies, this is what I consider to be impossible in itself, and most contradictory to my senses and my reason, but of which Transubstantiation requires a firm belief: for a person believing that doctrine, must believe that the body which one priest holds in his hands, wholly and substantially, must be also wholly and substantially in the hands of thousands of others.
But you, Roman Catholics, again say, “we do not know the nature of a glorified body, and therefore you conclude that the glorified body of Christ might be in many places at the same time.”
This seems to me absurd; for though the resurrection had added glory to, still it has not annihilated the humanity of Christ. This is evident, first, from the words of Christ to his Apostles collectively; for when he appeared among them after his resurrection, he said, as is mentioned in Luke xxiv. 39—“Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have.” Therefore the resurrection has not abolished the humanity of our Saviour. Again, our Saviour said to Thomas, as is mentioned in John xx. 27—“Reach hither thy finger and behold my hand; and reach hither thy hand and thrust it into my side.” Therefore, from these two passages, the one addressed by our Saviour to the Apostles collectively, and the other to St. Thomas individually, it is evident that the resurrection has not abolished the humanity of Christ, but that he has flesh and bones like us, even in his glorified state. If he has flesh and bones like us (as has been already proved to you,) his body must necessarily be a finite substance—if a finite, or what is the same, a limited substance, it must necessarily be subject to finite or limited laws—if subject to limited laws, it cannot be consequently in many places at the same time. Therefore the belief as to Transubstantiation must be false.
But, my friends, more of you, Roman Catholics, say upon this subject, “that as the body of our Saviour entered into the room where the Apostles were assembled together, though the windows and doors were closed at the time, that therefore the body of our Saviour was and can be in many places at the same time.”—The answer to this is plain; for in order that this objection would hold good on the present occasion, it would be necessary to shew that when the body of our Saviour was in the room with the Apostles, it was also in another or a thousand different places at the same instant of time. Many natural reasons also could be given as to how the body of our Saviour might have entered the room of the Apostles without their perceiving him enter, or without supposing that his body was in many places at the same time.
There are more Roman Catholics who, in endeavouring to explain the mode by which our Saviour’s body might be present in many places at the same time, assert, “that as our Saviour fed the multitude of the five thousand with five loaves, without any increase as to the number of the loaves, that therefore our Saviour’s body could, by a similar mode of reasoning, be received by many at the same instant.” [30] But, my friends, in order that this argument would hold good in the present instance, it would be necessary that each of the multitude referred to would eat an entire loaf wholly and substantially, without part or parcel; for Roman Catholics hold, that it is not a part of our Saviour’s body, but the whole of his body, which is taken by each individual, on receiving their sacrament.